A "party seeking to recover on the ground of negligence per se must plead a statutory violation." Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). Pleading general negligence alone ordinarily will not give an opposing party fair notice of a specific statutory violation.

(mem. op.) (not designated for publication); see also Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989); see generally McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (using civil cases as persuasive authority regarding rules of evidence). In Daugherty, a civil case, the Texas Supreme Court held that, while Texas courts may take judicial notice of federal law in the absence of a pleading of a specific statute, Rule 202 does not require that a court take judicial notice of federal law.

The failure to plead the sister state's law will not preclude the trial court from taking judicial notice of that law, but rule 202 does not require it. Daugherty v. So. Pac. Transport Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). To assure the application of the laws of another jurisdiction, a preliminary motion is required.

In conducting such review, the appellate court presumes that the jury acted in accordance with the trial court's instructions. See Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). A review of the original jury finding as to attorney's fees could not afford the Barkers the factual sufficiency review to which they were entitled — a factual sufficiency review of a jury finding made in consideration of the correct damages amount.

If the jury could have done so, then the failure to award damages for that particular loss would not be against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Gillette Motor Transp. Co. v. Whitfield, 200 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1947); see also In re K.R., 63 S.W.3d 796, 800-01 (Tex. 2001); Turner, Collie, Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 167 (Tex. 1982); Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). The court of appeals should first consider what evidence is unique to "physical impairment other than loss of vision."

And, the court is presumed both to know the law, state or federal, and to be capable of taking "notice [of] and apply[ing] the proper rule." Lyon Van Lines v. Ogden , 503 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ) ; see alsoW&T Offshore v. Meyers , 577 S.W.3d 247, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (op. on rehearing) ("Meyers was not required to plead for the application of federal or Louisiana law for the trial court, or this court, to take notice of it.") (citing Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. , 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) ).See alsoHowlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose , 496 U.S. 356, 367, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990).

A "party seeking to recover on the ground of negligence per se must plead a statutory violation." Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). A pleading of general negligence alone ordinarily will not give an opposing party fair notice of a specific statutory violation.

Sandoval's negligence per se claim stands on his allegation that DISA violated "DOT regulations," but Sandoval does not "reasonably identify" the regulation that DISA purportedly violated. See Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989). Sandoval did not adduce facts supporting a claim that DISA breached a legal duty arising out of the transportation and routing activities it had contracted to perform.

Meyers was not required to plead for the application of federal or Louisiana law for the trial court, or this court, to take notice of it. See Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) ("The failure to plead sister-state law does not preclude a court from judicially noticing that law."). And Meyers had no need to request that the trial court consider federal or Louisiana law until W&T challenged, after the verdict, the propriety of the jury charge.

Tex. R. Evid. 202(b)(1), (d). Meyers was not required to plead for the application of federal or Louisiana law for the trial court, or this court, to take notice of it. SeeDaugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. , 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) ("The failure to plead sister-state law does not preclude a court from judicially noticing that law."). And Meyers had no need to request that the trial court consider federal or Louisiana law until W & T challenged, after the verdict, the propriety of the jury charge.