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holding absolute immunity applies when clerk's actions are prescribed by court rules
Summary of this case from Florance v. BuchmeyerOpinion
Civil Action No. 4:06-CV-053-Y.
August 15, 2006
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A (B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2) (B)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se plaintiff Eligah Darnell Jr.'s ("Darnell") claims under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e) (2) (B). When this suit was filed, Darnell was a prisoner housed within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Correctional Institutions division. The form civil-rights complaint with attachment pages seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, names as defendants Steven W. Conder, assistant District Attorney; and Troy C. Bennett, clerk, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. (Compl. Style; § IV(B).) Darnell alleges that he twice filed state applications for a writ of habeas corpus under article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, each of which was returned to him because pages were missing and form questions were left unanswered. (Compl. § V, attachment pages.) Darnell alleges that Bennett held up the return of the writs, and deemed them insufficient for "baseless" reasons. He contends that assistant district attorney Conder failed to prepare and file a reply to either application in contravention of state law. Darnell also contends that Bennett removed the missing pages from his applications and failed to provide accurate copies of what was actually filed in the state-court records later submitted to this federal court during the consideration of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Darnell v. Anderson, No. 4:04-CV-910-A. He further alleges that Conder engaged in a conspiracy with Bennett to have the state writ applications returned to him due to procedural inadequacies and that the two defendants engaged a conspiracy to fail to provide accurate copies of the state writ applications for consideration in the § 2254 proceeding. Darnell insists that his right to access to courts was violated because, due to the rejection of his state applications, by the time he sought relief in federal court, his sentence had expired and the federal court was without jurisdiction to consider his claims. (Compl. § V, attachment pages.) Darnell alleges that he sustained mental anguish and severe emotional distress, for which he seeks punitive, compensatory, and nominal damages. (Compl. § VI, attachment pages.)
Since then, he has provided notice of an on-the-street address in Fort Worth, Texas.
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B), a district court retains broad discretion in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should be dismissed. Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity or governmental officer or employee as soon as possible after docketing. Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing that a district court is not required to await a responsive pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry. Rather, § 1915 gives judges the power to "dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." After review of the complaint under these standards, the Court concludes that Darnell's claims must be dismissed.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is frivolous or malicious, but also when "the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e) (2) (A) and (B) (West Supp. 2006).
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e) (2) (West Supp. 2006); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a) (West Supp. 2006).
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Darnell cannot prevail on his claims because each defendant is entitled to absolute immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Absolute judicial immunity can be overcome only if the plaintiff shows that the complained — of actions were nonjudicial in nature or that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Absolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-judicial functions. When absolute immunity is extended to those other than judges, "it is because their judgments are `functionally comparab[le]' to those of judges — that is, because they too, `exercise a discretionary judgment' as a part of their function." The proper focus of the inquiry is not on the identity of the party, but on his official role or function in the context of the case.
Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991), citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-229 (1988) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978); see also, Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
O'Neal v. Mississippi Bd. Of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1997).
Antoine v. Byers Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20 (1976)).
O'Neal, 113 F.3d at 65, citing Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996).
In the context of this case, then the analysis turns to the function performed by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' (TXCCA) clerk Troy Bennett with regard to rejecting Darnell's applications for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that "court clerks `have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's discretion.'" But the focus here is whether Bennett is entitled to immunity for his actions that flow from court rules. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73.1 now mandates that an application for post-conviction habeas corpus relief under article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be filed in the form required by the TXCCA, and specifies the content to be included in such form. Rule 73.2 provides to the clerk of the TXCCA the discretion to return a form not in compliance:
Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tarter v. Jury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)).
TEX. R. APP. P. 73.1(a) and (c).
The clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals may, without filing an application that does not comply with this rule, return it to the clerk of the convicting court, with a notation of the defect, and the clerk of the convicting court will return the application to the person who filed it, with a copy of the official form.
Thus, with regard to Darnell's complaints that his 11.07 applications were rejected by the TXCCA, clerk Bennett was exercising a discretionary function entrusted to him by rule. Although the Fifth Circuit does not appear to have recently considered the question of immunity for a clerk acting in accordance with a court rule, consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Antoine, and the analysis of other circuits, Bennett's actions in refusing to file 11.07 applications that he deemed not to be in compliance with the state rule, are entitled to absolute immunity.
Cf., Williams v. Wood, 612 F.3d 982, 985 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing as examples of instances where clerks were afforded absolute immunity from damage actions, cases where the clerk had acted in accordance with a rule or statute) (citations omitted).
508 U.S. at 436-37 (noting that as the statutory duty of a court reporter to "record verbatim" court proceedings is a ministerial act with no discretion, there is no exercise of judgment to be protected by judicial immunity).
See Harris v. Suter, 3 Fed. Appx. 365, 2006 WL 111586, at **1 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Supreme Court clerk William K. Suter was entitled to absolute immunity for his determination to reject a petition for writ of certiorari that did not comply with Supreme Court rules and was untimely) (unpublished-copy attached); see also Geitz v. Overall, 62 Fed. Appx. 74, 2003 WL 1860542, (8th Cir. 2003) ("Clerks are absolutely immune only for acts that may be seen as discretionary, or for acts taken at the direction of a judge or according to court rule."), citing Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (unpublished — copy attached); Humphrey v. Court Clerk, NDNY, et al., No. 5:05-CV-1159 (NAM) (GJ), 2005 WL 2490155, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2005) ("Since plaintiff's allegations arise out of and relate to actions taken by court personnel which were in accordance with the terms of the Local Rules of Northern District, and pursuant to the direction of a judicial officer, these actions constitute an integral part of the judicial process and are shielded from liability by judicial immunity.")
The doctrine of absolute immunity also applies to defendant assistant district attorney Steven W. Conder. The Supreme Court has consistently held that acts undertaken by a government prosecutor in the course of his role as an advocate for the government are cloaked in absolute immunity. The focus is upon whether the prosecutor is acting "in his role as advocate for the State." Here, even assuming Plaintiff's allegations against Conder are true, he took such action in the role as a prosecutor on behalf of the State of Texas. That Darnell alleges Conder engaged in a conspiracy does not vitiate Conder's immunity from suit. As defendant Conder is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, Plaintiff's claims against him must be dismissed.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1993); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33.
See White v. Stricklin, No. 3:02-CV-688-D, 2002 WL 1125747, at *2 (N.D.Tex. May 23, 2002) (holding that as an assistant district attorney's action in responding to a petition for writ of habeas corpus is taken in his role as an advocate for the State, he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity).
See generally Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors"); Smith v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ.A. No. 95-0821, 1996 WL 39424, at *3 (E.D.La. Jan. 30, 1996) ("The Court has already determined that the underlying acts were protected by absolute immunity; mere allegations that defendants performed those acts in the course of a conspiracy will not be sufficient to avoid absolute immunity"), citing Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. den'd, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985).
The Court notes that an alternative basis for dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages is the limitation on recovery of damages for other than physical injury. As a part of the PLRA, Congress placed a restriction on a prisoner's remedies unless there is a showing of physical injury: "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that this provision bars recovery of damages for mental or emotional injury, absent physical injury, allegedly resulting from a violation of a constitutional right:
42 U.S.C.A. 1997e(e) (West 2003).
We agree with the majority of the other federal circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that it is the nature of the relief sought, and not the underlying substantive violation, that controls: Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury. Thus, as the district court correctly held, Geiger's failure to allege physical injury falls squarely under § 1997e(e)'s bar, precluding his recovery of compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the purported First Amendment violation.
Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Darnell has not alleged any physical injury as a result of the claimed violations of his rights. Thus, Darnell is not entitled to recover damages for his alleged mental and emotional injuries. Any claim for compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury is barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), and must be dismissed under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B).
It is therefore ORDERED that all Plaintiff's claims be and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2) and alternatively, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2) (B) (iii).
Alternatively, all Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i) and (ii).
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