However, reason and the principle of stare decisis "dictate at least a minimal comparison of decisional fact patterns." Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 236, 243 (1983). Such a comparison reveals that "where the courts of our State have upheld the finding of a parent's unfitness on the ground of failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to a child's welfare, or in cases where a contrary finding has been reversed, the parents involved have made comparatively fewer attempts to contact their children over comparatively longer periods."

Supreme Court Rule 604(f) does not mandate that a defendant file an interlocutory appeal; rather, by using the work "may" it merely provides a defendant with the option of doing so. The issue of waiver under Supreme Court Rule 604(f) is one of first impression; however, the reasoning employed by the appellate court in its decision in Davis v. Bughdadi (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 236, 458 N.E.2d 177, is persuasive, despite the fact that Davis is a civil case and the instant case is a criminal case. The court in Davis adjudicated the waiver question as to Supreme Court Rule 307(a), which provides as follows: "An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from any interlocutory order of court * * *." (87 Ill.2d R. 307(a).)

Prior to considering this issue, we must address the preliminary issue of whether the respondent could wait until the conclusion of the adoption proceeding to appeal from the interim order or whether he is barred from seeking review at this time because of his failure to file an interlocutory appeal of that order under Supreme Court Rule 307 (87 Ill.2d R. 307). While the petitioner-appellee asserts that the respondent could not wait until the conclusion of the adoption proceeding to appeal from the interim order terminating rights, this court, in Davis v. Bughdadi (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 236, 76 Ill.Dec. 38, 458 N.E.2d 177, held that Rule 307 is not the exclusive mechanism for appealing an interim order terminating parental rights but that an appeal of such an order may be taken at the time of the final judgment in the adoption proceeding. The Davis court distinguished the case of In re Workman, (1978), 56 Ill.App.3d 1007, 14 Ill.Dec. 908, 373 N.E.2d 39, aff'd, 76 Ill.2d 256, 28 Ill.Dec. 541, 390 N.E.2d 900, relied upon by the petitioner here, which held that one whose parental rights had been terminated in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 37, par. 705-9) could not seek restoration of those rights by means of a petition to modify after the time for appeal had expired.

) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 26, par. 9-504.) Nowhere in the body of the section is reference made to disposition by any other party, and since "[a] construction of a statute, variant from the strict and literal meaning, is justified only upon the ground that it effectuates the intention of the legislature manifestly disclosed by a consideration of the whole context" (emphasis added) ( Davis v. Bughdadi (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 236, 241, 458 N.E.2d 177, 180), we do not believe section 9-504 may be interpreted to include dispositions otherwise not within the statute which are neither specifically referred to in the body of the statute nor encompassed by the caption. Although our research has found little case law which specifically addresses the application of the notice requirement where the collateral was not disposed of by the secured party, courts presented with the issue have generally rejected such an interpretation with little comment.

The rule, however, does not require that a party appeal from an interlocutory order of the circuit court denying a stay of arbitration. Under the rule, the party has the option of waiting until after final judgment has been entered to seek review of the circuit court's interlocutory order. See Anderson v. Financial Matters, Inc., 285 Ill. App.3d 123, 135 (1996); Alpine Bank v. Yancy, 274 Ill. App.3d 766, 768 (1995); Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App.3d 236, 241 (1983). The optional nature of Rule 307 is manifest from the language it employs.

"The fact that a custodial parent denies or hinders the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent may be a significant element weighing against the clear and convincing determination of the noncustodial parent's indifference to his or her child." Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill.App.3d 236, 243 (1983).

consideration. Id. "Such a comparison reveals that 'where the courts of our State have upheld the finding of a parent's unfitness on the ground of failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to a child's welfare, or in cases where a contrary finding has been reversed, the parents involved have made comparatively fewer attempts to contact their children over comparatively longer periods' " Id. (quoting Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 236, 243, 458 N.E.2d 177, 181 (1983)).¶ 64 3. The Trial Court's Finding in This Case

We have reviewed the cases and find them distinguishable. ¶ 47 For example, In re Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 236, 238-39 (1983), is distinguishable solely on the basis that it concerns a non-custodial parent's visitation privileges ordered in the judgment for dissolution of marriage. See also Blakey v. Blakey, 72 Ill. App. 3d 946, 948 (1979) (reservation of child support and visitation in the divorce decree did not amount to unfitness).

The failure to file a timely appeal from the contempt order imposing sanctions deprives this court of jurisdiction to review the merits of the contempt order of March 31, 2003, the denial of the motion to vacate the contempt, dated May 22, 2003, and the initial rule to show cause entered January 13, 2003. See Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1036 (2001); Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240 (1983). Appellants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order in which the court found that appellants failed to purge the contempt.

Similarly, interference by other third parties has been held to be a reasonable excuse for failure to visit a child. ( Davis v. Bughdadi (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 236, 458 N.E.2d 177 (custodial parent hindered visitation rights of noncustodial parent); Bryant v. Lenza (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 275, 412 N.E.2d 1154 (foster parents prevented incarcerated father from contacting his children).) The defendant does not allege any wrongful conduct by a third party which prevented him from contacting his sons.