Data Proc. Fin. Gen. v. Int'l Bus. Mach

22 Citing cases

  1. Mills v. United Producers, Inc.

    Case Number 11-13148-BC (E.D. Mich. May. 14, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Def.'s Mot. to Strike ¶ 6. In support, Defendant cites decisions of the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and a Kentucky district court. Def.'s Br. Supp. Mot. to Strike 5-6 (citing Lipsky v Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976); Data Processing Fin. & Gen. Corp. v. IBM, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); and Hyland v. Homeservices of Am. Inc., No. 3:05-cv-612-R, 2007 WL 1959157 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2007)). As Plaintiff succinctly observes, however, Defendant's argument is foreclosed by Sixth Circuit precedent. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. 6-7 (citing United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991)).

  2. Rafferty v. Nynex Corp.

    744 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that where plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment offers no rebuttal to defendants' argument, plaintiff may be deemed to have conceded that issue

    Indeed, it has been specifically established that a private party cannot premise a treble damage action under Section 4 upon violations of a government consent decree. Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502, 504 (N.D.Ohio 1961);See also, Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. Tel. Co., [1979-2] Trade Cas. ¶ 62,974, at 79,547-48 (S.D.Iowa 1979, aff'd, 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980)); Cinema Service Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 477 F. Supp. 174, 177-78 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839, 846 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277, 1278 (8th Cir. 1970). Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Paul M. Harrod by suggesting that it turns on the fact that references to the consent decree would prejudice the jury and that references to it were readily excisable.

  3. Pure Country, Inc. v. Sigma Chi Fraternity

    312 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002)   Cited 264 times
    Holding that, as a procedural matter, it is plainly erroneous for a district court to grant a motion to dismiss and then deny a pending motion to amend as moot, without consideration of the merits of the motion to amend

    As the district court explained, strangers to a consent decree generally do not have standing to enforce a consent decree. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975); Data Processing Fin. Gen. Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'g Control Data Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 306 F.Supp. 839 (D.Minn. 1969). In order for a third party to be able to enforce a consent decree, the third party must, at a minimum, show that the parties to the consent decree not only intended to confer a benefit upon that third party, but also intended to give that third party a legally binding and enforceable right to that benefit.

  4. Allen-Myland v. Intern. Business Mach. Corp.

    33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994)   Cited 80 times
    Reversing finding of no monopolization when lower court erroneously found entry barriers to be low

    This effect is similar to that caused by IBM's past practices of offering tabulating and computer equipment only for lease and not for sale. These practices also spawned antitrust litigation, resulting in a 1935 injunction and a 1956 consent decree. See Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970). We also disagree with the district court's view that AMI admitted that leasing companies "compete with IBM and constrain IBM's ability to set prices or exclude competition in the market for new large scale main frame computers."

  5. Gautreaux v. Pierce

    707 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1983)   Cited 7 times

    This principle has been applied frequently in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Data Processing Financial Gen'l Corp. v. IBM Corp., 430 F.2d 1277, 1278 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Cinema Service Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 477 F. Supp. 174, 177-78 (W.D.Pa. 1979). To reject it would be to turn every consent decree into a statute.

  6. Johnson Products Co. v. F.T.C.

    549 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1977)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that contract law of offer and acceptance did not apply in determining whether a private party could unilaterally withdraw from a consent order prior to its acceptance by the Commission

    In United States v. Swift Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932), for example, the Court summarily rejected the contention that a consent decree should be considered a contract for purposes of determining whether the courts have the power to modify such a decree absent the parties' consent. And, in Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970), the court rejected the argument that a consent decree should be treated as a contract for purposes of determining whether a third party beneficiary action could be maintained for breach of that contract. As Professor Handler has pointed out, treating consent decrees differently in distinct contexts is not inconsistent:

  7. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps

    492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974)   Cited 20 times
    In Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973) the Court of Appeals compared a consent decree which required the appellee to offer its shares to particular non-shareholders, to a contract to purchase.

    ( E. g., Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley Co. (1925) 269 U.S. 42, 46 S.Ct. 61, 70 L.Ed. 155; United States v. ASCAP (2d Cir. 1965) 341 F.2d 1003; Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp. (D.Minn. 1969) 306 F. Supp. 839, aff'd sub nom. Data Processing Financial General Corp. v. IBM Corp. (8th Cir. 1970) 430 F.2d 1277. See Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co. (9th Cir. 1971) 448 F.2d 17, 20.

  8. Lavapies v. Bowen

    687 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1988)   Cited 8 times

    Generally, non-parties have no right of action based upon a settlement or consent decree. Data Processing Financial General Corp. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970). It has been held that a consent decree is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those who were not parties to it even though they were intended to be benefited by it. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).

  9. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.

    654 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Del. 1987)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that the term sugar as used in the decrees did not include HFCS

    The rationale for strictly limiting standing to sue for violation of antitrust consent decrees was stated in a pre- Blue Chip decision: "To permit enforcement of an antitrust consent decree by third parties in reality makes the decree a statute continuing perhaps in perpetuity, and one withal not enacted by Congress." Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 306 F.Supp. 839, 846 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970); see Gautreaux v. Pierce, 707 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1983) (antitrust consent decree creates enforceable rights in plaintiff only) (Posner, J., concurring). The Blue Chip statement is not limited solely to government antitrust consent decrees, as that case was itself a suit for violation of the securities law.

  10. Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft

    555 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1983)

    E.g., Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 1935); Cinema Service Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 477 F.Supp. 174, 178 (W.D.Pa. 1979); Kunc v. ARA Services, Inc., 414 F.Supp. 809, 812 (W.D.Okla. 1976); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 306 F.Supp. 839, 843 (D.Minn. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970). The purpose of excluding consent decrees from the scope of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and from use as evidence in subsequent cases, is to encourage the use of consent decrees to settle antitrust suits.