Opinion
No. CV04 0201279 S
February 2, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
Before the court is a motion for judgment requesting dismissal of the plaintiff Emma J. Davis' appeal from a decision of the employment security appeals division board of review (the board). On November 17, 2003, the administrator of the unemployment compensation act, who constitutes the first level of review (the administrator), the defendant, determined that Davis was ineligible for unemployment benefits upon leaving her job with the United States Postal Service. On February 3, 2004, Davis appealed the administrator's decision to the appeals referee. On March 2, 2004, the appeals referee dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Davis had filed the appeal more than twenty-one days after the administrator mailed its decision to her on November 17, 2003.
On the same ground, on May 7, 2004 the board of review dismissed the subsequent appeal that Davis brought from the appeals referee's decision of March 23, 2004. The board determined that, although the administrator's decision was mailed to her on November 17, 2003, Davis had good cause for not filing an appeal with said referee though December 18, 2003, because she had been out of state until then. The board further acknowledged that when Davis finally received notice of the administrator's decision, on December 19, 2003, she did not understand the ruling. Davis become aware that she had been denied benefits in early January, upon contacting a staff member of the administrator. Davis, nonetheless, further delayed her appeal to said referee for one month, until February 3, 2004. The board determined that the fact that, during that time, Davis was taking care of her ill mother and husband did not amount to good cause for her delay in filing the appeal, which they felt she could have done by mail or fax.
On May, 24, 2004, Davis filed the present appeal claiming that she had good cause for filing a late appeal with the appeals referee. On July 22, 2004, the administrator filed a motion for judgment requesting the court to dismiss Davis' appeal.
DISCUSSION
"[T]he remedial purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide relief for its primary beneficiaries, those who are unemployed without fault or for cause . . ." (Citation omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381, 388, 551 A.2d 724 (1988). "[T]he act . . . consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries . . . Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualifaction in doubtful cases. General Statutes § 31-274(c)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Church Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 250 Conn. 297, 306-07, 735 A.2d 805 (1999). "To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence . . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion." (Citations omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 209 Conn. 385-86.
The administrator has moved to have the court dismiss Davis' appeal, arguing that the board's determination that Davis did not have good cause for filing a late appeal was neither illegal nor unreasonable, and that, therefore, the court is bound by the board's finding.
"[A]ppeals within the unemployment compensation system must be taken in a timely fashion and, if they are not, they come `too late' for review." Gumbs v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 9 Conn.App. 131, 133, 517 A.2d 257 (1986). Under General Statutes § 31-241(a), "[t]he decision of the administrator shall be final . . . unless the claimant . . . within twenty-one calendar days after such notification was mailed to his last-known address, files an appeal from such decision . . ." Nonetheless, an untimely appeal "may be considered to be timely filed if the filing party shows good cause, as defined in [the applicable] regulations . . . for the late filing . . ." Id. According to § 31-237g-15(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, the late filing of an appeal to a referee may be excused "if a reasonably prudent individual under the same or similar circumstances would have been prevented from filing a timely appeal. In determining whether good cause has been shown, the Referee shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to . . . (ii) Whether the party was represented; (iii) The degree of the party's familiarity with the procedures of the Appeals Division; (iv) Whether the party received timely and adequate notice of the need to act . . . (vi) Factors outside the control of the party which prevented a timely action; (vii) The party's physical or mental impairment; (viii) Whether the party acted diligently in filing an appeal once the reason for the late filing no longer existed; (ix) Where there is substantial prejudice to an adverse party which prevents such party from adequately presenting its case, the total length of time that the action was untimely . . . (xi) Good faith error, provided that in determining whether good faith error constitutes good cause[,] the Referee shall consider the extent of prejudice to any other party, any prior history of late filing due to such error, whether the appeal is excessively late, and whether the party otherwise acted with due diligence."
On the basis of the record filed by the board of review, the court cannot affirm the board's decision to dismiss Davis' appeal because the board's findings of fact are insufficiently apparent to the court to be deemed supportive of its conclusions. The board excused Davis for her late filing through the day of her return home from out of state, on December 18, 2003. In discussing whether Davis acted diligently after that date, the board then took note of the fact that when she read the administrator's ruling on December 19, 2003, Davis did not understand it. Davis did not become aware that the administrator had denied her benefits until she contacted an administrator staff member by telephone, sometime in "early January 2004." The board also found that Davis then further delayed for one month her appeal, which she filed on February 3. The board determined that Davis did not have good cause for her delay during the latter period, i.e. later January, and concluded that this delay was fatal to her appeal. Thus, the board placed critical weight upon an uncertain date, between "early January" and February 3, 2004.
The board's conclusions of law are flawed as a result of two ambiguities in the decision. First, the board did not indicate whether Davis' failure to understand the administrator's ruling constituted good cause for her delay through the time when she contacted the staff member. Presumably, the board did not discuss this issue because it deemed Davis' further delay until February 3, 2004 to be in itself cause for dismissal of the appeal. That, however, is not necessarily sound due to the temporal ambiguity in the board's rationale regarding "early January," such that, if Davis had good cause until her conversation with the staff member. Then Davis' appeal on February 3 could be a timely one. The board did not specify the exact date on which Davis talked with the staff member. "Early January" might be deemed to embrace some dates before January 15. If the date was January 14, or January 13, for instance, Davis' appeal on February 3, 2004 would be within the 21 days prescribed by § 31-241(a) from the last day on which Davis had good cause for not filing the appeal if one presumes the period of claimed incomprehension to be good cause.
Because of these ambiguities, the board does not sufficiently support the conclusion that Davis filed a late appeal without good cause. The court, therefore, cannot affirm the board's decision to dismiss Davis' appeal. This outcome is warranted by the remedial purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act. which requires that its beneficiaries be favored in construing and applying the Act. See Church Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 250 Conn. 306-07. Accordingly, an unemployment compensation appeal should not be dismissed on procedural grounds in the presence of material ambiguities in the findings of fact and legal conclusions supporting the dismissal. In such a case, the claim of the potential beneficiary of unemployment benefits should be adjudicated on the merits.
The court was not made any further comfortable as to the imprecise timing calculation used by the board by the fact that Davis' proffered excuse (her need to take care of her mother and husband) was deemed wanting for reasons this court also finds rather inadequate. That is to say, if the question on the table is "why did you not file your appeal in (a certain) 30 days" and the answer is "because I was caring for my sick mother and husband," then to say it falls short of constituting sufficient evidence for a finding of good cause is simply to say her answer was merely too short. That answer was obviously intended to say that her obligations left her unable to do the filing. If one were to appropriately reject such a suggestion, ought not it be based upon its inability to pass muster when met skeptically? The record leaves the court wondering whether Davis, a lay person with probably no full understanding of her evidentiary burden, was given the opportunity to fill the void (now seen) of an abundance of possibly compelling detail.
According to Practice Book § 22-9, in an unemployment compensation appeal, "[i]n addition to rendering judgment on the appeal, the court may order the board to remand the case to a referee for any further proceedings deemed necessary by the court. The court may remand the case to the board for proceedings de novo, or for further proceedings on the record, or for such limited purposes as the court may prescribe." See also General Statutes § 31-249b. The board's dismissal prevented Davis' claim to be decided on its merits. The court, therefore, is sustaining Davis' appeal and is ordering the board to remand the case to the appeals referee for further proceedings addressing the merits of Davis' appeal from the initial determination of the administrator.
NADEAU, J.