Opinion
NO. 4:03-CV-0293-A
January 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendant City of Hurst, Texas ("Hurst") for summary judgment. The court, having considered the motion, the response of plaintiff Samuel John Major Davis ("Davis"), the reply, the summary judgment evidence, the record, and applicable authorities, finds that the motion should be granted.
I. The Remaining Claim in This Action
The only claim remaining in this action is that Hurst was deliberately indifferent to Davis's medical needs while he was incarcerated in its jail. In his amended complaint, filed July 15, 2003, Davis alleges: He was arrested on October 4, 2002, and taken to Hurst's jail. Hurst did not have any medical personnel on duty at the jail, but relied upon the Hurst fire department paramedics to provide medical care for inmates. Hurst did not have a food service system to prepare necessary medical diets; hence, Davis went without eating for seven days. Davis takes seven types of medicine daily for diabetes, a thyroid disorder, arthritis, high blood pressure, a prostate condition, and a heart condition. Because there were no safeguards to protect him, Davis suffered a stroke a few days after being arrested. Pls.' First Am. Civil Compl. at 4-5.
II. Summary Judgment Motion
Hurst contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment that Davis take nothing on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
III. Applicable Summary Judgment Principles
A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support [s] [its] claim[s]." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1984).
The standard for granting a summary judgment is the same as the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. See also Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (explaining the standard to be applied in determining whether the court should enter judgment on motions for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
IV. Law Pertinent to the Remaining Claim
Pretrial detainees are entitled to "reasonable medical care" unless the failure to supply the medical care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental function. See Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1990); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1987). As noted inCupit, pretrial detainees, because they have not been adjudged guilty, are entitled to protection from adverse conditions of confinement created by prison officials for a punitive purpose or with punitive intent. 835 F.2d at 85.
Summary judgment is proper in actions alleging deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a convicted prisoner or failure to provide "reasonable medical care" to a pretrial detainee if the materials before the court fail to raise genuine issues as to the facts that would indicate a denial of medical care. See Cupit, 835 F.2d at 85; Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Neither inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care nor carelessness constitute a constitutional wrong. Dickson v. Colman, 569 F.2d 1310, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978). And, the mere fact that a plaintiff did not receive the treatment he desired does not raise a genuine issue for trial. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
Hurst can be sued and subjected to monetary damages under § 1983 only if its official policy or custom caused Davis to be deprived of a federally protected right. Bd. of County Comm's v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Hurst cannot be held liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Id.; Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To support a claim based on the existence of a custom or policy, Davis must plead facts to show that: (1) a policy or custom existed; (2) governmental policymakers actually or constructively knew of its existence; (3) a constitutional violation occurred; and (4) the custom or policy served as the moving force behind the violation. Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1996). Davis must establish that his claims are based on Hurst's official policy, not the policy of an individual official. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984). In sum, "municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — the deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986).
V. Law Applied to the Facts
Contrary to the allegation in the amended complaint, the summary judgment evidence establishes that Davis was in Hurst's jail for only two days. See Hurst's App. at 007; Davis's App. at 4-5. The only fact issue Davis raises is whether Hurst properly performed a medical screening review when he was booked into the jail. He does not, however, present any summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine fact issue as to whether Hurst was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, i.e., subjectively intended to cause him harm. See Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000). There is no evidence that Davis made Hurst aware of an excessive risk to his health and safety. Whether Hurst had a screening policy that it failed to comply with or had a policy of failing to screen inmates, there is no evidence that any policy caused Davis to suffer any harm. As Davis himself pleaded, Hurst relied on its paramedics to handle medical needs and the summary judgment evidence establishes that Davis was taken to John Peter Smith Hospital after suffering a stroke. There is no allegation that he was not timely transported to the hospital. Moreover, there is no evidence that he suffered any harm as a result of the alleged failure to provide him a particular diet. For the reasons discussed herein, Davis has failed to raise a genuine fact issue as to deliberate indifference by Hurst.
VI. ORDER
The court ORDERS that Hurst's motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted; that Davis take nothing on his claim against Hurst arising out of his confinement in the Hurst jail; and, that such claim be, and is hereby, dismissed with prejudice.