These basic principles apply to brokerage contracts; brokers are generally not third-party beneficiaries of sales agreements to which they are not a party. Glassberg v. Warshawsky, 638 N.E.2d 749, 755 (Ill.App. Ct. 1994); David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc., 394 N.E.2d 583 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979). In this case, Harper is mentioned only incidentally in the Stock Purchase Agreement between Nortek and the Pozzis as the broker involved in the deal.
Churchill claims that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between Continental and Destron and that Continental breached its contract with Destron, thereby damaging Churchill. Assuming, arguendo, that a contract existed between Continental and Destron and that Continental breached that contract, Churchill must show that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. Midwest Concrete Products Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, 94 Ill.App.3d 394, 49 Ill.Dec. 968, 970, 418 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1981); David v. J. Elrod Realtors of Devon, Inc., 75 Ill.App.3d 449, 31 Ill.Dec. 381, 383, 394 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1979). Nothing in the record supports any finding that Churchill was an intended third-party beneficiary of any contract between Continental and Destron. At most, Churchill was only an incidental beneficiary.
• 1, 2 It is well established that a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided in section 2-615(e) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-615(e)), tests the sufficiency of the pleadings by determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought by his complaint or, alternatively, whether the defendant by his answer has set up a defense that would entitle him to a hearing on the merits. ( Teeple v. Hunziker (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 492, 496, 454 N.E.2d 1174; Hartlett v. Dahm (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 1, 3, 418 N.E.2d 44; David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 451, 394 N.E.2d 583; see also Carebuilt Corp. v. Horsting (1963), 40 Ill. App.2d 280, 189 N.E.2d 364; Milanko v. Jensen (1949), 404 Ill. 261, 88 N.E.2d 857.) In deciding the motion, the trial court must examine all pleadings on file, taking as true the well-pleaded facts, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, set forth in the opposite party's pleadings ( Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill.2d 543, 552-53, 359 N.E.2d 113), to determine whether a material factual dispute exists or whether the controversy can be resolved strictly as a matter of law.
OPINION • 1 It is well settled that entry of judgment on the pleadings, as provided in section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-615(e)), is proper only where the court can determine the relative rights of the parties solely from the pleadings ( Teeple v. Hunziker (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 492, 454 N.E.2d 1174; David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583). In making its ruling, the trial court must examine all pleadings on file — taking as true the well-pleaded facts, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, set forth in the pleadings of the party opposing the motion ( Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill.2d 543, 359 N.E.2d 113; Teeple v. Hunziker (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 492, 454 N.E.2d 1174) — to determine whether there are any material issues of fact or whether the controversy can be resolved strictly as a matter of law ( BakerWendell, Inc. v. Edward M. Cohon Associates, Ltd. (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 924, 427 N.E.2d 317; Quaintance Associates, Inc. v. PLM, Inc. (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 818, 420 N.E.2d 567; David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583; Affiliated Realty Mortgage Co. v. Jursich (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 146, 308 N.E.2d 118); and where such an examination discloses the existence of issues of material fact, the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied (
( Teeple v. Hunziker (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 492, 454 N.E.2d 1174.) In making its ruling, the trial court must examine all pleadings of the party opposing the motion to determine whether there are any material issues of fact or whether the controversy can be resolved strictly as a matter of law. ( Triangle Sign Co. v. Weber, Cohn Riley (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 839, 501 N.E.2d 315; Baker-Wendell, Inc. v. Edward M. Cohon Associates, Ltd. (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 924, 427 N.E.2d 317; Quaintance Associates, Inc. v. PLM, Inc. (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 818, 420 N.E.2d 567; David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583.) Moreover, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not the factual sufficiency."
( Metro East Sanitary District v. Village of Sauget (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 653, 475 N.E.2d 1327. See also David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583; Dale v. Groebe Co. (1981), 103 Ill. App.3d 649, 431 N.E.2d 1107.) As this court stated in Metro East Sanitary District:
In order for a party to assert the rights of a third-party beneficiary, the party must demonstrate that the benefit received was direct and not incidental to the contract. ( David v. J. Elrod Realtors on Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583.) Our review of the record and the arguments of the parties leads us to conclude that the Marzecs have failed to demonstrate that they are anything more than mere incidental beneficiaries to the loan commitment agreement. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Marzecs are not entitled to maintain an action as third-party beneficiaries and Burbank is entitled to judgment.
• 1, 2 Section 45(5) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 45(5)) provides that "[a]ny party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings." This motion requires an examination of the pleadings to determine if there is an issue of fact or if the controversy can be resolved solely as a matter of law. ( David v. J. Elrod Realtors On Devon, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 449, 394 N.E.2d 583; Affiliated Realty Mortgage Co. v. Jursich (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 146, 308 N.E.2d 118.) This motion admits all facts well pleaded and all fair inferences to be drawn from the pleadings of the opposing party ( Maywood Sportservice, Inc. v. Maywood Park Trotting Association, Inc. (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 1028, 353 N.E.2d 295; James Coates Motors, Inc. v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. (1974), 19 Ill. App.3d 919, 312 N.E.2d 291) and submits to the court that there is no issue of fact to be tried and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Affiliated Realty Mortgage Co. v. Jursich; Tompkins v. France (1959), 21 Ill. App.2d 227, 157 N.E.2d 799.) If the pleadings place one or more material facts in issue, then a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied.