More specifically, "where a claim sets forth a means for performing a specific function, without reciting any specific structure for performing that function, the structure disclosed in the specification must be considered, and the patent claim construed to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof." Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The phrase at issue here does not use the word "means," and although a claim element might still meet the requirements of § 112, ¶ 6, this does not. In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Com'n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit stated:

" In paragraph 6, Congress sought to provide instruction on the interpretation of "means" claims, "which otherwise might be held to be indefinite." Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ2d 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 12 USPQ2d 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Paragraph 6 "operates to cut back on the type of means which could literally satisfy the claim language."

While encompassing equivalents of those disclosed in the specification, the provision, nevertheless, acts as a restriction on the literal satisfaction of a claim limitation. Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ2d 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If the required function is not performed exactly in the accused device, it must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6, equivalency is not involved.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the claim limitation must be construed to cover structure that is equivalent to the disclosed gears and, in light of the specification, to be equivalent such structure must be capable of producing substantially synchronous rotation. See Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201-02, 1 USPQ2d 2052, 2055-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 975 n. 4, 226 USPQ at 8-9 n. 4. PCM contends that the trial court erred in limiting the claims to a literal requirement for "gears."

Section 112, ¶ 6 acts to allow claims which might otherwise be found indefinite. See Laitram, 939 F.2d at 1536; Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Congress has provided this statute as a specific instruction on interpretation of this type of claim which otherwise might be held to be indefinite"). However, a means-plus-function claim may still be found indefinite if the specification fails to disclose adequate structure corresponding to the claimed function.

Indeed, this Court has stated that: "When trustees seek recovery of allegedly fraudulent conveyances from banks, the outcome of the cases turn on whether the banks actually controlled the funds or merely served as conduits, holding money that was in fact controlled by either the transferor or the real transferee." Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that a bank controls funds where it receives money from a debtor to pay off a debt owed to the bank). Third, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that "FUFTA was not intended to serve as a vehicle by which a creditor may bring a suit against a non-transferee party (like [the bank] in this case) for monetary damages arising from the non-transferee party's alleged aiding-abetting of a fraudulent money transfer."

David's challenge fails, however, because the Federal Rules of Evidence establish that an expert need not have obtained the basis for his opinion from personal perception. See e.g., Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1982); Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Likewise, numerous courts have held that reliance on scientific test results prepared by others may constitute the type of evidence that is reasonably relied upon by experts for purposes of Rule of Evidence 703.

Indeed, section 112, paragraph 6 is rooted in the definiteness requirement of section 112, paragraph 2: "Congress has provided this statute [section 112, paragraph 6] as a specific instruction on interpretation of the type of claim which otherwise might be held to be indefinite." Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir.1987); accord Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 819 (Fed. Cir.1990); see also Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533,1536 (Fed. Cir.1991) ("Absent section 112(6), claim language which requires only a means for performing a function might be indefinite."). Such a claim would, of course, be invalid under section 112, paragraph 2.

The recitation of the word "spring" does not vitiate the patentee's choice. See Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536, 19 USPQ2d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The recitation of some structure in a means-plus-function element does not preclude the applicability of section 112, ¶ 6 [when it] merely serves to further specify the function of the means."). But see Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ2d 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (proper means-plus-function format sets forth a means for performing a specific function without reciting any specific structure for performing that function). Our decision in Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. also is not in conflict with our decision here.

Serrano's proposed construction of the "determination means" as requiring structure for performing digit analysis is thus overly limiting and is contrary to the statement of multiple structures disclosed in the specification. See Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1202, 1 USPQ2d 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that a means clause must be construed to cover the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof). Disclosed structure includes that which is described in a patent specification, including any alternative structures identified.