CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.507; Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The purpose of the statute is to eliminate frivolous healthcare-liability claims, while allowing potentially meritorious claims to proceed.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.507; Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The purpose of the statute is to eliminate frivolous healthcare-liability claims, while allowing potentially meritorious claims to proceed.

Specifically, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.251(a) provides that a health care liability claim must be brought "within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.251(a); see also Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

Several of our sister courts have held that the failure to provide a complete list of health care providers as required by the statute precludes a plaintiff from relying on the tolling provision, and they have rejected substantial-compliance arguments similar to Rhodes-Madison's. See Colia v. Ewing, No. 02-19-00109-CV, 2020 WL 241978, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Galloway v. Atrium Med. Ctr. L.P., 558 S.W.3d 316, 320-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Borowski v. Ayers, 524 S.W.3d 292, 301-03 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied). Looking at the purpose of the pre-suit notice and corresponding authorization form, our sister courts held that an incomplete list of providers "frustrated the purpose behind [S]ection 74.052's disclosure requirements and hindered [the defendant's] ability to engage in pre-suit investigation, negotiation, and settlement with respect to [the plaintiff's] claims."

Several of our sister courts have held that the failure to provide a complete list of health care providers as required by the statute precludes a plaintiff from relying on the tolling provision, and they have rejected substantial-compliance arguments similar to Margaret's. See, e.g., Galloway v. Atrium Med. Ctr., L.P., 558 S.W.3d 316, 320-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Borowski v. Ayers, 524 S.W.3d 292, 301-03 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied). For example, in Galloway, the decedent's estate and children sued medical providers for health care liability claims arising from the decedent's death.

There, our court agreed with decisions of the First Court of Appeals that: "[A]n authorization form that provided only a portion of the requested health care information did not toll the statute of limitations. See Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (authorization form that "omitted physicians who treated [the plaintiff] in the five-year period preceding the 2012 surgery, numerous persons and entities involved in the 2012 surgery at the heart of this case, and a majority of the providers who treated [the plaintiff] after the 2012 surgery" did not toll limitations period); Johnson v. PHCC-Westwood Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC, 501 S.W.3d 245, 251-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (authorization form that excluded five treating physicians and two other health care providers that treated the plaintiff for injuries forming the basis of her claim did not toll limitations period)." Although the authorization form of the appellant, Walthour, included a list of 13 medical providers, Walthour failed to list Advanced Dermatology and Jackson or any other medical provider who treated Walthour after the incident made the basis of this suit.

A claimant's complete failure to provide an authorization form prescribed by § 74.052 precludes tolling. Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 74; Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The same is true of providing an incomplete authorization form or one omitting names of providers required to be included.

Fraudulent concealment is a fact-specific, estoppel counter-defense to an assertion of limitations and has four elements: (1) actual knowledge that a wrong occurred, (2) a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong, (3) the wrong was in fact concealed, and (4) the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the facts upon which fraudulent concealment is premised. See Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011); BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Tex. 2011); Davenport v. Adu-Larty, 526 S.W.3d 544, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Fraudulent concealment will estop a defendant from relying on an established limitations defense only until the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Similarly, an authorization form that provided only a portion of the requested health care information did not toll the statute of limitations. See Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (authorization form that "omitted physicians who treated [the plaintiff] in the five-year period preceding the 2012 surgery, numerous persons and entities involved in the 2012 surgery at the heart of this case, and a majority of the providers who treated [the plaintiff] after the 2012 surgery" did not toll limitations period); Johnson v. PHCC-Westwood Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC, 501 S.W.3d 245, 251-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (authorization form that excluded five treating physicians and two other health care providers that treated the plaintiff for injuries forming the basis of her claim did not toll limitations period). Here, Walthour's authorization form included a list of 13 medical providers identified as "Myra Walthour Medical providers in the past 5 years."

Similarly, an authorization form that provided only a portion of the requested health care information did not toll the statute of limitations. See Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (authorization form that "omitted physicians who treated [the plaintiff] in the five-year period preceding the 2012 surgery, numerous persons and entities involved in the 2012 surgery at the heart of this case, and a majority of the providers who treated [the plaintiff] after the 2012 surgery" did not toll limitations period); Johnson v. PHCC-Westwood Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC, 501 S.W.3d 245, 251-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (authorization form that excluded five treating physicians and two other health care providers that treated the plaintiff for injuries forming the basis of her claim did not toll limitations period). Here, Walthour's authorization form included a list of 13 medical providers identified as "Myra Walthour Medical providers in the past 5 years."