Was the plaintiff entitled to a certain sum? Should the defendant have paid it? Could the latter have determined what was due, either by computations alone or by computation in connection with established market values, or other generally recognized standards?" See also, Dary v. Prov. Police Ass'n. 27 R.I. 377, at p. 385; Bright v. James, 35 R.I. 492, p. 495-6; Durfee v. O'Brien, 16 R.I. 213; Spencer v. Pierce, 5 R.I. 63, 71. The fourteenth exception is overruled.

The question as applied to the precise state of facts presented in the case at bar does not appear to have been considered in any reported case of this court. The respondent cites in his brief three Rhode Island cases in support of his claim, namely, Spencer v. Pierce, 5 R.I. 63; Durfee v. O'Brien, 16 R.I. 213 and Dary v. Providence Police Association, 27 R.I. 377. In Spencer v. Pierce, supra, the question arose on the disallowance of interest by the master in the case on certain sums allowed by him to be due "for labor and service."

In Spencer v. Pierce, 5 R.I. 63, 71, the court, after stating the English rule, says: "The well-settled American rule, on the other hand, is much more liberal in this respect, and gives interest, though not stipulated for, as an invariable legal incident of the principal debt, from the day of default, whenever the debtor knows precisely what he is to pay, and when he is to pay it." See, also, Durfee v. O'Brien, 16 R.I. 213; Dary v. Providence Police Ass'n, 27 R.I. 377. The respondent also asks that the only costs ordered by the decree be the costs of the action up to the present time and that the costs of inquiries before the master should be left for future determination.