The reasons given must be sufficiently specific. See e.g. Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980); Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982). Both parties were previously married.
Even if we could say otherwise, and that the misstatement was error affecting the result, chancery cases are tried de novo and even if the chancellor improperly applied the law, if he reached the right result we affirm. Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980). II.
[3] We begin with the statement that on appeal of a chancery decision we review the case de novo, and if the chancellor's decision can be sustained on grounds other than those he made, we will affirm. O'Neal v. Ellison, 266 Ark. 702, 587 S.W.2d 580 (1979); Pharris v. Vanderpool, 230 Ark. 233, 266 S.W.2d 702 (1959); Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.App. 1980). With that said, we find that the chancellor may have misapplied what may constitute a material change in circumstances in this case — the marriage of the father and the move of the mother.
Appellant contends the chancellor's mechanical recitation of his reasons does not comply with the statute. For this proposition, appellant cites Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (1980), and Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982), which held when marital assets are not divided equally the chancellor is required by statute to state in writing the reasons for not so dividing the marital property. Davis and Glover, however, are distinguishable from the present case, because they were decided prior to the 1983 amendment to Section 34-1214.