Opinion
C/A No. 8:18-cv-3068-BHH-JDA
12-13-2018
Jamie Daquan David, Plaintiff, v. Srgt. Bostic, Probation Officer Goff, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jamie Daquan David, ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Marlboro County Detention Center in Bennettsville, South Carolina, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
As noted, Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Marlboro County Detention Center, and he alleges Defendants violated his civil rights by denying him a visit with his lawyer, wrongfully placing a probation hold on him, and placing him on lockdown. [Doc. 1-2 at 3.] The Court takes judicial notice, see Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting "the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records"), that Plaintiff has been charged with armed robbery in the Marlboro County Court of General Sessions at case no. 2017A3420200015, which remains pending against him. See Marlboro County Fourth Judicial Circuit Public Index https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Marlboro/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bostic placed Plaintiff on lockdown for four days without a mat, covers, or shower, and denied Plaintiff a visit with his lawyer on October 20, 2018. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] According to Plaintiff, when his lawyer came to visit him, Defendant Bostic stated, "'You can't see Mr. David because he's in lock up.'" [Id.] Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Goff placed a probation hold on Plaintiff on October 17, 2018, but lifted it on October 30, 2018, claiming it was a mistake. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that "[t]here were no injuries" as a result of the alleged events. [Id. at 5.] Nevertheless, for his relief, Plaintiff seeks "justice" and to be paid for his suffering, for being wrongly accused, and for the "headaches" the alleged events caused. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construed, the Complaint purports to assert claims for violations of Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, for the reasons below, the claims in this § 1983 action are subject to summary dismissal.
Defendant Goff is Entitled to Dismissal
Plaintiff has named two Defendants in this action: Srgt. Bostic and Probation Officer Goff. [Doc. 1-2 at 1-2.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goff mistakenly placed a probation hold on Plaintiff on October 17, 2018, which he then lifted on October 30, 2018. [Id. at 5.] As an initial matter, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim against Defendant Goff because he has not alleged that he suffered any injury as a result of the probation hold. See Gilmore v. Bostic, 659 F. Supp. 2d 755, 763 (S.D.W. Va. 2009).
Further, Defendant Goff is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity with respect to any claims brought against him in his individual capacity for actions he took within the scope of his duties as a probation officer. See Curry v. Young, No. 2:11-cv-01687-HFF, 2011 WL 5403353, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5403299 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding a probation agent acting within the scope of his duties has absolute immunity in an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Levers v. Hudson, No. RWT-09-cv-2511, 2009 WL 3231553, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2009) (same) (citing Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding D.C. probation officers immune from suit); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding state probation officers immune from suit); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding federal probation officers immune from suit); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986) (same); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding state probation officers immune from suit); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1984) (same)).
Further, as a State employee of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Pardon, and Parole, Defendant Goff is also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity as to any claims against him for monetary damages. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina, or its officials in their official capacities, by a citizen of South Carolina or a citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D.S.C. 1989); Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corrs., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D.S.C. 1978).
While the United States Congress can override Eleventh Amendment immunity through legislation, Congress has not overridden the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979). Further, although a State may consent to a suit in a federal district court, the State of South Carolina has not consented to such actions. To the contrary, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e).
Accordingly, Defendant Goff, as an agent of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Pardon, and Parole is entitled to both quasi-judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity for the reasons above, and he is therefore entitled to summary dismissal from this action. See Graham v. Webber, No. 8:15-cv-4231-DCN-BM, 2016 WL 403622, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016); Stevens v. Spartanburg Cty. Prob., Parole, & Pardon Servs., No. 6:09-cv-795-HMH-WMC, 2010 WL 678953, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2010); Brown v. United States, No. 2:15-cv-4065-PMD-MGB, 2016 WL 1104728, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 1089385 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2016).
Failure to State a Claim
The remaining allegations in the Complaint, as to Defendant Bostic, fail to state a claim for relief or are not cognizable in this § 1983 action.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Plaintiff alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated because, while Plaintiff was on lockdown, Defendant Bostic "denied [Plaintiff's] Lawyer visit when [his lawyer] came to the jail." [Doc. 1-2 at 5.]
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. "'The deliberate denial of counsel, absent an intelligent and voluntary waiver, is a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,'" but, actual injury is required to state a claim. Carver v. Greenville Cty., No. 1:16-cv-2528-TMC, 2016 WL 4771287, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2016) (quoting Clark v. Cty. of Tulane, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2010)); see also Charley v. McDowell, No. 6:12-cv-1589-CMC-KFM, 2012 WL 3844369, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 3844351 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2012) (finding the plaintiff failed to make any plausible factual allegations of a violation such that the Sixth Amendment was implicated, and he failed to allege any injury); Masika v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-02102-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 4277155, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4222883 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2017) (explaining that, to show actual injury, an inmate must demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded) (collecting cases). "Obviously, a person accused of crime retains his constitutional right to counsel despite his incarceration." Hearn v. Hudson, 549 F. Supp. 949, 960 (W.D. Va. 1982) (citing Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 271, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1972); McDonough v. Dir. of Paxtuxent, 429 F.2d 1189, 1192 (4th Cir. 1970)). "Although the needs of prison security may warrant limitations on the rights of pretrial detainees to the same extent that security needs warrant limitations on the rights of convicted individuals, prison officials cannot, absent some valid justification, totally cut off pretrial detainees' communications with legal counsel." Hearn, 549 F. Supp. at 960 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that the alleged deprivation of his right to counsel caused him any harm, instead asserting that "[t]here were no injuries." [Doc. 1-2 at 5.] Further, a prisoner may not raise claims in a § 1983 action if "success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). "Claims 'fall[ing] within the 'core' of habeas corpus . . . [are] not cognizable when brought pursuant to § 1983.'" Best v. North Carolina, No. 5:12-cv-3148-BO, 2013 WL 140057, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2013) (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004)); see also Jenkins v. Prince George's Cty. Police Dep't, No. 16-cv-433-JFM, 2016 WL 775747, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2016). "Specifically, to recover money damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must show that the underlying conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Banks v. Kavanagh, No. 1:15-cv-2801-ELH, 2015 WL 5923295, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2015) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). "A district court must undertake a case specific analysis to determine whether success on the claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence." Thigpen v. McDonnell, 273 F. App'x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2008). Heck "applies to pretrial detainees." Best, 2013 WL 140057, at *1 (citing Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Heck to a pretrial detainee's claim seeking damages for an alleged illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Heck applies to pending criminal charges," and any claim "that if successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist."); Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App'x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying Heck to a pretrial detainee's alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
Here, Plaintiff's claim that he was denied access to counsel, if found to have merit, would call into question the validity of his conviction. See, e.g., Kanz v. Wisconsin, 84 F. App'x 677, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2003); Kilbane v. Huron Cty. Comm'rs, No. 3:10-cv-2751, 2011 WL 1666928, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 2011). "Before such a claim may be proper, [P]laintiff would need to be convicted and subsequently have that conviction invalidated. Neither has yet happened . . ." Carver, 2016 WL 4771287, at *2. Because a cause of action has not yet accrued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Green v. Dewitt, No. 8:06-cv-0626-MBS, 2006 WL 1074983, at *2-4 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (citing Heck). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 845-46 (4th Cir. 2003); Green, 2006 WL 1074983, at *3 (collecting cases). Although the decision in Heck v. Humphrey concerned a conviction, its rationale is also applicable to pretrial detainees, such as Plaintiff in this case. Westpoint v. Wilson, No. 2:11-cv-1480-RMG-BM, 2011 WL 3490085, at *2 (D.S.C. July 19, 2011) (citing Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n inmate already participating in state litigation must make his stand there rather than attempt the equivalent of federal-defense removal by filing an independent § 1983 suit.")), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 3490262 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2011). In this regard, Heck has been held to bar "damage claims which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction on a pending criminal charge." Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enf't Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 898 n.8 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim challenging the validity of a future conviction raises the same concerns as a claim challenging the legality of a conviction and, as a result, "does not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist"). Courts in this district have applied the holding in Heck v. Humphrey to a pretrial detainee under circumstances such as here where a plaintiff asserts violations of his Sixth Amendment rights:
In this case, plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to put on a meaningful defense. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that claim would imply the invalidity of his ongoing criminal proceedings. If plaintiff were successful in showing that he had been denied his constitutional right to prepare his defense, any conviction which flowed from that denial would be invalidated. Therefore, the instant allegations fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 and are DISMISSED without prejudice.Barr v. Battiste, No. 2:06-cv-2209-CMC-RSC, 2006 WL 2708217, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006) (quoting Daniel v. Ruph, No. 94-cv-3317-EFL, 1994 WL 589352, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1994); see also Scott v. Sanford, No. 8:06-cv-3484-MB, 2007 WL 474062, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2007) (same); Anderson v. McCombs, No. 0:09-cv-3340-TLW-RSC, 2010 WL 2772703, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2772839 (D.S.C. July 13, 2010) (same); Robinson v. Waters, No. 2:06-cv-2128-TLW-RSC, 2008 WL 548858, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (explaining that, "[i]n an earlier case, Norris v. Patsy, 1994 WL 443456 (N.D. Cal., July 29, 1994), the court noted that, under Heck v. Humphrey '[a] judgment in favor of the plaintiff here would imply the invalidity of pending state criminal proceedings which have not already been invalidated; . . . therefore, any request for damages pertinent to said proceedings is premature and must be DISMISSED'").
Moreover, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal district courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989).
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the pending state court criminal charges against him are invalid as a result of him being denied access to counsel, he must challenge the legitimacy of the charges against him as part of his state criminal action. See, e.g., Ballenger, 352 F.3d at 845-46; Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1997); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not alleged that his pending state court criminal proceedings, with respect to the Sixth Amendment claim he now asserts in this action, cannot provide him with an adequate opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims. Plaintiff may vindicate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the ongoing state court proceedings. Accordingly, summary dismissal of the Complaint is appropriate as Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at this time because a right of action has not yet accrued.
Conditions of Confinement
As to the remaining allegations in the Complaint concerning the conditions of confinement, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges he was "Placed on Lockdown with [n]o shower, [m]at[ ], covers [for a] total of (4) days." [Doc. 1-2 at 3, 4.] Importantly, Plaintiff also alleges that "[t]here were no injuries," and for his relief, he seeks "justice" and to "be paid for my suffering, wrongly accus[]ed & headaches they caused." [Id. at 5.]
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations about the conditions of confinement (being placed in lockdown for four days without a shower, mat, or covers), the United States Supreme Court explained in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment (or the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of pretrial detainees) only when two requirements are met: (i) the alleged deprivation must be objectively "sufficiently serious," that it results "in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" and (ii) the prison official must have a "'sufficiently culpable state of mind,'" i.e., "'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. at 834 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court further determined that its standard for "deliberate indifference" would be "subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law." Id. at 839-40. "In short, the Court concluded that 'a prison [or detention center] official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'" Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847); see also Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.1998) (applying Eighth Amendment analysis in a conditions-of-confinement case filed by a state pre-trial detainee). Although "prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . . lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that federal courts "'ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.'" McCoy, 2008 WL 4646924, at *2 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (explaining courts should not "substitute [their] judgment on . . . difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration . . . for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison").
"While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pre-trial detainees—such as Plaintiff—humane conditions of confinement, 'the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims."" McCoy v. Misle, No. 8:08-cv-3219-GRA-BHH, 2008 WL 4646924, at *1 n.3 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2008 WL 5169104 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2008) (quoting Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d at 495); see also Chisolm v. Cannon, No. 4:02-cv-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Feb.15, 2006). For this reason, the standards discussed in Farmer are equally applicable to Plaintiff's claims.
During the time period at issue, Plaintiff was a prisoner in a county detention center, not a guest in a hotel. "It is to be expected that conditions of confinement under such circumstances are often times less than ideal." Witherspoon v. Berry, No. 9:13-cv-2942-MGL, 2015 WL 1790222, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2015) (citing Hadley v. Peters, No. 94-cv-1207, 1995 WL 675990, at *8 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining "prisons are not required to provide and prisoners cannot expect the services of a good hotel" (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988))); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) ("[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 'punishment.'").
Here, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief because he has failed to allege any injury as a result of the conditions of which he complains, and he has failed to set forth any facts or evidence to establish that the conditions about which he complains resulted in any violation of his constitutional rights. Richburg v. Williams, No. 8:10-cv-981-DCN-JDA, 2011 WL 1631007, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.1995) ("In the context of a conditions-of-confinement claim, to demonstrate that a deprivation is extreme enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must 'produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,' or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.") (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993)), aff'd 2011 WL 1638049 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2011). Simply put, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. "[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim . . . . '[O]nly those deprivations denying "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). Moreover, Plaintiff's claims also fail because he has not alleged any injury from the challenged conditions—indeed, he alleges that "[t]here were no injuries." [Doc. 1-2 at 5.] See Holcomb v. Greenville Cty., No. 1:15-cv-03582-MGL, 2015 WL 6125358, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2015) (citing White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 269 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that an Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed if it fails to suggest inmate suffered a serious physical or mental injury from the condition)). The deprivations alleged in a conditions-of-confinement claim must be serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs. Wall v. Knowlin, No. 9:07-cv-3199-HMH-GCK, 2007 WL 3232129, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff has made no such allegations and has affirmatively averred that he suffered no injuries.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge December 13, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).