Davis v. Davis

4 Citing cases

  1. Canady v. Canady

    687 S.W.2d 833 (Ark. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    The reasons given must be sufficiently specific. See e.g. Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980); Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982). Both parties were previously married.

  2. Wright v. Langdon

    623 S.W.2d 823 (Ark. 1981)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that it is proper to do so "to deter those who might be otherwise tempted to profess a competence they have no right to claim"

    Even if we could say otherwise, and that the misstatement was error affecting the result, chancery cases are tried de novo and even if the chancellor improperly applied the law, if he reached the right result we affirm. Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980). II.

  3. Hollinger v. Hollinger

    65 Ark. App. 110 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the combined effect of the mother's move, the desires of the children to stay in their original location, and the long passage of time between the divorce decree and the modification, amounted to a material change in circumstances.

    [3] We begin with the statement that on appeal of a chancery decision we review the case de novo, and if the chancellor's decision can be sustained on grounds other than those he made, we will affirm. O'Neal v. Ellison, 266 Ark. 702, 587 S.W.2d 580 (1979); Pharris v. Vanderpool, 230 Ark. 233, 266 S.W.2d 702 (1959); Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980). With that said, we find that the chancellor may have misapplied what may constitute a material change in circumstances in this case — the marriage of the father and the move of the mother.

  4. Jones v. Jones

    705 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    In Jones v. Jones, 17 Ark. App. 144, 705 S.W.2d 447 (1986), we upheld when the chancellor, in dividing marital property unequally, stated he was relying on the reasons cited in Section 34-1214(A)(1), and stated the main reasons were that it was appellee who contributed to the acquisition of her own pension plan and individual retirement account, and appellant was able to support himself.

    Appellant contends the chancellor's mechanical recitation of his reasons does not comply with the statute. For this proposition, appellant cites Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (1980), and Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982), which held when marital assets are not divided equally the chancellor is required by statute to state in writing the reasons for not so dividing the marital property. Davis and Glover, however, are distinguishable from the present case, because they were decided prior to the 1983 amendment to Section 34-1214.