holders, it held the assets subject to their claims for the value of their stock and the dividends, and since it is alleged that the assets of the former bank were so taken over subject to the obligation to issue stock in exchange for the outstanding stock of the former bank and with full knowledge that the certificate of stock in question was outstanding and owned by the Williams estate and did not issue stock in exchange therefor, it is perfectly plain, I think, that were it not for the fact that there was no one in existence who could represent the Williams estate in tendering the surrender of said certificate or making a demand or to whom the cause of action could accrue, these facts would form the basis of some cause of action in favor of the Williams estate against the successor bank. (See Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. [U.S.] 333; Alden v. Wright, 175 App. Div. 692; People v. National Trust Co., 82 N.Y. 283; Ferris v. Van Vechten, 73 id. 119; Davis Provision Co. v. Fowler Bros., Ltd., 20 App. Div. 626; affd., 163 N.Y. 580; Wilson v. Æolian Co., 64 App. Div. 337; Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210; Jones v. Missouri Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. Rep. 765; Zachra v. Mfg. Co., 179 Mo. App. 683; Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. McFarland, 156 Ky. 44.) If it were probable that the Statute of Limitations did not run against any cause of action in behalf of the estate before the executor died and that there was no laches on the part of the beneficiaries which will preclude a recovery for their benefit, we might deem it advisable to discuss the various theories on which the plaintiff claims to be entitled to relief and to express an opinion with respect to the precise relief to which he will be entitled, but, in the circumstances, we deem it sufficient to hold that if the facts are as alleged in the complaint and reply, a cause of action for some relief against the defendant, who is charged with having received a proportionate interest of the Williams estate in the assets of the original b

Section 15 of the General Corporation Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 23; Laws of 1909, chap. 28) was primarily designed to regulate and control the business of foreign stock corporations in this State, for the protection of the citizens of the State against any unlawful business of a foreign stock corporation and, if they were doing business in this State, render them equally accessible to process with domestic corporations. ( Emmerich Co. v. Sloane, 108 App. Div. 330.) Compliance with the statute is a condition precedent to the right of a foreign stock corporation to do business in the State. ( Bean v. Flint, 204 N.Y. 153; Wood Selick v. Ball, 190 id. 217, 224.) Having complied with the law, it may sue in like manner as a domestic corporation, and is entitled to the equal protection of the laws of the State ( Davis Provision Co. v. Fowler Brothers, Ltd., 20 App. Div. 626; affd., 163 N.Y. 580; People ex rel. Browning, King Co. v. Stover, 145 App. Div. 259), and to the same right to transact business as a domestic corporation. ( Burke v. Galveston, Houston Henderson R.R. Co., 173 App. Div. 221.)