Daughtry v. State

13 Citing cases

  1. Turbeville v. State

    268 Ga. App. 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    (Citation omitted.) Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 SE2d 53) (1986).Clark v. State, 149 Ga. App. 641, 644 (2) ( 255 SE2d 110) (1979).

  2. Maynor v. State

    257 Ga. App. 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 23 times
    Noting that simple assault is an attempted battery under OCGA § 16–5–20 that focuses on the intention of the perpetrator to injure the victim

    Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532 ( 405 S.E.2d 524) (1991).Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712(1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). The existence of criminal intent may be inferred by the trier of fact "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted."

  3. Vick v. State

    516 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 6 times

    There is no requirement that a victim be actually injured. See Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). Accord Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga. App. 483, 484 (1) ( 433 S.E.2d 664) (1993).

  4. Gilbert v. State

    209 Ga. App. 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 11 times

    Contrary to defendant's contentions otherwise, there is no requirement that the victim actually be injured by the deadly weapon before a conviction for aggravated assault is authorized. See Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by use of a deadly weapon that establishes the crime of aggravated assault.

  5. Peterson v. State

    419 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that a plain reading of OCGA § 16–5–21 allows that “the crime [of aggravated assault] is complete without proof of injury”

    [Cit.]" Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1), 712 ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986). "Criminal intent rarely can be proved by direct evidence, but its existence may be inferred by the trier of fact `upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.' [Cit.

  6. Cline v. State

    199 Ga. App. 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 20 times
    Noting that criminal intent may be inferred from circumstances connected with the accused's crime

    However, aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)), unlike aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape or rob, does not require a specific criminal intent (compare McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55 (2) ( 322 S.E.2d 87)); rather it requires only a general criminal intent such as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1, which in the case of simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), is a general intent to injure (see Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 269 (2) ( 328 S.E.2d 537)). General intent to injure may be proven by circumstantial evidence and is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. See generally OCGA § 16-2-6; Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53). Criminal intent rarely can be proved by direct evidence, but its existence may be inferred by the trier of fact "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted." OCGA § 16-2-6.

  7. Edmunds v. Cowan

    192 Ga. App. 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 6 times
    Reversing summary judgment on claim for negligentstorage of firearm claim against parent for adult child's use of parent's firearm

    OCGA § 16-11-131. Pistols, even when unloaded, can be considered dangerous weapons, e.g., Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 712 ( 350 S.E.2d 53). Moreover, even in negligence cases, it has long been recognized that firearms are treated differently: "Where the instrumentality in question is a firearm or other explosive, liability is frequently imposed upon an offending parent, or at the least a jury question as to such liability arises. [Cits.

  8. Richardson v. State

    375 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)

    OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). "Taken in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact of appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) [(1979)]; Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 ( 350 S.E.2d 53) [(1986)]." Davis v. State, 184 Ga. App. 230, 231 (1) ( 361 S.E.2d 229) (1987).

  9. Fussell v. State

    369 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 9 times

    The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the two charged crimes. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296, 297 ( 279 S.E.2d 743) (1981). Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., and Banke, P. J., concur.

  10. Garrett v. State

    362 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to convict appellant of kidnapping and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711 (1) ( 350 S.E.2d 53) (1986); Helton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 662 (1) ( 305 S.E.2d 592) (1983). 2.