Davis v. Davis

2 Citing cases

  1. Budri v. Humphreys

    NO. 02-18-00070-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 9, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    Because Budri's motion to postpone was not verified or supported by an affidavit and because it did not state any reason demonstrating the need for a continuance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying it. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251; see also, e.g., Hartwell v. Lone Star, PCA, 528 S.W.3d 750, 758 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. abated) (recognizing "[a] lack of diligence on the part of a party or its attorney is sufficient grounds for denying a motion for a continuance" and overruling appeal of denial of motion for continuance); Davis v. Davis, No. 2-00-436-CV, 2003 WL 1564824, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming denial of motion for continuance when used solely for delay); Arvedson v. Luby, 498 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1973, no writ) (holding no abuse of discretion when trial court denied an application for continuance that "was neither verified nor supported by affidavit" as required by rule 251 because "[b]efore the trial court may exercise its discretion there must be a motion presented in conformity with Rule 251"). We overrule Budri's fourth issue.

  2. Lipsitz v. McCurley

    No. 05-11-00714-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 22, 2013)

    We agree with appellees that Melvin did not have standing to maintain these claims against them. See Double S Petroleum Ltd. v. Super Circle 7 Stores, Inc., No. 07-07-0278-CV, 2008 WL 4192709, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding party did not have standing to challenge attorney's fees award based on attorneys' contingency fee contract with another party); Davis v. Davis, No. 2-00-436-CV, 2003 WL 1564824, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant, in his capacity as trustee of a family trust, did not have standing to challenge award of attorney's fees assessed against him individually). The postmarital agreement provided that Marcie would hold Melvin "and his property harmless from, and shall indemnify [Melvin] against all liabilities and obligations of" Marcie "which have been previously incurred or which will be incurred in the future."