(Citation omitted.) Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 SE2d 53) (1986).Clark v. State, 149 Ga. App. 641, 644 (2) ( 255 SE2d 110) (1979).
Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532 ( 405 S.E.2d 524) (1991).Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712(1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). The existence of criminal intent may be inferred by the trier of fact "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted."
There is no requirement that a victim be actually injured. See Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). Accord Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga. App. 483, 484 (1) ( 433 S.E.2d 664) (1993).
Contrary to defendant's contentions otherwise, there is no requirement that the victim actually be injured by the deadly weapon before a conviction for aggravated assault is authorized. See Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by use of a deadly weapon that establishes the crime of aggravated assault.
[Cit.]" Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1), 712 ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). "Criminal intent rarely can be proved by direct evidence, but its existence may be inferred by the trier of fact `upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.' [Cit.
However, aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)), unlike aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape or rob, does not require a specific criminal intent (compare McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55 (2) ( 322 S.E.2d 87)); rather it requires only a general criminal intent such as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1, which in the case of simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), is a general intent to injure (see Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 269 (2) ( 328 S.E.2d 537)). General intent to injure may be proven by circumstantial evidence and is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. See generally OCGA § 16-2-6; Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53). Criminal intent rarely can be proved by direct evidence, but its existence may be inferred by the trier of fact "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted." OCGA § 16-2-6.
OCGA § 16-11-131. Pistols, even when unloaded, can be considered dangerous weapons, e.g., Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 ( 350 S.E.2d 53). Moreover, even in negligence cases, it has long been recognized that firearms are treated differently: "Where the instrumentality in question is a firearm or other explosive, liability is frequently imposed upon an offending parent, or at the least a jury question as to such liability arises. [Cits.
OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). "Taken in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact of appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) [(1979)]; Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 ( 350 S.E.2d 53) [(1986)]." Davis v. State, 184 Ga. App. 230, 231 (1) ( 361 S.E.2d 229) (1987).
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the two charged crimes. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296, 297 ( 279 S.E.2d 743) (1981). Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., and Banke, P. J., concur.
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to convict appellant of kidnapping and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986); Helton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 662 (1) ( 305 S.E.2d 592) (1983). 2.