Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12946, No. 1343.
June 10, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael A. MacDonald, Judge, Superior Court No. 4FA-07-01308 CI.
David L., pro se, Eloy, Arizona, Appellant. No appearance by Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices. [Matthews, Justice, not participating.]
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
David L. appeals the superior court's dismissal of his case against adoptive parents Christopher and Doris Grant and their attorney Daniel Callahan. David objects to the transfer of his case from Kotzebue to Fairbanks, and he contends that the superior court in Fairbanks erred when it failed to grant him a default judgment and eventually dismissed his lawsuit. Because all of David's claims against Callahan and the Grants were previously adjudicated and are thus barred by res judicata, and because the superior court acted well within its discretion in ruling on David's various motions, we affirm the superior court's judgment in all respects.
This is not the first time the parties have been before us. See In re Adoption of Erin G., 140 P.3d 886 (Alaska 2006). Because of the privacy interest of the adopted child and her biological and adoptive parents, we continue the use of the pseudonyms used in that case. Daniel Callahan has been the adoptive parents' attorney in all matters relating to the adoption.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. In re Adoption of Erin G.
This case arises out of an adoption proceeding conducted before Superior Court Judge Richard D. Savell in Fairbanks. Erin G. was born in 2001 to Joanne A., who was unmarried and ill with terminal cancer. Erin is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and before her death, her mother sought to permanently place Erin with appellees Christopher and Doris Grant. The Grants petitioned to adopt Erin in late January 2002. In February Joanne consented to termination of her parental rights. She also identified appellant David L. as the father.
Erin G. contains a lengthy facts section that is repeated here almost in its entirety. Erin G., 140 P.3d at 887-88.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000).
David was incarcerated at the time, and Daniel Callahan, the Grants' attorney, formally notified David of the adoption petition and filed a copy of the notice with the superior court in March 2002. David obtained court-appointed counsel and, through counsel, objected to the proposed adoption. The Grants moved for summary judgment against David, arguing that David's consent to the adoption was not necessary because David had not properly acknowledged paternity of Erin. In opposing the Grants' motion, David submitted several signed but unsworn statements in which he appeared to assert that he was Erin's father.
On August 12, 2002, Judge Savell granted summary judgment to the Grants. The superior court ruled that because David had not produced the results of a blood test or a sworn statement acknowledging paternity, he was not a "parent" as defined by state law or ICWA and therefore could not object to the adoption.
On September 4, 2002, the court entered the adoption decree and the Grants assumed legal custody of Erin. David appealed the grant of summary judgment against him. He was dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney and requested a new attorney for the appeal. The superior court granted his request, but the new attorney did not pursue David's appeal, and in April 2003 we dismissed that appeal for lack of prosecution under Alaska Appellate Rule 511.5. David continued to file motions and write letters to the superior court regarding his case. In late January 2004 the superior court appointed a third attorney, Kenneth Kirk, to represent David regarding "any further post decree motions or appeals in this matter." In March 2004 we denied Kirk's motion to reinstate David's appeal.
David continued to file pro se motions in the superior court throughout the remainder of 2004. On October 21, 2004, David filed a petition to invalidate the adoption. His petition claimed that the Grants' adoption of Erin violated various provisions of ICWA. On December 7, 2004, the superior court denied David's petition. David then filed a "Motion Pursuant to Petition to Invalidate Illegal Adoption" in which he again requested the invalidation of the adoption and also sought a grand jury indictment of the Grants for kidnapping. On March 1, 2005, the superior court issued an opinion thoroughly addressing and rejecting all of David's arguments regarding the adoption.
In a letter dated March 9, 2005, David asked the superior court to appoint an attorney to appeal the superior court's most recent decisions. David submitted a second request in mid-April, and later that month the superior court "reappointed" Kirk, who then filed a notice of appeal in this court. On appeal, David challenged the superior court's holding that AS 25.23.140(b), Alaska's one-year statute of limitations for challenging adoption decrees, barred his petition to set aside the adoption. We affirmed the superior court's decision "[b]ecause it appears that Congress intended that state statutes of limitations would generally apply to ICWA challenges to placement decrees." B. 2005 Lawsuit, 4FA-04-01387 CI
Erin G., 140 P.3d at 887.
Id.
In addition to appealing the statute of limitations issue, David filed a civil suit against Callahan and the Grants in June 2004. Acting pro se, David's complaint alleged several constitutional claims based on actions taken by Callahan and the Grants during the adoption proceedings. In the following months, David filed a number of motions with the court to amend his complaint. On February 7, 2005, the superior court observed that the case file contained "a jumble of pleadings" and determined that "[a]fter investing several hours just locating and reviewing [the pleadings], the court is uncertain of the precise claims, causes of action, and prayer for relief." The superior court remarked that it did "not expect the defendants and their counsel to spend additional time attempting to determine [David's] claims or to speculate what they are" and ordered David to file a new "comprehensive complaint" within thirty days.
On March 2, 2005, David filed a new complaint which named Callahan, the Grants, Superior Court Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger, and Standing Master Alicemary L. Closuit as defendants. David alleged that Judge Steinkruger and Standing Master Closuit "knowingly [and] intentionally in bad faith fabricated fraud[u]lent reasons to illegally [terminate his] parent[a]l rights" (emphasis omitted) and that all of the defendants conspired and colluded to commit fraud and deny him his due process and equal protection rights. David also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he requested compensatory damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $300,000 against each defendant for each count.
On June 6, 2005, the superior court dismissed David's case on summary judgment. The superior court found that David failed to
produc[e] specific facts by admissible evidence that ten[d] to show he was deprived of any rights related to the minor child, [Erin], in violation of his constitutional rights to equal protection under the law or due process of law, or that the conduct of [the Grants] and Callahan was the cause of any injury, or was outrageous in regard to the adoption.
The superior court concluded that all of David's claims relating to the adoption "have been fully adjudicated and determined in the adoption proceeding and cannot be relitigated in this action." The court dismissed all claims against Callahan and the Grants with prejudice and also remarked that "[a]s a result of this order, no claims remain, all pending motions are moot, and no further proceedings in court or at trial are necessary." There is no indication in the record that David appealed.
C. 2006 Lawsuit, 4FA-07-01308 CI
On December 20, 2006, David again sued Callahan and the Grants, filing his complaint in the superior court in Kotzebue and alleging that he had been deprived of various rights as a result of "malicious actions" during the adoption case. David's complaint asserted a variety of claims against Callahan and the Grants, including fraud, discrimination, and violations of his "constitutional rights to fair and impartial justice," due process, and equal protection. David also claimed that Callahan and the Grants were responsible for a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. David complained that the judge, Callahan, and the Grants are all Caucasian and argued that he filed in Kotzebue because he is Yup'ik and would be subject to "bias and discrimination issues" in the superior court in Fairbanks. David claimed that "as a result of this discrimination" he suffered "great mental anguish" and "extreme emotional distress over the loss of his child." David sought compensatory damages of three million dollars and punitive damages of five million dollars, as well as costs and attorney's fees.
The following month, Callahan entered an appearance on behalf of the Grants and himself. Callahan submitted a motion for a change of venue from the Second Judicial District at Kotzebue to the Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks, arguing that the superior court in Fairbanks was the proper venue under Alaska Civil Rule 3(c) because Callahan and the Grants could be served there and because "[t]here is no allegation or claim involving any activity other than in the adoption proceeding in Fairbanks." David opposed any change of venue and reiterated that he chose to file in Kotzebue because he is Yup'ik and would be prejudiced in another venue. Kotzebue Superior Court Judge Richard J. Erlich approved the change of venue from Kotzebue to Fairbanks on February 21, 2007.
Believing that Callahan's response to the complaint was late, David filed a request for a default judgment, which was opposed by Callahan and the Grants and later denied by Superior Court Judge Mark I. Wood. David also filed a motion requesting that all of Callahan's and the Grants' assets be sequestered and attached, which was also denied.
In June 2007 Callahan and the Grants filed a motion for summary judgment. David opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. In early August 2007 David submitted a motion to add an allegation of obstruction of justice to his complaint, and the superior court granted this request.
On November 5, 2007, the superior court granted Callahan and the Grants' motion for summary judgment and denied David's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The superior court reasoned that David's claims in his December 20, 2006 complaint were barred by res judicata because they arose out of the same transaction that had been "previously fully litigated in case number 4FA-04-1387 Civ.," and had resulted in an order granting summary judgment in favor of Callahan and the Grants. The superior court also found that David's claims were not timely, that David had not produced any admissible evidence tending to show that he had been deprived of any constitutional rights, and that he had failed to show how the conduct of Callahan and the Grants "constituted discrimination, obstruction of justice, or any other legally actionable injury."
David filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that he had "a due process right to correct erroneous information in the record" and that "the court should know what [he intended] to tell [the] jury in this case." The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration and awarded Callahan and the Grants enhanced attorney's fees of $3,942 on the grounds that David's claims "were not reasonable and were vexatious and in bad faith." A final judgment was issued on December 31, 2007, dismissing all of David's claims with prejudice. David appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A trial court's decision regarding a motion for change of venue is reviewed only for abuse of discretion." We also review a trial court's refusal to enter a default judgment under the abuse of discretion standard.
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 931 P.2d 354, 360 n. 7 (Alaska 1996) (citing Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913, 919 (Alaska 1980)).
Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378 (Alaska 1982).
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. "The moving party has the initial burden of offering admissible evidence showing both the absence of any genuine dispute of fact and the legal right to a judgment." Once that burden is satisfied, to avoid summary judgment the non-moving party must produce "specific facts showing that he could produce admissible evidence reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the movant's evidence." The non-moving party may not "rest upon mere allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Questions of law, such as the application of res judicata and the statutes of limitations, are reviewed de novo.
Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 991 (Alaska 2004).
Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 152 P.3d 460, 465 (Alaska 2007).
Id.
Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 125 P.3d 335, 339 (Alaska 2005).
Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 991 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1309 (Alaska 1977)).
Martech Constr. Co. v. Ogden Envtl. Servs., Inc., 852 P.2d 1146, 1149 n. 7 (Alaska 1993); Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Beegan v. State, Dep't of Tramp. Pub. Facilities, 195 P.3d 134, 138 (Alaska 2008).
IV. DISCUSSION
David makes three primary arguments. First, he claims that the superior court erred by transferring his case from Kotzebue to Fairbanks without assessing the prejudice David would suffer in a Fairbanks court. Second, David argues that the superior court erred by denying his request for a default judgment. Finally, David contends that the superior court erred when it dismissed his lawsuit, depriving him of the opportunity to argue the merits of his case. We address these arguments in turn.
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Transferring Venue of the Case from Kotzebue to Fairbanks.
David initially filed his complaint in Kotzebue, noting that his reason for doing so was to avoid "bias and discrimination issues" because of his Yup'ik descent. Callahan and the Grants requested that the court transfer venue of the case from the Second Judicial District at Kotzebue to the Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks under Civil Rule 3(c).
Alaska Civil Rule 3(c) provides that if a defendant can be personally served within Alaska, an action may be commenced in: "(1) the judicial district in which the claim arose; or (2) a judicial district where the defendant may be personally served; or (3) a venue district where the claim arose if the superior court in the district accepts such cases for filing." On February 21, 2007, Judge Erlich ordered the change of venue from Kotzebue to Fairbanks, finding that David's case had been "filed in the wrong judicial district." The superior court concluded that because "[a]ll claims in this action arose in Fairbanks" and Callahan and the Grants "may be served personally in Fairbanks . . . [u]nder Civil Rule 3(c), venue of this action belongs in the Fourth Judicial District."
1. Transfer was required under Alaska Civil Rule 3(c).
David challenges the transfer of venue from Kotzebue to Fairbanks, arguing that because he was incarcerated in Arizona at the time he filed his complaint, Callahan and the Grants had "just as much access [to] the Kotzebue Court" as he did and thus their "physical presence" in Kotzebue was not necessary for jurisdiction. Under AS 22.10.020(b), "[t]he jurisdiction of the superior court extends over the whole of the state." The question in this case is whether Fairbanks was the proper venue for David's case against Callahan and the Grants.
Here, Fairbanks was the proper venue under Civil Rule 3(c) because the claim arose in Fairbanks and Callahan and the Grants were personally served in Fairbanks. Under Alaska law, plaintiffs must comply with the requirements of Civil Rule 3 and may not simply file a complaint in the forum of their choosing. Thus, the superior court in Kotzebue could not have retained jurisdiction on its own discretion: Alaska law provides that when a complaint is filed in the wrong judicial district, a superior court may either transfer venue of the case to the proper district or dismiss it, but the court may not discretionarily retain venue. Thus, Judge Erlich was correct to transfer venue of the case to Fairbanks.
Ketchikan Gen. Hosp. v. Dunnagan, 757 P.2d 57, 59 (Alaska 1988). In Dunnagan, the court recognized that
plaintiffs must follow the standard procedure; they must commence suit in the proper Rule 3 venue, and then, if that forum is inconvenient, move for a change of venue under AS 22.10.040. By adopting this policy, we ensure that the superior court in the proper venue, rather than one in the venue of plaintiff's choosing, makes the initial determination as to which forum is convenient. This rule precludes plaintiffs from selecting a forum they believe is convenient without regard to Civil Rule 3.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (discussing a superior court's options when a complaint is filed in the wrong judicial district and limiting the superior court's exercise of discretion to these two choices).
2. There was no basis to transfer venue from Fairbanks to Kotzebue under AS 22.10.040.
David next argues that the transfer of venue to Fairbanks has led to the "denial of [his] right to pursue [a] Civil Rights [c]omplaint in an unbiase[d] jurisdiction." David contends that it is not possible for him to receive "fair and impartial justice" in Fairbanks. He bases this argument on the fact that he has been criminally prosecuted in Fairbanks, and on his Yup'ik heritage. He maintains that his case should have been heard in Kotzebue where the court would not be biased against him "because [of] his ethnicity."
Alaska Statute 22.10.040 allows the superior court to change venue within "the same judicial district or to a designated place in another judicial district" for any of the following reasons:
(1) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had;
(2) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change;
(3) when for any cause the judge is disqualified from acting, but if the judge of another judicial district is assigned to try the action, no change of place of trial need be made;
(4) if the court finds that the defendant will be put to unnecessary expense and inconvenience. . . .
Although David's argument could be read to fall under the rubric of (1), a discretionary change of venue based on a claim of discrimination or prejudice may only be decided by the superior court in the proper venue under Civil Rule 3(c). Thus, it was up to the superior court in Fairbanks to assess the potential for bias against David.
See id. at 59 ("[T]he superior court in the proper venue, rather than one in the venue of plaintiff's choosing, makes the initial determination as to which forum is convenient. This rule precludes plaintiffs from selecting a forum they believe is convenient without regard to Civil Rule 3.").
We have instructed trial courts to "be sensitive to the impropriety of conducting a trial in an atmosphere hostile to a [party]," and a party is relieved, in certain situations, from the burden of having to demonstrate actual prejudice. In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Allen, the defendants argued that "they could not get an unbiased jury in the `largely native community' of Kotzebue, where [the plaintiff] had strong family and cultural ties." But we upheld the superior court's denial of a request to transfer venue because the defendant offered no evidence to show that a Kotzebue jury would be biased against them. Here, there is similarly no shred of evidence or even any factual allegation that the judge in Fairbanks was biased against David. Though David repeatedly claims that he can only receive an unbiased hearing on his case in Kotzebue, he has produced no facts or any information to demonstrate the merit of his allegation.
Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 747 (Alaska 1980).
Id. at 748; see Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 931 P.2d 354, 360 (Alaska 1996) (discussing Mallott and recognizing that a showing of actual prejudice is not required for a change of venue).
758 P.2d 92, 96 (Alaska 1988).
Id. at 96-97.
The claims in this case arose and all defendants were served in the Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks. Therefore, the proper venue under Civil Rule 3 is the Fourth Judicial District and the superior court did not abuse its discretion in transferring venue of the case from Kotzebue to Fairbanks. In addition, because there was no evidence of any prejudice in the Fairbanks court that could suffice as a reason for transfer under AS 22.10.040, it was not error for the superior court in Fairbanks to retain venue.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying David's Motion for Default Judgment.
David filed his complaint against Callahan and the Grants on December 20, 2006, and mailed three copies to Callahan's office. On January 26, 2007, David filed a Civil Rule 4(f) affidavit claiming that all three defendants had been served at Callahan's place of business. Five days later, Callahan filed a motion to change the venue from Kotzebue to Fairbanks. On February 20, 2007, David filed a motion for a pretrial scheduling order and a motion for default judgment, arguing in both that a default judgment was appropriate because Callahan and the Grants had "failed to timely respond" to his complaint by January 30, 2007. Callahan and the Grants opposed David's motions, arguing that David was not entitled to a default judgment because service was not proper and that David's motion for pretrial scheduling was premature because the proper venue for the case had not yet been determined. Callahan filed an answer to David's complaint on March 29, 2007.
On June 8, 2007, the superior court denied David's motion for default judgment, reasoning that it was unclear whether Callahan and the Grants had been properly served because although Callahan had represented the Grants in the adoption proceeding, the Grants had not again retained him at the time that David's complaint was received and he thus "was not an agent through whom the [Grants] could be served." The superior court also found that even if Callahan was properly served, "the fact that he filed his entry of appearance and motion for change of venue" one day late "was not egregious and, given the confusion as to the propriety of service and venue, any failure was a result of excusable neglect." The superior court thus denied David's motion for default judgment "[g]iven the confusion as to whether service was proper, the eventual correction of any fault in the service of defendants, and because determining a case on its merits is `strongly preferred' to judgment by default."
Default judgments are governed by Alaska Civil Rule 55. "When a plaintiff applies for entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(c), the trial court must `exercise its discretion' in determining whether to enter judgment." David argues that the superior court erred when it denied his motion for default judgment. But as the superior court concluded, there was a question regarding whether the Grants were properly served. In any event, Alaska Civil Rule 6(b) gives the superior court discretion to enlarge the period within which a response should be filed if the failure to file was the result of excusable neglect. "We have consistently held that disposition of a case on the merits is strongly preferred to judgment by default." Thus, the superior court reasonably concluded that a default judgment was not appropriate and did not abuse its discretion when it denied David's motion for default judgment.
Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Brauneis, 141 P.3d 726, 728 (Alaska 2006) (quoting Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378 (Alaska 1982)).
Alaska Civil Rule 6(b) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 264 (Alaska 2002).
C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Granting Callahan and the Grants Summary Judgment.
David has filed two nearly identical lawsuits against Callahan and the Grants, alleging that they deprived him of various rights as a result of their "malicious actions" during the adoption case. The first case was filed in Fairbanks in March 2005, and was dismissed with prejudice in June of that year on a motion for summary judgment. On December 20, 2006, David again filed suit against Callahan and the Grants, and his complaint contained nearly identical allegations. On November 5, 2007, the superior court granted Callahan and the Grants' motion for summary judgment, reasoning that David's claims were barred by res judicata because they arose out of the same transaction as his claims that were fully litigated in 2005. The superior court also found that David's claims were not timely. Finally, the court found that David had not produced "facts demonstrated by admissible evidence that tends to show he was deprived of any . . . of his constitutional rights to equal protection under the law or due process of law" and that David also failed to show how the conduct of Callahan and the Grants "constituted discrimination, obstruction of justice, or any other legally actionable injury."
The doctrine of res judicata "provides that a final judgment in a prior action bars a subsequent action if the prior judgment was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a dispute between the same parties (or their privies) about the same cause of action." Because the first and second conditions have been met, and both of David's lawsuits were filed against Callahan and the Grants, the only question before us is whether the claims in the 2006 complaint can be considered part of the same causes of action as those brought in the first complaint.
Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997).
For purposes of res judicata analysis, a cause of action includes more than the exact claim already litigated: new claims that arise from the "same transactions" as those in the previous litigation and that could have been raised in the earlier lawsuit are also barred from litigation in the second suit. The majority of claims that David asserted in his 2006 complaint are nearly identical to those in his first complaint and are therefore plainly barred. But there are two claims in David's 2006 complaint that do not appear in the 2005 complaint. First, David claimed that because the superior court judge, Callahan, and the Grants are all Caucasian, they discriminated against him. Second, David claimed that his parental rights were wrongfully terminated and that we should "grant him the rights he is entitled to" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the state and federal constitutions. Because the discrimination and § 1983 claims are new, the preclusive effect of the dismissal of his 2005 complaint on these two claims depends on whether they stem from the same transaction as the claims made in the first complaint. "Importantly, the legal theories on which multiple claims are based are not considered when determining whether those claims arise from the same transaction" and a litigant "cannot avoid the preclusive effect of an earlier judgment by alleging the same facts under a new legal theory." Res judicata also prohibits a party from asserting a "legal theory, cause of action, or defense which could have been asserted in [a prior] action." When a party has previously had an opportunity to litigate an issue, "the fact that he chose not to, whether because of a strategic decision or ignorance or other reason, does not exempt him from the principles of res judicata" in subsequent litigation.
Alderman v. Iditarod Props., Inc., 104 P.3d 136, 141 (Alaska 2004).
David's 2005 complaint asserted that the superior court judge, Callahan, and the Grants conspired to commit fraud, deny him his due process and equal protection rights, and "illegally [terminate his] parent[a]l rights." (Emphasis omitted.) David also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court dismissed David's case on summary judgment, concluding that all of David's claims in regards to the adoption "have been fully adjudicated and determined in the adoption proceeding and cannot be relitigated in this action." David's 2006 complaint repeated the allegations from his 2005 complaint and asserted that Callahan and the Grants' actions in the adoption proceeding resulted in a violation of his "constitutional rights to fair and impartial justice," liberty, due process, and equal protection. David further claimed that he suffered "great mental anguish" and "extreme emotional distress over the loss of his child." David himself acknowledged that "there may be some overlap" between his 2005 and 2006 complaints.
See Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (Alaska 2006) (discussing plaintiff's three claims and concluding that the preclusive effect of the plaintiff's prior action on the three claims depended on whether they came from the same transaction as the claims presented in the plaintiff's prior complaint); see also Plumber, 936 P.2d at 167 (reasoning that what constitutes a transaction is determined by evaluating "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation" and "whether they form a convenient trial unit") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1980)).
Smith, 132 P.3d at 822 (citing White v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 14 P.3d 956, 959-60 (Alaska 2000)).
McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 906 (Alaska 2003) (quoting Dixon v. Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520, 523 (Alaska 1999); see also Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 780 (Alaska 2002) ("[A]ll claims arising out of a single transaction must be brought in a single suit, and those that are not become extinguished by the judgment in the suit in which some of the claims were brought.") (quoting Osborne v. Buckman, 993 P.2d 409, 412 (Alaska 1999)).
McElroy, 74 P.3d at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).
David has maintained that his claims were not barred by res judicata because they were "not litigated in any previous action." (Emphasis omitted.) But the record reveals that David has previously had the opportunity to litigate his claims. The record of the adoption proceeding indicates that David, who was represented by court-appointed counsel, had notice and an opportunity to respond to the proceedings. In dismissing David's 2005 civil suit against Callahan and the Grants, the superior court expressly held that David had not produced any admissible evidence tending to show that his rights to equal protection and due process were violated by Callahan and the Grants during the course of the adoption action. David's new discrimination and § 1983 claims both stem from the alleged actions of Callahan and the Grants during the adoption proceedings and are therefore new legal theories derived from the same facts alleged in the 2005 complaint.
David claims that he was "denied effective assistance [of] counsel" in the adoption of his daughter. But David did have counsel and was able to fully participate in the adoption proceeding. See In re Adoption of Erin G., 140 P.3d 886, 888 (Alaska 2006).
David requests that we relax the appellate rules because he has no formal training in law, citing to Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass'n where we recognized that in cases involving a pro se litigant, "the superior court must relax procedural requirements to a reasonable extent." Indeed, we have cautioned "that courts should generally hold the pleadings of pro se litigants to less stringent standards than those of lawyers." But the latitude that Alaska courts provide pro se litigants in their filings does not extend to fundamental requirements, such as those necessary to avoid summary judgment. David's claims were barred by res judicata and the superior court did not err in granting Callahan and the Grants' motion for summary judgment.
64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003).
Id.; see also Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987) (concluding that "the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers").
See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803, 805 (Alaska 2002) (finding that a grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff was appropriate even though the plaintiff appeared pro se and was entitled to more leniency in his pleadings).
Because David's claims are barred by res judicata, we decline to reach the issues whether his claims were also time barred and whether David produced evidence that tended to show that he was deprived of any rights. David also appeals as a separate point the superior court's denial of his motion for reconsideration. But David only repeats his objection to the adoption proceeding and again requests a declaratory judgment in his favor. There are no new arguments in David's motion for reconsideration and it was thus not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to deny it.
V. CONCLUSION
It was not error for the superior court to transfer venue of the case to Fairbanks under Civil Rule 3(c), nor did the superior court err in denying David's request for a default judgment. In addition, the superior court ruled correctly when it dismissed David's case on summary judgment because David's claims were barred by res judicata. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court in all respects.