[19] However, we are not restricted solely to the circumstances presented to the trial court at the time of the ruling. Dausch v. State , 616 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ind. 1993). A questionable foundation for the admissibility of evidence may be cured by later testimony.

se qualify), overruled on other grounds byJohnson , 135 S.Ct. 2551 ; United States v. Woods , 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009).E.g., Whitlow v. Indiana, 901 N.E.2d 659, 661–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (the defendant repeatedly struck the victim with a belt, causing severe pain and leaving marks on her body); Buckner v. Indiana, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (the defendant repeatedly struck the victim with his hand and fist, causing severe pain and leaving marks on her body); Sutton v. Indiana, 714 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (the defendant struck the victim twice in the face with an open hand, causing a large contusion to the victim's temple and a swollen knot, plus vision problems and a migraine-like headache that lasted for one to two weeks); Hollowell v. Indiana, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1020–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (the defendant stabbed the victim in the side, causing internal bleeding, a kidney laceration, and a four-centimeter stab wound requiring emergency surgery); Dausch v. Indiana, 616 N.E.2d 13, 15–16 (Ind. 1993) (the defendant beat the victim with his fists over the course of multiple hours, causing the victim to suffer "a broken nose ; swollen shut eyes; and lacerations and bruises to her face, neck, chest, and extremities, with over 20 sutures required for her nose and head injuries"); Schweitzer v. Indiana, 552 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 1990) (the defendant shot the victim in the arm, causing pain greater than the victim had ever experienced); Judy v. Indiana, 470 N.E.2d 380, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (the defendant beat the victim with a cue stick and kicked him continuously for from three to five minutes, breaking the victim's leg in three places and leaving him with a limp); see also Davis v. Indiana, 813 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. 2004) (overturning a criminal recklessness conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury, even though the defendant pushed the victim onto the street and, when she attempted to get up, punched her in the mouth, causing the victim to have a swollen, lacer

In September 1989, Dausch attacked, raped, confined and abused P.D., his former girlfriend. Dausch was convicted of these offenses in an Indiana state court. His convictions were affirmed in Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13 (Ind. 1993). An action for post-conviction relief was filed on October 1, 1999, was withdrawn on April 6, 2000, was refiled on January 15, 2002, and was granted in part and denied in part on January 8, 2004.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that evidence of battered women's syndrome, in the form of her lay testimony and expert testimony, would have been relevant to explain Barrett's motive for remaining with her boyfriend. See also Isaacs, 659 N.E.2d at 1040-41 (evidence of battered women's syndrome admissible to refute defendant's claim that relationship with former wife he was accused of murdering was "friendly"); Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. 1993) (evidence of battered women's syndrome admitted to explain alleged rape victim's recanting of story of abuse at hands of defendant);Carnahan v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) (evidence of battered women's syndrome relevant to credibility of wife who claimed husband had abused her but then recanted at trial); Allen v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (evidence was admitted at sentencing that woman convicted of criminal recklessness had been abused by the victim husband). B. Bar Against Ex Post Facto Laws

When addressing a sufficiency of evidence issue, we will affirm the conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find each element of the charged crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Dausch v. State (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 13, 14-15; Case v. State (1984), Ind., 458 N.E.2d 223, 226; Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 407, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881, 101 S.Ct. 231, 66 L.Ed.2d 105. Application of this standard leads us to reject the analysis of the Court of Appeals majority opinion in favor of that presented by Chief Judge Sharpnack. Initially noting "that this is a very difficult case to consider and that there is an abundance of evidence to support the conclusion that Weaver was under the influence of LSD during the time that the material events occurred," the Chief Judge concluded that the Court of Appeals majority had inadvertently reweighed the evidence and discounted proper evidence and inferences that support the jury's conclusion that Weaver had the capacity to form the intent to kill and acted with that intent.

This evidence is sufficient to support Richey's conviction for domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury. See Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where victim suffered from a broken nose and bruising and required stitches to close her wounds); McFadden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1271, 1275 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (finding sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where defendant had several injuries, including a broken nose, which caused extreme pain).

There are presumably fact patterns under which a trial court might abuse its discretion by declining to instruct a jury about battery resulting in bodily injury as a lesser included offense, but we must affirm the trial court's decision in this case because the injuries Knowles received could have justified a charge of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. See Ind.Code § 35–31.5–2–292 (“Serious bodily injury” defined); see also, e.g., Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind.1993) (broken nose, stitches, and bruising satisfy criteria for “serious bodily injury”); Phares v. State, 506 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ( “eight stitches ... required to close the head wound... was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury”). The statutes criminalizing battery with moderate bodily injury and defining moderate bodily injury became effective in 2014.

Although at trial Graham attempted to discount her injuries and deny they caused her extreme pain, such denials do not render the evidence insufficient. See Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. 1993) (other evidence sustained defendant's conviction for rape, criminal confinement, and battery of his girlfriend despite girlfriend's in-court testimony recanting her allegations against defendant). Based on the testimony of Officer Sofianos and Graham's mother, Graham's pre-trial statements to police, and the photographs and medical records depicting Graham's injuries, the jury was entitled to infer that Graham suffered extreme pain as a result of being struck twice in the face with an open fist, and as such, sustained serious bodily injury. Moreover, we have noted that whether bodily injury is "serious" is a question of degree and therefore more appropriately reserved for the finder of fact. Minniefield v. State, 569 N.E.2d 734, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Ricks v. State, 446 N.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)).

Indiana courts have considered the admissibility of BWS based on the facts of each particular case, not the general nature of a case. For example, BWS has been admitted to demonstrate why a victim of abuse might recant her allegations against her abuser, Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13 (Ind. 1993); to refute a defendant's testimony that he and the victim had a friendly relationship prior to her death, Isaacs, 659 N.E.2d at 1041; and as a mitigating factor for a trial court to consider when sentencing a woman for killing her abuser, Allen v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Although this court has previously prevented the admission of BWS evidence, we did so because the evidence was not sufficient to support it, not because of the lack of a self-defense claim.

In addressing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts will affirm the conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Dausch v. State (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 13. IC 35-43-4-2(a) provides: "A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits Theft, a Class D felony. . . ."