Data Proc. Fin. Gen. v. Int'l Bus. Mach

5 Citing cases

  1. Lavapies v. Bowen

    687 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1988)   Cited 8 times

    Generally, non-parties have no right of action based upon a settlement or consent decree. Data Processing Financial General Corp. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970). It has been held that a consent decree is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those who were not parties to it even though they were intended to be benefited by it. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).

  2. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.

    654 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Del. 1987)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that the term sugar as used in the decrees did not include HFCS

    The rationale for strictly limiting standing to sue for violation of antitrust consent decrees was stated in a pre- Blue Chip decision: "To permit enforcement of an antitrust consent decree by third parties in reality makes the decree a statute continuing perhaps in perpetuity, and one withal not enacted by Congress." Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 306 F.Supp. 839, 846 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970); see Gautreaux v. Pierce, 707 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1983) (antitrust consent decree creates enforceable rights in plaintiff only) (Posner, J., concurring). The Blue Chip statement is not limited solely to government antitrust consent decrees, as that case was itself a suit for violation of the securities law.

  3. Golden v. National Finance Adjusters

    555 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Mich. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that "a default judgment entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void"

    It is clear, and plaintiffs concede, that a nonparty to a consent decree entered in a government antitrust suit may not either directly or collaterally enforce the decree against the defendant. United States v. Western Electric Co., 1968 Trade Case ΒΆ 72, 415 (D.N.J.) aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clark Walter Sons Inc. v. United States, 392 U.S. 659 (1968); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., Inc., 448 F.2d 17, 20 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 341 F.2d 1003, 1008 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877, 86 S.Ct. 160, 15 L.Ed.2d 119 (1965); Cinema Service Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 477 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D.Minn. 1969) aff'd sub nom. Data Processing Financial General Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). Plaintiffs contend, however, that they are not seeking to enforce the consent decree, but are merely seeking a declaratory judgment interpreting their rights under the consent decree.

  4. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel

    474 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1979)   Cited 12 times
    Applying usual standard of review of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and noting that the court does not intimate it is applying the Franchise Realty standard

    Other courts, although not all directly confronted by the allegation pleaded here, have interpreted California Motor Transport as creating a cause of action based upon unethical or illegal behavior before an adjudicatory body. See, e. g., Rodgers v. Federal Trade Commission, 492 F.2d 228, 232 n. 6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834, 95 S.Ct. 60, 42 L.Ed.2d 60 (1974); Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Association, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (10th Cir. 1972). Similarly, lower federal courts have interpreted California Motor Transport as excluding gross misconduct in an adjudicatory setting or abuse of process from the Noerr-Pennington immunity.See Rush-Hampton Industries v. Home Ventilating Institute, 419 F. Supp. 19, 24 (M.D.Fla. 1976); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839, 849 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970). None of the cases cited above appear to concur with plaintiff's interpretation that the "sham" exception can only be successfully invoked when literal exclusion from the agency proceedings has occurred.

  5. Davis v. City of Los Angeles

    No. B241631 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014)

    [Citations.]" (Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. (D.Minn. 1969) 306 F.Supp. 839, 845, aff'd sub nom. Data Processing Financial & General Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. (8th Cir. 1970) 430 F.2d 1277.) Thus, "[o]rdinarily non-parties have no right of action based upon a consent decree."