Opinion
B330485
07-26-2024
BITA DARYABARI et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. EHSAN RAJABI et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Jeff Lewis Law, Kyla Dayton and Jeffrey Lewis for Defendants and Appellants. Alpha Trial Group, Richard K. Welsh, Jeffrey A. Zuidema; Aramesh Law and Arash Ari Aramesh for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 22VECV02533 Huey P. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeff Lewis Law, Kyla Dayton and Jeffrey Lewis for Defendants and Appellants.
Alpha Trial Group, Richard K. Welsh, Jeffrey A. Zuidema; Aramesh Law and Arash "Ari" Aramesh for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
ZUKIN, J.
INTRODUCTION
In social media posts, defendants publicly accused plaintiffs of having financial ties to the government of Iran at a time when the Iranian government was facing widespread criticism for its role in the imprisonment and death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. In response, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging eight causes of action, including claims for defamation and false light. Defendants filed a special motion to strike plaintiffs' entire complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,[ arguing plaintiffs suit constituted a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). The trial court granted defendants' motion as to six of the eight causes of action. Defendants appeal the denial of their motion regarding the defamation and false light claims. Defendants also appeal the trial court's order granting plaintiffs leave to amend the civil harassment claim. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Parties
Plaintiffs and respondents Bita Daryabari (Daryabari) and Shahkar Bineshpajooh (Bineshpajooh) are a married couple. Daryabari is a philanthropist in the Iranian American community and is the founder and executive director of an organization called the PARS Equality Center (PARS). Bineshpajooh is a composer and musician. Defendants and appellants Eshan Rajabi (Rajabi) and Ali Ebrahimzadeh (Ebrahimzadeh) are self-described activists who oppose the current regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and participated in an online campaign meant to shame individuals associated with the Iranian government.
B. Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint
On December 23, 2022, plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting two separate causes of action for defamation, as well as causes of action for false light, civil harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations. They also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions. Plaintiffs allege defendants are the founders of the "Name and Shame" campaign that has targeted plaintiffs and their family. As part of this campaign, defendants have falsely accused plaintiffs of being associated with the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), suggesting that plaintiffs support "the tyrannical government of the Islamic Republic of Iran." Plaintiffs allege NIAC has been under scrutiny for its ties to the Iranian government in the wake of protests against the Iranian government after Mahsa Amini was detained and killed by Iran's Morality Police in 2022. Being labeled a supporter of NIAC or the Iranian government "can have significant and sometimes irreversible impact on one's reputation." In addition to these alleged ties to NIAC, defendants also accused plaintiffs of having direct financial ties to the Iranian government.
Over several weeks, defendants posted about plaintiffs on social media platforms, including Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. In these posts, defendants directed followers to intimidate plaintiffs and members of their family at public events. People have accosted plaintiffs and their family members at "public events, including at concerts, angrily accusing them of the same false information" contained in defendants' social media posts. With the exception of plaintiffs' second cause of action for defamation, these allegations form the basis of all of the claims against defendants. Plaintiffs' second defamation cause of action concerns defendants' social media posts claiming PARS is a for-profit company rather than a non-profit organization.
C. Special Motion to Strike
On February 22, 2023, defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike all of plaintiffs' causes of action. Defendants argued their statements regarding plaintiffs' connections to NIAC and the Iranian government qualified for anti-SLAPP protection because they were made in a public forum and concerned an issue of public interest. Defendants argued plaintiffs could not show a probability of prevailing on any of the causes of action asserted in plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants also argued that "civil harassment" is not a cause of action recognized by California law. Finally, defendants asserted plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue damages allegedly incurred by PARS.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion. In their opposition, plaintiffs argued defendants' statements did not qualify as protected activity. Plaintiffs claimed they were not required to show actual malice because Daryabari is not a public figure. They also argued they were not required to show actual damages because the defendants' statements were defamatory per se and reputational damages were presumed. Plaintiffs' opposition did not include any argument regarding the cause of action for civil harassment.
Defendants' motion was heard on March 23, 2023. Following oral argument, the trial court continued the hearing and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether plaintiffs were required to provide evidence of malice to succeed on their causes of action for false light and civil harassment. The parties filed supplemental briefs.
After the continued hearing on April 12, the court issued a minute order granting defendants' motion in part and denying it in part.[ On the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the trial court held that plaintiffs' claims arise from statements made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. Turning to the question of whether plaintiffs had established a probability of success on the merits, the court addressed the causes of action for defamation and false light together. For the purposes of these claims, the court noted the parties agreed that Bineshpajooh is a limited public figure who must show actual malice to succeed on these claims. The court found plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie case of malice through evidence suggesting defendants made no investigation into the veracity of their claims and made no effort to determine whether the social media posts on which they relied were reliable or credible. It also noted that defendants' refusal to stop their Name and Shame campaign "after Ebrahimzadeh admitted that he had serious doubts about the basis for attacks against plaintiffs may bear some light on his earlier state of mind in publishing defamatory statements and encouraging confrontation by followers." As to Daryabari, the trial court found she was not a limited public figure because she did not voluntarily "thrust herself into the controversy regarding American support of the Iranian government."
It appears there was no court reporter present for either the March 23 or April 12 hearings as no reporter's transcripts from these hearings were included in the record on appeal.
The court also found defendants' statements were defamatory per se, and thus plaintiffs were not required to offer proof of actual damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs' evidence was "sufficient to state a claim for defamation and false light" and denied defendants' motion "as to the first three causes of action." These causes of action include the second cause of action for defamation concerning the corporate structure of PARS. However, the court's minute order does not mention the allegations concerning PARS and instead focuses on the statements regarding plaintiffs' alleged ties to the Iranian government.
The trial court then turned to the cause of action for civil harassment. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that their cause of action for civil harassment was based on section 527.6. The court noted section 527.6 provides a mechanism for obtaining injunctive relief against future harassment rather than redress for past harassment. This mechanism "contemplates filing a petition with the court, rather than alleging a cause of action for damages." The court granted defendants' motion to strike this cause of action, finding plaintiffs had "not alleged the harassment is likely to recur or provided evidence to that effect." Additionally, the court held that plaintiffs' cause of action for harassment "seeks damages and the statute provides only injunctive relief." However, the court granted plaintiffs leave to amend the claim.
The trial court then addressed plaintiffs' remaining claims together. The court granted defendants' motion on all remaining causes of action because plaintiffs did not address these claims in their briefing or illustrate how the evidence offered was sufficient to create a prima facie showing of a probability of prevailing.
On April 14, 2023, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc order amending the April 12 minute order. The order makes two changes to the April 12 order. First, it corrects a typographical error in a statutory reference. Second, it states "Special Motion to Strike is granted as to PARS." While not stated directly, this appears to be a reference to plaintiffs' second cause of action for defamation concerning the corporate status of PARS. Taken together, the April 12 and 14 minute orders indicate the trial court denied defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike as to plaintiffs' first cause of action for defamation and third cause of action for false light. As to the remaining causes of action, the trial court granted defendants' motion to strike while giving plaintiffs leave to amend only their fourth cause of action for civil harassment.
D. Appeal
Defendants timely appealed. On appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred in denying the motion as to the first and third causes of action for defamation and false light. Plaintiffs did not cross-appeal from the court's order granting defendants' motion as to their remaining claims.
DISCUSSION
A. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
The "anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern." (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883-884 (Wilson).) A "cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a two-step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its "burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims 'aris[e] from' protected activity in which the defendant has engaged." (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court decides if the plaintiff "has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
We review the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion de novo, applying the same two-step analysis. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) However, in doing so, we must also keep in mind "'[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' [Citations.]" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
B. Prong One: Protected Activity
"At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must make two related showings. Comparing its statements and conduct against the statute, it must demonstrate activity qualifying for protection. (See § 425.16, subd. (e).) And comparing that protected activity against the complaint, it must also demonstrate that the activity supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff's claims." (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) "At this stage, the question is only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie case that activity underlying a plaintiff's claims is statutorily protected." (Id. at p. 888.)
Protected activity has been statutorily defined to include four categories of statements or conduct. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) Below, defendants argued their statements fell within the third category, which extends protection to "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) Defendants argue their statements were made on social media websites which are considered public forums. Defendants also argued they satisfied the "public interest" requirement because statements "about support for, or opposition to, a repressive foreign regime are a matter of public interest." Alternatively, defendants argued the relationship between the United States and Iran is a matter of public controversy also satisfying this requirement. In their briefing below, plaintiffs' argument on prong one was limited to the assertion that "While American-Iranian relations may be an issue of public interest, it is neither at the core nor the periphery of Defendants' statements or the suit at hand." The trial court agreed with defendants, finding that "support of the Iranian government is a public issue."
On appeal, plaintiffs change tack and argue for the first time that defendants' statements do not qualify as protected activity under the statute because plaintiffs' alleged connections to NIAC, and the Iranian government, are only of interest to a "small, specific audience," and not the public at large. Plaintiffs forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court below. (In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 (Nassimi) ["'"theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal"'"]; Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 857 (Bocanegra) ["'"a party is not permitted to change its position on appeal and raise new issues not presented in the trial court"'"].) As this is the only challenge raised to the trial court's finding under prong one, we therefore affirm the trial court's ruling that defendants satisfied their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute.
C. Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits
Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff "need only establish that his or her claim has 'minimal merit.'" (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff "'must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.'" (Ibid.) Although "'the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.'" (Ibid.) "In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) "However, speculative inferences not supported by the evidence proffered need not be considered." (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 795.) "The prima facie showing of merit must be made with evidence that is admissible at trial." (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1289.)
Defendants raise three issues regarding prong two. First, that plaintiffs failed to produce the required evidence of actual damages to establish a prima facie case for defamation per quod. Second, that plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence of actual malice to meet their burden on the defamation and false light causes of action. Finally, that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs leave to amend the cause of action for civil harassment. We discuss each of these arguments separately.
1. Actual Damages
"Defamation is 'a false and unprivileged publication that exposes the plaintiff "to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." [Citation.]'" (Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1047-1048.) A statement which is defamatory "without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact" is deemed defamatory on its face or defamatory per se. (Civ. Code, § 45a; Yelp Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1, 17; McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) The test is whether a "reasonable reader" would "perceive a defamatory meaning without extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common sense." (Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 386 (Barnes-Hind).) A plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damages where the challenged statement is defamatory per se. (Id. at p. 382.) Instead, in such instances, damage to the plaintiff's reputation is "conclusively presumed." (Ibid.) A defamatory statement is deemed to be defamatory "per quod" if it is not defamatory per se. (Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 351.) Parties asserting defamation per quod must prove actual damages to prevail on their claim. (Barnes-Hind, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 382.)
On appeal, defendants argue that the statements forming the basis of plaintiffs' claims are all oral statements that amount to slander per quod rather than slander per se. Defendants contend that because plaintiffs are alleging slander per quod, they were required to provide evidence of actual damages to satisfy their burden under prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Defendants argue the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs had put forth sufficient evidence of actual damages.
We reject defendants' attempt to cast the subject statements as sounding solely in slander rather than libel. In their briefing below, defendants did not seek to draw any such distinction. Instead, defendants discussed defamation generally without distinguishing between libel and slander. Having failed to allege below that plaintiffs' claims sounded exclusively in slander, defendants forfeited the argument on appeal. (Nassimi, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 695; Bocanegra, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 857.) Moreover, defendants' conclusory assertion that "the alleged statements were made orally" is belied by the plaintiffs' complaint and supporting evidence. Such written statements constitute libel, not slander. (Civ. Code, § 45 [defining libel as "a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation"].) Plaintiffs' first cause of action for defamation is based in part on alleged libel, not just slander.[
The same is true of plaintiffs' third cause of action for false light. A false light cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim and should meet the same requirements of a libel claim. (See De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 865.)
Defendants argue their statements cannot be defamatory per se because they merely suggested a connection between plaintiffs and NIAC, and readers would need extrinsic information regarding NIAC to understand why their statements were defamatory. In other words, defendants are alleging the statements are per quod defamatory because NIAC's connection to the Iranian government is not common knowledge. This argument is unpersuasive.
In making this argument, defendants do not examine any of the specific defamatory statements proffered by plaintiffs. A review of these statements illustrates that defendants' argument is without merit. For example, plaintiffs allege that Rajabi posted a video containing a written caption in Farsi that reads "Ms. Daryabari: you [should] hurt the Islamic Republic's lobby for once since you've helped them so much." In the video itself, Rajabi says, in part, "we presented documents and evidence needed to show . . . Daryabari's financial relations with the disgraced NIAC, the Islamic Republic's lobby." The video also refers to NIAC as a "disgraced organization" and calls on Daryabari to take action against the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of defendants' Name and Shame campaign.
These statements do not require the reader to have any extrinsic knowledge of NIAC to understand that defendants were accusing plaintiffs of activities warranting contempt and ridicule. Instead, defendants' statements expressly accused plaintiffs of direct ties to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not just to NIAC. Even ignoring these accusations of direct ties to the Iranian government, Defendants' statements explicitly described NIAC as a disgraced organization that acted as the lobby for the Iranian regime. In doing so, the statements provided all the context necessary for their readers to understand the defamatory significance of plaintiffs' alleged association with NIAC. Some of defendants' statements also make express reference to the "Name and Shame" campaign. This itself indicates to the reasonable reader that plaintiffs' alleged conduct was worthy of contempt and ridicule.[ Indeed, the goal of the campaign was to subject plaintiffs to public shame in the hope they would cease alleged support of NIAC or the Iranian government.
Defendants' reliance on Barnes-Hind is misplaced. There, the plaintiff conceded "that knowledge of the extrinsic facts alleged was necessary to make the asserted libel apparent to its readers." (Barnes-Hind, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 388.) Plaintiffs have made no such concession here.
On these facts, we conclude a reasonable reader would not need independent knowledge of NIAC to understand the defamatory nature of defendants' statements. Plaintiffs' claim thus amounts to defamation per se and plaintiffs were not required to plead or prove actual damages to defeat defendants' anti-SLAPP. As plaintiffs were not required to establish actual damages, we need not determine whether the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs had put forth sufficient evidence of actual damages, and we decline to do so.
2. Actual Malice
"If the person defamed is a public figure, he must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false." (Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 207, 218.) By contrast, a private figure is "required to prove only negligence, and not actual malice, to recover damages for actual injury to his reputation." (Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 274.)
There is no dispute that Bineshpajooh is a limited public figure who must prove actual malice to succeed in his claim for defamation. Defendants argue Daryabari was required to show actual damages either because she too is a limited public figure or because even private figures must show actual malice when defamatory statements relate to issues of public concern. Even assuming that both plaintiffs were required to prove actual malice, we affirm the trial court's determination that plaintiffs carried their burden to produce circumstantial evidence of actual malice.
The trial court found plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of actual malice through evidence that: (1) defendants failed to investigate the truthfulness of their claims, (2) Ebrahimzadeh displayed signs of regret and remorse regarding his allegations against plaintiffs, (3) he relied on other social media posts without making any effort to determine whether these posts were reliable, and (4) he made these accusations "at a time when those allegations would cause a significant outcry." In their opening brief, defendants ignore the trial court's ruling on this point and claim that plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of malice without discussing the evidence the trial court relied on.
"[O]n appeal, the trial court's judgment is presumed correct, and the burden is on the Appellants to demonstrate reversible error. [Citation.] This is true even on de novo review [citation]." (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 708.) In refusing to acknowledge or address the basis for the trial court's ruling, defendants have failed to establish error. Defendants do not offer argument or authority establishing that the evidence cited by the trial court was insufficient to make a prima facie showing of actual malice. "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited]." (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 ["[m]ere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review"].) In the absence of argument or authority on this issue, we presume the trial court's order was correct and plaintiffs carried their burden to provide sufficient evidence of actual malice.
Thus, even if we were to assume the trial court erred in holding that Daryabari is not a public figure, defendants cannot point to any prejudice flowing from this ruling as plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of actual malice. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573-574 [only prejudicial error constitutes a basis for reversal].) As defendants have not shown the trial court erred in denying its anti-SLAPP motion to strike the first and third causes of action for defamation and false light, we affirm the trial court's ruling as to both causes of action.
3. Civil Harassment
Both sides challenge the trial court's civil harassment rulings. Plaintiffs argue the court erred in striking the cause of action. Defendants contend the trial court properly struck the claim, but erred in granted plaintiffs leave to amend. We conclude both arguments have been forfeited and affirm the trial court's rulings on this cause of action.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court wrongly determined "that an injunction is the exclusive remedy pursuant to section 526.7 [sic]." Plaintiffs also raise arguments regarding the legislative history of section 527.6, "common law harassment," Civil Code section 1708.7, and the sufficiency of the evidence of harassment under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Plaintiffs have forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them below. In their initial opposition to defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, plaintiffs did not address the civil harassment cause of action. At the first hearing, the trial court requested additional briefing regarding a malice requirement in the false light and civil harassment claims. In their supplemental briefing below, plaintiffs argued only that malice was not required for a claim of civil harassment and that "Courts routinely consider and grant injunctive relief for civil harassment even when anti-SLAPP challenges are raised by defendants."
The record on appeal does not include any reporter's transcripts from the hearings on defendants' motion. The record is also devoid of a suitable substitute for those transcripts, such as a settled or agreed statement. "It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record. [Citations.]" (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) The record before us is thus inadequate to show plaintiffs' arguments on appeal were raised in the trial court in the first instance. This is fatal to plaintiffs' claim of error, as plaintiffs may not assert arguments for the first time on appeal. (Nassimi, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 695; Bocanegra, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 857.)
Defendants argue the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs leave to amend this claim. A timely objection, however, was necessary to preserve the claim for appellate review. "'"In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party ordinarily must raise the objection in the trial court." [Citation.] "The party also must cite to the record showing exactly where the objection was made." [Citation.] As the California Supreme Court . . . reaffirmed, "a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court." [Citation.] "The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected." [Citation.]'" (Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1065; see also Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1429 [defendant's forfeited claim of error in granting leave to amend by failing to object in the trial court].)
The record before us does not contain any indication that defendants made a timely objection to the grant of leave to amend. In the absence of a reporter's transcript or suitable alternative, the record before us is inadequate to establish that defendants preserved this argument on appeal. As defendants have not demonstrated they preserved this contention for appeal, we must resolve it against them. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9.) Based on the record before us, we affirm the trial court's rulings on plaintiffs' cause of action for civil harassment.
D. Plaintiffs' Claims of Error
In their brief, plaintiffs allege the trial court erred in granting defendants' anti-SLAPP motion as to the PARS defamation claim. Plaintiffs also allege error in the striking of the emotional distress and interference claims. Plaintiffs have forfeited any challenge to these rulings by failing to file a cross-appeal. "As a general matter, '"a respondent who has not appealed from the judgment may not urge error on appeal."' [Citation.] 'To obtain affirmative relief by way of appeal, respondents must themselves file a notice of appeal and become cross-appellants.'" (Preserve Poway v. City of Poway (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 560, 585; see also Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 665.) There is an exception to this general rule that permits a non-appealing respondent to raise arguments on appeal that provide an alternative basis for affirming the trial court's order. (See, e.g., Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 759, 770.) Plaintiffs' arguments on the remaining causes of action do not provide an alternate basis for affirmance but rather seek reversal of the trial court's order. Accordingly, the general rule applies and plaintiffs had to file a cross-appeal to preserve these issues on appeal. As plaintiffs did not file a cross-appeal, they have forfeited any claims of error regarding the remaining causes of action stricken by the court.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order on defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to strike is affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: CURREY, P. J. MORI, J.