The Court in Darlington Theatres characterized a lottery as a form of gambling which provided for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance. Darlington Theatres Inc. v. Coker, 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782 (1939). While every lottery is a gaming device, not every gaming device is a lottery within the generally recognized meaning of the word.

December 8, 1975.Thomas A. Babb, Esq., of Laurens, for Appellant, cites: As to the drawings conducted by the Laurens County FairAssociation, in which Respondent and Appellant were participating,being a lottery: 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782. As to the Trial Court's having erred in refusing to grantAppellant's motion for nonsuit and judgment non obstanteveredicto if the event resulting in this action was in fact alottery: 94 S.C. 231, 77 S.E. 931; Section 16-501, and Section 16-502 of the Code of Laws for 1962 as amended; 97 S.C. 185, 81 S.E. 501; 112 S.C. 369, 99 S.E. 703; 159 S.C. 526, 157 S.E. 836; 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689. Messrs. Culbertson Whitesides, of Laurens, for Respondent, cite: As to there having been an independent contractand/or a trust or agency relationship between the parties: 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782; 94 S.C. 231, 77 S.E. 931; 1 Bailey, 315; 28 S.C. 463, 6 S.C. 298; 3 Desaus, eq. 125. As to the Trial Court's properly refusingto grant Appellant's motion for nonsuit and judgment nonobstante verdicto: 228 S.C. 29, 88 S.E.2d 776; 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729; 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517. As to the issues raised by Appellant's appeal beingres judicata: 232 S.C. 245, 101 S.E.2d 657; S.C. Constitution of

Messrs. Weinberg Weinberg, of Sumter, for Appellant, cite: As to law of lottery: 190 S.C. 288, 2 S.E.2d 782. As to error on part of Trial Judge in refusing to dismissthe complaint: 94 S.C. 231, 77 S.E. 931, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.), 776, Ann. Cas. 1915-A, 1002; 26 (Cyc.), 1637; 14 Am. Eng. Enc. 602; 20 S.C. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 845; 99 S.E. 703, 112 S.C. 374; 198 S.C. 307, 17 S.E.2d 689; 81 S.E. 501, 97 S.C. 187; 190 S.C. 288, 2 S.E.2d 782; 21 S.E.2d 393, 201 S.C. 67. As to burdenof proving title being on Respondent, and she failed toshoulder such burden: 29 S.E. 659, 51 S.C. 560; 144 S.E. 66, 146 S.C. 322; 23 R.C.L. 932, 934; 107 S.C. 461, 93 S.E. 142. Messrs. George D. Levy and C.M. Edmunds, of Sumter, for Respondent, cite: As to contract or transaction betweenthe parties being separate and wholly independent from thealleged illegal lottery: 77 S.E. 931; 262 Ky. 640, 90 S.W.2d 63. As to all the evidence pointing to "no gift" andthis question should not have been submitted to the jury: 81 F.2d 914, 110 A.L.R. 281; 10 N.E.2d 966, 367 Ill. 185; 86 F.2d 710, 90 L.Ed. 1030; 103 F.2d 81, 81 L.Ed. 406; 91

Messrs. M.L. Meadors and H.L. Smith, Jr., for appellant, cite: Jurisdiction: 187 S.C. 525; 198 S.E., 25; 190 S.C. 8; 1 S.E.2d 900; 161 S.C. 49; 159 S.E., 490. Residence of domestic corporation: 2 Rich. L., 512; 47 S.C. 387; 25 S.E., 283; 74 S.C. 438; 54 S.E., 657; 74 S.C. 69; 54 S.E., 218; 79 S.C. 555; 61 S.E., 202. Agency: 73 S.C. 526; 53 S.E., 991; 33 N.W., 653; 40 N.E., 527; 20 A., 760; 172 U.S. 602; 43 L.Ed., 569; 124 S.C. 346; 117 S.E., 594; 65 S.C. 326; 43 S. Ed., 569; 818; 86 S.C. 258; 68 S.E., 465. Change of venue: 120 S.C. 478; 113 S.E., 318; 145 S.C. 539; 143 S.E., 269; 163 S.C. 33; 161 S.E., 174; 173 S.C. 338; 175 S.E., 810; 5 S.E.2d 286; 158 S.C. 496; 155 S.E., 826; 183 S.C. 545; 191 S.E., 516; 108 S.C. 234; 94 S.E., 109. Messrs. George W. Keels, G. Badger Baker and W. StokesHouck, for respondent, cite: Confirmation of findings oflower Court: 124 S.C. 346; 117 S.E., 594; 30 A.L.R., 168; 145 S.C. 539; 143 S.E., 269; 163 S.C. 33; 173 S.C. 338; 190 S.C. 282; 2 S.E.2d 782; 114 S.C. 488. Agency: 190 S.C. 282; 114 S.C. 488; 104 S.E., 30; 97 S.C. 148; 81 S.E., 97; 135 S.C. 365; 133 S.E., 834; 185 S.C. 523; 194 S.E., 642; 114 A.L.R., 1244; 180 S.C. 177; 185 S.E., 541. July 31, 1940.

1 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina: 82 C.J.S. 924-928, Sec. 389; 141 S.C. 207, 139 S.E. 386; 96 S.C. 5, 79 S.E. 641; 119 N.E.2d 322; 99 S.C. 218, 82 S.E. 1048; 203 Ark. 1129, 160 S.W.2d 218; 128 Conn. 160, 20 A.2d 737; 217 S.C. 345, 60 S.E.2d 682; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645. As to conviction of Appellant, who doesnot have and has never had a driver's license, under Section 46-192.1 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolinabeing clearly unconstitutional: 248 S.C. 386, 149 S.E.2d 913; 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782; 141 S.C. 207, 139 S.E. 386; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 389; 378 U.S. 347, L.Ed.2d 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697; 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332; 347 U.S. 612, 617, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S. Ct. 808; 306 U.S. 451, 83 L.Ed. 888, 59 S.Ct. 618; 378 U.S. 353; 5 Wheat 76, 5 L.Ed. 37; 378 U.S. 355, 12 L.Ed.2d 901. As to scope in dealing with a penal statuteinvolving severe penalties, and the Courts will not extendthe scope of prohibition by liberal construction of thewords used: 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782. Messrs. T. Kenneth Summerford, Solicitor, and DavidW. Keller, Jr., of Florence, for Respondent, cite: As to theoffense of Appellant coming with a reasonable constructionof the statute involved: 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736; 7 Am. Jur.2d 668; 86 S.E.2d 466, 125 A.L. R. 1455; 249 S.C. 399, 154 S.E.2d 674; 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737; 278 F. Supp. 725; 146 N.W.2d 373; 202 N.E.2d 120.

Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, Ben T.DeBerry, Assistant Attorney General, of Columbia, and W.K. Charles, Jr., Attorney for City of Greenwood, of Greenwood, for Appellant, cite: As to error on part of trial Judgein holding that coin-operated free-play, non-payout pinballtables are not subject to seizure and destruction under theprovisions of Section 5-622 of the South Carolina Code ofLaws, when they are used as gambling devices: 212 S.C. 399, 47 S.E.2d 833; 78 F. Supp. 918, aff. 335 U.S. 803, 69 S.Ct. 56, 93 L.Ed. 360; 207 S.C. 284, 35 S.E.2d 835, 162 A.L.R. 1184; 354 U.S. 271, 1 L.Ed.2d 1337, 77 S.Ct. 1099, reh. den. 354 U.S. 495, 1 L.Ed.2d 1558, 77 S.Ct. 1423; 371 P.2d 805; 18 N.J. 441, 114 A.2d 257; 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782. Messrs. Nicholson Nicholson, of Greenwood, and Belser,Belser Baker, of Columbia, for Respondents, cite: As tothe machines not being subject to seizure and destructionunder the authority of Section 5-622 because under that sectionsuch a machine must be "prohibited by Section 5-621",whereas the machines here involved are expressly exceptedfrom Section 5-621: 192 S.C. 176, 6 S.E.2d 20; 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630; 212 S.C. 399, 47 S.E.2d 833; 78 F. Supp. 918, aff. 335 U.S. 803, 69 S.Ct. 56, 93 L.Ed. 360. As to rule that criminal statutes must bestrictly construed and any doubt must be resolved againstthe State: 216 S.C. 182, 57 S.E.2d 165; 225 S.C. 232, 81 S.E.2d 342; 1955-56 Op. Atty. Gen. 303; 1954-55 Op. Atty. Gen. 105. As to a machine not being a"lottery": 34 Am. Jur., Lotteries, Sec. 2; 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 783. As to Supreme Court not consideringmatters not considered by lower Court: 94 S.C. 366, 77 S.E. 1108; 233 S.C. 210, 104 S.E.2d 384; 231 S.C. 613, 105 S.E.2d 201; 233 S.

J.A. Hutto and F. Ehrlich Thomson, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to habeas corpus being properwhere sentence imposed is excessive: 194 S.E. 21, 185 S.C. 296; 132 S.C. 199, 128 S.E. 882-886. As to rule thatpenal statutes must be strictly construed: 190 S.E. 28, 2 S.E.2d 782; 141 S.C. 207, 139 S.E. 386; 22 S.C. 301; 2 Bailey 335. Messrs. John M. Daniel, Attorney General, R. HokeRobinson and James S. Verner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the rule governingthe interpretation of statutes: 99 S.C. 218, 82 S.E. 1048; 2 S.E.2d 782, 190 S.C. 282; 196 S.C. 497, 14 S.E.2d 29. As to the meaning of "original sentence": 107 S.C. 413, 93 S.E. 134; 115 S.E. 742, 122 S.C. 48; 115 S.E. 760, 123 S.C. 28; 302 U.S. 211, 82 L.Ed. 204. As to the period required to be served, plus the period ofparole or probation, making up the full term of the sentence: 115 S.E. 760, 123 S.C. 28; 19 S.E.2d 525, 193 Ga. 684; 63 F. Supp. 633; 10 A.2d 842, 138 Pa. Sup. 215; 199 A. 185, 330 Pa. 289; 12 A.2d 510, 139 Pa. Sup. 414; 203 S.C. 90, 26 S.E.2d 319; 201 S.C. 221, 22 S.E.2d 590; 202 S.C. 533, 25 S.E.2d 745; 201 S.C. 344, 23 S.E.2d 17.

Messrs. Mozingo Watts, and C.R. Parrott, of Darlington, for Appellant, cite: As to the Code of 1942 beingthe only general statutory law: 145 S.E. 695, 148 S.C. 118. Messrs. Dargan, Paulling James, and Samuel Want,James S. Verner, Sam Rogol, and Leroy M. Want, all of Darlington, for Respondents, cite: As to requirement thatpenal statutes be strictly construed: 25 R.C.L. 1081; 139 S.E. 386, 141 S.C. 207; 2 S.E.2d 782, 190 S.C. 282. As to the power of the Court to examine and consider thehistory of the statutes in order to determine the true intentionof the Legislature: 151 S.E. 279, 154 S.C. 129; 45 S.E. 211, 67 S.C. 312; 45 S.E.2d 850, 211 S.C. 432; 102 U.S. 1, 26 L.Ed. 59. November 4, 1948.

Proceeding by Julian B. Weston, Jr., and others, against the Board of Commissioners of the Police Insurance and Annuity Fund of the State of South Carolina, to review the action of the Board of Commissioners in disallowing a claim made by the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of Julian B. Weston, Sr., deceased. From a judgment sustaining the action of the Board, the plaintiffs appeal. Messrs. McEachin Townsend for appellants, cite: Constructionof statutes: 10 Pet., 526; 9 L.Ed., 519; 3 S.C. 423; 134 S.C. 402; 132 S.E., 680; 185 S.C. 313; 194 S.E., 139; 188 S.C. 187; 198 S.E., 392; 246 U.S. 547; 62 L.Ed., 876; 192 S.C. 271; 6 S.E.2d 271; 190 S.C. 282; 2 S.E.2d 782; 43 C.J., 813; 59 C.J., 1106; 102 S.C. 77; 86 S.E., 195; 102 S.C. 483; 86 S.E., 1057; 1 S.E.2d 251; 180 S.C. 329; 185 S.E., 491; 307 U.S. 214. Messrs. Heyward Brockinton and John W. Crews for respondent, cite: Construction of statutes: 104 S.C. 342; 88 S.E., 894; 176 S.C. 404; 180 S.E., 348; 25 R.C.L., 960; 171 S.C. 221; 171 S.E., 42; 90 A.L.R., 915; 290 U.S. 645; 78 L.Ed., 560; 68 S.C. 1054; 87 S.E., 102; 166 S.C. 99; 164 S.E., 434; 149 S.C. 178; 146 S.E., 815; 164 S.C. 313; 162 S.E., 334; 143 S.C. 104; 141 S.E., 180; 164 S.C. 383; 162 S.E., 444; 169 S.C. 314; 168 S.E., 722; 180 S.C. 491; 186 S.E., 395; 183 S.C. 38; 190 S.E., 249; 182 S.C. 72; 188 S.E., 508; 192 S.C. 308; 6 S.E.2d 473; 135 S.C. 190; 133 S.E., 709; 144 S.C. 366; 142 S.E., 651; 165 S.C. 219; 163 S.E., 653; 169 S.C. 439; 169 S.E., 174.

Perry A. Shumpert was convicted of having unlawful possession of alcoholic liquors in his place of business other than a licensed liquor store and he appeals. Messrs. R.B. Hildebrand and John T. Roddey, for appellant, cite: Construction of penal statutes: 141 S.C. 207; 139 S.E., 386; 25 R.C.L., 1081; 22 S.C. 301; 2 Bailey, 335; 67 S.C. 312; 45 S.E., 211; 71 S.E., 208; 50 S.E., 782; 96 S.C. 5; 79 S.E., 641; 90 S.C. 412; 73 S.E., 769; 99 S.C. 218; 82 S.E., 1048; 13 S.C. 46; 113 S.C. 99; 101 S.E., 285; 36 Cyc., 1186; 190 S.C. 282; 2 S.E.2d 782; 286 F., 833; 33 A.L.R., 315; 63 A.L.R., 292; 62 S.E., 574; 61 S.E., 917; 60 S.E., 1082; 30 S.E., 992; 48 C.J., 1213. Admissibility of evidence of formerviolations: 151 S.E., 233; 128 S.E., 709; 98 S.C. 117; 82 S.E., 278; 120 S.C. 207; 112 S.E., 921; 128 S.C. 411; 123 S.E., 260; 180 S.E., 809. Mr. W.G. Finley, Solicitor, for the State, cites: "Placeof business" defined: 48 C.J., 12; 90 S.E., 989; 115 A., 609; 149 S.C. 84; 146 S.E., 695. Admissible evidence: 153 S.E., 341. Indictment: 64 S.C. 350; 42 S.E., 175.