Opinion
CIV-20-358-C
07-16-2020
BRYAN WAYNE DAVENPORT, Plaintiff, v. BECKY PATA, et. al.,, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the Cleveland County Detention Center ("CCDC") located in Norman, Oklahoma, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments that he has been denied adequate medical care for his condition of HIV and that officials have interfered with his right access to the courts. See generally Doc. No. 14. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's "Motion for Expedited Review and Emergency Injunctive Relief Due to Imminent Danger." Doc. No. 33. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
In his Motion, Plaintiff requests to be moved to the "Mental Health Court" because the procedures at CCDC are insufficient to protect inmates from contracting COVID-19 and he is in a high-risk category due to his pre-existing medical condition of having HIV. He seeks injunctive relief from this Court to be transferred as requested.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must establish that four factors weigh in his favor: "(1) [he] is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2)[he] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [his] threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest." Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). "[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal." Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held," Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981), and, therefore, "injunctions that disrupt the status quo are disfavored and must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course." Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070 (quotations omitted). Along this vein, a preliminary injunction "grant[s] intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally." De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945); see also Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he movant must establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." (quotations omitted)). When the movant seeks intermediate relief beyond the claims in the complaint, the court has no authority to enter a preliminary injunction. For this reason, the Court cannot properly issue a preliminary injunction when, as here, Plaintiff seeks intermediate relief beyond the claims of the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit are related to the medical care received, or not received, for his condition of HIV and his assertion that officials have interfered with his right of access to the courts. Doc. No. 14. His request for a preliminary injunction is related to being transferred because CCDC's procedures are allegedly not sufficient to protect him from contracting COVID-19. Doc. No. 33. Thus, Plaintiff's request is not related to his original claims and the Court is without authority to grant an injunction based on these allegations. See Farris v. Frazier, No. CIV-12-1099, 2014 WL 3749142, at *16 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2014) ("Plaintiff's Amended Complaint raises no claims relevant to his legal mail issues and seeks no relief on those grounds, which are the only grounds raised in his request for a preliminary injunction. . . . Plaintiff therefore has not shown the requisite relationship between Defendants' conduct asserted in the Amended Complaint and the injury claimed in his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction."); see also Stouffer v. Eulberg, No. CIV-09-320-C, 2010 WL 567998, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2010) ("When the movant seeks intermediate relief beyond the claims in the complaint, the court is powerless to enter a preliminary injunction."). Thus, Plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction must be denied.
The proper avenue for Plaintiff to raise this claim is in an action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, Plaintiff would first be required to present his claims to the state courts prior to filing such an action in this Court. See Parkhurst v. Pacheco, 809 F. App'x 556, 557-58 (10th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court's dismissal of the petitioner's habeas action where he sought compassionate release from incarceration based on risk of COVID-19 exposure but had not exhausted available state court remedies prior to filing). --------
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended the Motion for Expedited Review and Emergency Injunctive Relief Due to Imminent Danger (Doc. NO. 33) be DENIED. Plaintiff is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by August 5th , 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States of America, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); see, cf., Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
Dated this 16th day of July, 2020.
/s/_________
GARY M. PURCELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE