Doe v. Dep't of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Substance Abuse Servs., 1997 ME 195, ¶ 8, 699 A.2d 422, 424 (citing Bangor Publ'g Co. v. City of Bangor, 544 A.2d 733, 736 (Me. 1988)); see also Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 16, 715 A.2d 148, 153. [¶ 9] We review the Superior Court's interpretation of the FOAA de novo. Dow v. Caribou Chamber of Commerce Indus., 2005 ME 113, ¶ 8, 884 A.2d 667, 669; see also Darling's v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 ME 22, ¶ 6, 892 A.2d 461, 464. When interpreting a statute, we accord its words their plain meaning.

" Kinney v. Me. Mut. Group Ins. Co., 2005 ME 70, ¶ 15, 874 A.2d 880, 884. "We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo." Darling's v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 ME 22, ¶ 6, 892 A.2d 461, 464 (citing Landis v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 2000 ME 111, ¶ 9, 754 A.2d 958, 960). When interpreting a statute, we accord its words their plain ordinary meaning.

Whatever merit there might have been to GM's position, Maine's Supreme Judicial Court recently decided the issue against it and consistent with the district court's ruling. See Darling's v. Ford Motor Co., 892 A.2d 461, 464-65 (Me. 2006) (holding that a manufacturer must issue final decisions on warranty claims within the statutory period). As a federal court sitting in diversity, we are obliged to give effect to the SJC's authoritative construction of the Maine statute.

We have previously addressed sections of the Dealers Act related to reimbursement for warranty repairs and parts. See, e.g., Darling's v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 ME 22, 892 A.2d 461. This appeal presents the more fundamental questions of what constitutes a “franchise” for purposes of the Dealers Act and what authority is delegated to the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board to enforce the Act's provisions.