ELFVIN, District Judge. In this employment discrimination action plaintiff's motion for class action certification had been denied by this Court February 20, 1985 as untimely under rule 8(c) of the Local Rules of Practice of this Court, 613 F. Supp. 462. Plaintiff now has moved for reconsideration of such decision. Having considered plaintiff's motion, counsel for defendants' acknowledgement June 3, 1984 that the prior motion had been timely made under said rule, and having reviewed the Complaint, Amended Complaint and class certification motion in question, it is hereby
In addition, the Court finds that there exists a substantial identity between the defendants named in the SDHR/EEOC charges and the DOPR. See Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr., 613 F. Supp. 462, 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding sufficient identity of interest between a community mental health center and state agencies such that failure to name state agencies in EEOC charge did not bar Title VII action). Accordingly, the Court finds that the claim against the DOPR is not procedurally barred.
It seems plain to this court that Blesedell's claim of constructive discharge is reasonably related to her original complaint as they both address the same course of discrimination. See Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center, 613 F. Supp. 462 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing the addition of a discharge claim, inter alia, to the original claim of racial and gender discrimination regarding transfers and promotions), vacated in part on other grounds, 623 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). Consequently, Mobil's motion for partial summary judgment against Blesedell on the grounds that her constructive discharge claim was not presented to the state or federal agencies is denied.
Moreover, the complaint in a civil action may properly encompass any discrimination similar to or reasonably related to the charges filed with the EEOC. Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir. 1971); Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr., 613 F. Supp. 462, 468, vacated on other grounds, 623 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). However, the civil complaint may not include new and unrelated types of discrimination.
" In response to defendant's contention that plaintiff has failed to follow administrative prerequisites to filing suit on the three claims, plaintiff argues that these claims were presented to the EEOC in the December 1984 charge and June 1985 amendment, or if not, that these claims are "reasonably related" to that charge, citing Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center, 613 F. Supp. 462, 468 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). The charge and amendment do not contain any allegations apprising the reader of a claim premised upon sexual discrimination.
Even in the Title VII context, however, Bailey is the minority position. See Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center, 613 F. Supp. 462, 465-66 (W.D.N.Y.), modified on other grounds, 623 F. Supp. 19 (1985). Courts have noted, nevertheless, that the precise scope of the applicability of Rule 6(a) remains unsettled.
See Sounds Express Int'l, Ltd., 101 F.R.D. at 697 ("[I]dentity of interests has also served as touchstone for determining whether the new party knew or should have known that `but for' a mistake in identity, he would have been sued in the first instance.") The notice requirement of 15(c)(1) and the knowledge requirement of 15(c)(2) are distinct, and the identity of interest doctrine properly applies only to the notice requirement. See, e.g., Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102-03 (1st Cir. 1979); Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center, 613 F. Supp. 462, 467 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). We do not, therefore, find persuasive those cases which allow relation back of an amended complaint based on a mistake in "selecting" the original defendants.