Opinion
20-1557
10-07-2022
DARLENE J. DAVIS, Debtor - Appellant, v. CARL M. BATES, Trustee - Appellee.
Darlene J. Davis, Appellant Pro Se.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: September 23, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:19-cv-00388-MHL)
Darlene J. Davis, Appellant Pro Se.
Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM.
Darlene J. Davis seeks to appeal the district court's orders dismissing her appeal of the bankruptcy court's orders and denying her motion for reconsideration. In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court's final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). See Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(1). "[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement." Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court's order was entered on the docket on April 3, 2020. The notice of appeal was filed on May 11, 2020. Because Davis failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction, we also deny Davis' motion to reverse decision on appeal or stay pending appeal and her motion to set aside a foreclosure sale. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
In our August 31, 2021 Order remanding this case, we concluded that Davis' postjudgment motion was properly construed as a motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 8022 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. As that motion served to toll the appeal period from the underlying dismissal order, we also concluded that the order disposing of Davis's postjudgment motion commenced the appeal period relevant to both orders.
In our August 31, 2021 Order, we concluded that, insofar as Davis' February 12, 2020 "Objection" purported to act as a conditional notice of appeal, her Objection did not manifest an intent to appeal sufficient to warrant its characterization as a notice of appeal.
On January 20, 2022, the district court denied Davis' request for an extension of the appeal period.
DISMISSED.