Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1305.
September 13, 2004
ORDER AND OPINION
I. Introduction
In this action, plaintiff Norman S. Davis has asserted counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging racial discrimination in the form of disparate treatment, a hostile work environment and constructive discharge. He has also asserted state law claims of tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. His wife, Marilyn Davis, has asserted a claim for loss of consortium. Defendant Alcoa Mill Products, Inc., ("Alcoa"), has filed a motion for partial dismissal of the case under Fed.R.Civ.Pr. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Alcoa's motion will be granted.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). A motion to dismiss may be granted only when it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of acts which could be proved. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999).
III. Discussion
A. Tortious Interference With Contract
Count IX of Davis's complaint states a claim for tortious interference with contract based upon the actions of defendants Wetzel, Isacc and Null — all Alcoa employees — which allegedly interfered with Davis's employment relationship with Alcoa. Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 49-51. In its motion, Alcoa argues that this count should be dismissed for two reasons.
First, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained, a cause of action for tortious interference with contract requires three parties; a plaintiff, a defendant, and a third party with whom the plaintiff had contracted. Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa.Super. 1996). Wetzel, Isacc and Null were all Alcoa employees acting in the course of their employment. Therefore, there is no defendant who is separate from Alcoa, which, itself, is a defendant in this matter.
Secondly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated in Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269, 1279 (Pa.Super. 1998), that "an action for intentional interference with performance of a contract in the employment context applies only to interference with a prospective employment relationship, whether at-will or not, not a presently existing at-will employment relationship." Davis seeks relief for interference with an existing at-will relationship.
Alcoa's analysis of the relevant law appears to be correct.See, also, Buckwalter v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-4795, 1998 WL 195701 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1998), and Black v. The Premier Company, Civ. A. No. 01-4317, 2002 WL 1471717 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 8, 2002). Moreover, in his response, Davis has not contested this portion of Alcoa's motion. Accordingly, I will dismiss Count IX of Davis's Complaint.
B. Denials of Promotion in 1997 and 2000
Davis has claimed that he was improperly denied promotions in 1997 and 2000. Complaint at ¶¶ 22-27. Alcoa points out that the two-year statute of limitations for these acts had run by the time Davis filed this case. It quotes National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Morgan, where the United States Supreme Court wrote: "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." 536 U.S. 101, 113-114 (2002).
On this issue, as well, Davis has not contested Alcoa's position. I will therefore dismiss the portions of Davis's complaint which seek relief for the 1997 and 2000 failures to promote.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Davis's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is set forth at Count X of his complaint. In it, he alleges:
Defendants Wetzel, Null, and Isacc committed the common law tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress because from 1993 to 2002, Defendants engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination against Davis which included unequal pay, disparate treatment, and the fabrication of incidents to create the false appearance that Davis was not properly performing his job. The pattern of Defendants' individual acts and the length of time over which they executed the racial discrimination constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
Complaint at ¶¶ 53 and 54.
Alcoa points out that the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1, et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for employee work-related injuries, and therefore bars claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, except where the acts complained of are "intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment." 77 Pa. C.S.A. § 411(1).
In federal courts considering civil rights actions with pending emotional distress claims, the language quoted above has become known as the "third-party attack" exception to preemption. See, Matczak v. Frankford Candy Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997). Application of this doctrine has varied somewhat, but the Honorable J. Curtis Joyner has provided this useful analysis:
Notwithstanding the various interpretations, the critical inquiry in determining the applicability of the third-party attack exception is whether the attack was motivated by personal reasons, as opposed to generalized contempt or hatred, and was sufficiently unrelated to the work situation so as not to arise out of the employment relationship.Fugarino v. University Services, 123 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (E.D. Pa. 2000); also quoted in DeWyer v. Temple University, Civ. A. No. 00-1664, 2001 WL 115461 at * 5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2001).
In Fugarino, Judge Joyner decided that the third-party attack exception would probably not apply, because most of the harassment alleged by the plaintiff, which included reprimands, criticisms, and searching of her desk, "clearly was work-related." Fugarino, supra. Similarly, in DeWyer, the Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter found the exception not to apply because the Plaintiff there also complained of "reprimands, suspension, criticisms, and requiring [her] to park other than where she desired", which Judge Buckwalter said were "entirely related to the work situation and arose solely from the employment relationship." DeWyer, supra.
Here, just as in Fugarino and DeWyer, Davis has complained only of actions taken in relation to his employment, such has having been interviewed more rigorously than non-minority job candidates, being paid less, not having been provided with a reserved parking space, as well as having been unfairly disciplined, evaluated, blamed for malfunctions at work, suspended and demoted. Complaint at ¶ 15-38. Nothing more personal is alleged.
It is therefore apparent that Davis has not pleaded the sort of facts which would remove his claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress from the category of cases preempted by the Workers' Compensation statute. For this reason, I will order Count X of Davis's Complaint dismissed.
Alcoa has also argued that, even if the third-party attack exception permitted this claim to go forward, Davis's allegations are not of the severity required for this cause of action. Given the extreme behavior required by Pennsylvania courts for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the nature of Davis's allegations, this is most likely true. See, Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 753-54 (Pa. 1998). However, at this early stage of proceedings, I would not dismiss Count X on this basis alone, since it is difficulty to say that no relief would be possible under any set of facts Davis may prove. Conley v. Gibson, supra.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I will enter the following:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed in this matter as Document No. 7, and Plaintiffs' response thereto, I hereby ORDER that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED:
(1) Counts IX and X of Plaintiffs' Complaint are DISMISSED; and
(2) Plaintiffs' claims for recovery for Defendants' failure to promote him in 1997 and 2000 are DISMISSED;