On a motion for directed verdict or judgment non obstante veredicto, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposite party. Vukich v. City of Detroit, 325 Mich. 644; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62. Accordingly, accepting cross-plaintiff driver's version as true, the facts are that he was driving lawfully, on his right-hand side of the pavement; that if he had seen cross-defendants' automobile earlier, he would have seen it on its own right-hand side of the road giving no indication of impending danger, and he would not have seen it cross to his side of the road until it was only 3 car lengths distant. That was when he actually did see it do so, and then he had a right to assume that its driver would turn it back to its own side where it belonged. It was not negligence as a matter of law for him to so assume or to fail to take steps in the short interval and distance then available to him to avoid the collision.

In reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, it was said (pp 647, 648): "The facts and all inferences therefrom must be construed most favorably for plaintiff on appeal from a directed verdict, Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62. Although we may be in accord with the trial judge as to the improbability of the accident occurring as testified to by plaintiff, this is primarily a question of fact for the jury, and there may be a possibility of reconciling the physical facts with the testimony of plaintiff, considered in the light most favorable to him. Defendant also contends that the verdict was properly directed in its favor as plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not making a proper observation or judgment as to his ability to cross the intersection ahead of the bus.

In determining whether the judgment was properly entered the testimony must be construed as strongly as possible in favor of the plaintiff. Longfellow v. City of Detroit, 302 Mich. 542; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; White v. Herpolsheimer Company, 327 Mich. 462 (26 ALR2d 667). It was the theory and claim of the plaintiff as set forth in her declaration that the sudden application of the brakes by defendant Torando followed the negligence of said defendant in driving at an excessive rate of speed and without making proper observations for traffic passing through the intersection on Hancock avenue. In support of her claim she introduced the testimony of 2 witnesses, McCurry and Chowning. The record indicates that a police officer of the city of Detroit had discovered that McCurry did not have a Michigan license for the operation of an automobile, and that he had directed McCurry to follow him to the police station.

In determining the matters raised on the appeal, it must be borne in mind that the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Lane v. B J Theatres, Inc., 314 Mich. 666; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62. Testimony was introduced from which the jury might well have found that defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of her car. She was called by plaintiff for cross-examination and stated in substance that she had not seen plaintiff before striking her, that plaintiff suddenly loomed in front of the automobile, and that defendant swerved to the left in an attempt to avoid the injury. A police officer who arrived on the scene shortly after the accident testified that defendant made statements to him of a like nature, and that she further stated that she was driving 25 miles per hour at the time.

In considering the situation presented by the record it must be borne in mind that the testimony is to be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62. We think that the testimony relating to the manner in which defendant operated his automobile at the time in question presented factual issues which, if resolved in favor of the plaintiff, might well result in a finding of negligence.

The principal question at issue in the case is whether the trial court was correct in directing a verdict as to defendant Harold Borr. A verdict having been directed against plaintiff, the testimony and the legitimate inferences therefrom must be construed as favorably to him as is reasonably possible. Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; Vukich v. City of Detroit, 325 Mich. 644. It was his claim on the trial and testimony was offered tending to show that defendant Borr pulled entirely out of the lane of westbound traffic and was on the south side of the road as Rowe's automobile came over the crest of the hill up which the tractor and trailer were proceeding, that the Borr car occupied the eastbound traffic lane, and that the lights were of such intensity as to blind defendant Rowe, causing him to lose control of his vehicle. On behalf of plaintiff it was insisted that Borr and Rowe were guilty of acts of negligence that together resulted in the collision of Rowe's car with that of plaintiff, and that in any event the negligence of defendant Borr was a proximate cause of the accident.

"`Contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a plaintiff for failure to anticipate negligent acts of a defendant — no one need anticipate an unlawful act.' "See, also, Guina v. Harrod, 275 Mich. 393; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; White v. Herpolsheimer Company, 327 Mich. 462. The finding of the jury that defendant was guilty of negligence is not questioned.

"Contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a plaintiff for failure to anticipate negligent acts of a defendant — no one need anticipate an unlawful act." See, also, Guina v. Harrod, 275 Mich. 393; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; White v. Herpolsheimer Company, 327 Mich. 462. The finding of the jury that defendant was guilty of negligence is not questioned.

No error. See Morrison v. Grass, 314 Mich. 87; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; Kurta v. Probelske, 324 Mich. 179. Appellant's principal claim of error seems to be that during the trial and in charging the jury error was committed by "injecting" the question of the defendant's insurance.

" See, also, Holmes v. Merson, supra; Dasovich v. Longacre, 324 Mich. 62; White v. Herpolsheimer Company, 327 Mich. 462. Whether negligence on the part of the driver of defendant's bus was the proximate cause of the accident and whether plaintiffs' proofs established Mrs. Staunton's freedom from contributory negligence were, on this record, jury questions.