Darling v. Mayor

4 Citing cases

  1. Brindley v. Borough of Lavallette

    33 N.J. Super. 344 (Law Div. 1954)   Cited 13 times

    Consequently, the area is subject to a dedication from which the owner-developer or its grantees cannot withdraw, and which the municipality may formally accept if and when it desires to act. Darling v. Jersey City, 73 N.J. Eq. 318 ( Ch. 1907). Further, plaintiffs Brindley, Hoffman and Purdy contend that they own the fee of the area in front of their lots.

  2. Osterweil v. Newark

    182 A. 917 (N.J. 1936)   Cited 17 times

    The contemporary conveyance of parts of the eight-foot strip to private owners by Beach has been before referred to. Even though the express limitations as is indicated in the deeds to Bolles and Gardner were lacking, nevertheless such conveyance did not militate against the fact of dedication as the titleholder at all times had the right to use the property lawfully, subject, however, to the dedication. Darling v. Jersey City,73 N.J. Eq. 318, and cases there cited. Acquiescence by respondent in user by predecessors in title of appellants, even if proved, is immaterial for the reason before stated. It is immaterial also that the formal acceptance by the city was approximately one hundred years after the dedication.

  3. Bacon v. Miller

    247 N.Y. 311 (N.Y. 1928)   Cited 27 times
    In Bacon v Miller, 247 N.Y. 311, 160 N.E. 381, 57 A.L.R. 456 (1928), Judge Martin of the Court of Appeals explained that "there is no vested right in the name of the street or in the number originally assigned to a house upon the street.

    ) There is no occasion to determine whether a different test would be applied if vested rights of property were interfered with under the guise of the police power, or if the ordinance were sought to be sustained under an implied power, or were less specific and exclusive. Here there is no vested right in the name of the street or in the number originally assigned to a house upon the street. The power to change the name of streets is akin to the power vested in the Boards of Aldermen and Common Councils to change the grade of streets or to close them altogether. ( McCabe v. City of New York, 213 N.Y. 468; Darling v. Jersey City, 80 N.J.L. 514; affd., 84 N.J.L. 758; Eldridge v. Fawcett, 128 Wn. 615.) The case of Anderson v. Lord Mayor Corporation of Dublin (15 Law Reports [Ireland], 1885, 1886, page 410) cited below, was limited in effect to the interpretation of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act of 1847. This was held to give the commissioners no power to change names once given, in this instance, the name of Sackville street to O'Connell street.

  4. Hercules Trust Estate v. Gauzzi

    177 A. 99 (Ch. Div. 1935)

    Camden v. McAndrews, etc., Co., supra. But the complainant says that in order to constitute a dedication of a public highway there must first be an acceptance by the public; citing Booraem v. North Hudson County R. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 557, 5 A. 106; Holmes v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; Darling v. Jersey City, 73 N. J. Eq. 318, 67 A. 709; Arnold v. City of Orange, 73 N. J. Eq. 280, 66 A. 1052; Wheeler v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 97 N. J. Law, 364, 118 A. 206; and it (complainant) alleges that there has been no act, formal or otherwise, by the borough, which would constitute an acceptance. It emphasizes the fact that the contract between the Building & Loan Association and the borough is definite evidence that the borough did not accept or regard Schuler avenue as dedicated to the public, but it points out that the borough, in the contract, referred to, treated, and designated Schuler avenue as a "private street or highway."