Opinion
No. 4D2022-2433
11-01-2023
Debra DARLING f/k/a Debra Darling-Ill, Appellant, v. Charles L. ILL, III, Appellee.
Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Adam M. Zborowski and Matthew S. Nugent of Nugent Zborowski, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Karen M. Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502019DR006615XXXX.
Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Adam M. Zborowski and Matthew S. Nugent of Nugent Zborowski, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
Forst, J.
Appellant Debra Darling ("Former Wife") appeals the trial court’s denial of her renewed motion to enforce a prenuptial agreement (the "Agreement") in favor of appellee Charles L. Ill, III ("Former Husband"). After the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage, Former Wife moved to enforce the Agreement, which she claimed entitled her to two lump sum payments totaling $1,465,000.00 after a final dissolution judgment was entered. Former Husband argued the motion was premature because arbitration had not been completed, and the trial court denied the motion.
After arbitration, Former Wife renewed her motion to enforce. However, the trial court found that its previous denial was a final order and that Former Wife’s second motion to enforce was barred by res judicata. As we conclude that the trial court’s res judicata finding was erroneous, we reverse and remand for the trial court to adjudicate the merits of Former Wife’s renewed motion to enforce the Agreement and specifically, her entitlement to the lump sum payments under the Agreement.
Background
Before the parties were married, they entered into a prenuptial agreement. The Agreement did two things relevant to the instant case. First, it required Former Husband to pay Former Wife two lump sum payments: $465,000 within 45 days of a final dissolution judgment and $1,000,000 within 60 days of a final dissolution judgment. Second, it required the parties to arbitrate any disputes concerning the Agreement’s interpretation, and allocated arbitration costs and fees. Former Husband would pay costs and fees upfront, but he could deduct half the arbitration costs and all Former Wife’s attorney’s fees from any amounts due under the Agreement.
Eventually, Former Wife filed a petition for dissolution, asking the court to determine a variety of issues, none of which involved the two lump sum payments. Shortly after this petition was filed, the trial court confirmed the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. Former Wife then moved to bifurcate the issues appropriate for arbitration and the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Former Wife’s position was that a final judgment would entitle her to the two lump sum payments, regardless of whether the judgment was entered before or after arbitration. The trial court granted Former Wife’s motion to bifurcate, explaining, in pertinent part:
The terms of the Prenuptial Agreement require the Husband to pay the Wife certain moneys, the timing of which is triggered by the entry of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Given the findings of this Court and the absence of any traditional family law issues, the Court finds the Wife is entitled to the immediate entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.
The trial court then entered its final dissolution order, and Former Wife sought the lump sum payments from Former Husband. After Former Husband failed to pay, Former Wife filed a motion to enforce, arguing the trial court’s final dissolution judgment entitled her to the payments.
At the hearing on Former Wife’s motion, Former Husband admitted he had not paid Former Wife the payments, arguing that he did not owe Former Wife the payments "at this time":
So as we sit here today, they’re asking for a certain part to be enforced when they come to court, and they haven’t complied with the terms of the agreement themselves, particularly arbitration and particularly the provision in the agreement that says this case shall be finalized within 60 days, all issues, not just she gets paid her money, and then we go on and do the rest of the case. It
says all issues shall be finalized. So I would submit to Your Honor that the motion is premature. It should be denied at this point.
... So it’s our position the motion should be denied. We should go through arbitration, finalize the case, and then figure out who owes what.
(Emphasis added).
The trial court then denied Former Wife’s motion to enforce, without explanation. Former Wife moved for rehearing, arguing that the trial court’s failure to state whether the denial was with or without prejudice meant that she could be barred from ever enforcing the Agreement. Her motion for rehearing was also denied without explanation.
Relying on Former Husband’s argument that arbitration needed to be finalized before she could receive the lump sum payments, Former Wife did not appeal the trial court’s denial. Instead, she waited until after arbitration had concluded and then filed a renewed motion to enforce.
The trial court denied Former Wife’s renewed motion on the basis that it was barred by res judicata. Specifically, the trial court found that its first denial was a final order because the order’s failure to specify the grounds for denying the motion made it a final adjudication on the merits. The trial court also pointed out that because Former Wife’s motion for rehearing acknowledged the denial could have been with prejudice, Former Wife’s failure to appeal that decision meant res judicata applied. This timely appeal followed.
Analysis
[1] We review whether res judicata applies de novo. Aronow?tz v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 174 So. 3d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
[2-4] "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action and is conclusive of all issues which were raised or could have been raised in the action." Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Res judicata has the same preclusive effect regardless of whether the claim was asserted in the same or a different proceeding. See Pelphrey-Weigand v. Weigand, 283 So. 3d 822, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). "The party claiming the benefit of the former adjudication has the burden of establishing ... that the matter was formerly adjudicated." Wisconsin ex rel North v. Martorella, 670 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
[5] Res judicata applies if there is a prior adjudication that has: "1) identity in the thing sued for; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of persons and parties of the action; and 4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made." Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Cowie v. Orlowski, 184 So. 3d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting W & W Lumber of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Town & Country Builders, Inc., 35 So. 3d 79, 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).
To show these identities, courts have required a "clear-cut former adjudication," because determining whether these identities are present involves analyzing which facts were essential to the maintenance of the action. See, e.g., Suniland Assocs., Ltd. v. Wilbenka, Inc., 656 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Badra, 765 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Universal Constr. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 68 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 1953) ("[S]imple justice demands there be an unquestionable, direct and official adjudication of such question." (emphasis omitted)). [6] Thus, res judicata does not apply to a judgment "which might have rested on either of two grounds, only one of which goes to the merits." deCancino v. E. Airlines, Inc., 283 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1973); see, e.g., Topps ?. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004) ("[U]nelaborated orders denying relief ... shall not be deemed to be decisions on the merits ... unless there is a citation to authority or other statement that clearly shows that the issue was considered by the court on the merits and relief was denied." (emphasis omitted)); Ocala Breeders' Sales Co. v. Brunetti, 567 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding res judicata unavailable because "the arbitrators’ award did not state the basis of the award and made no specific finding on the merits of the contract and misrepresentation claims"); Stewart v. Driscoll, 87 So. 3d 25, 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("[F]or res judicata to apply, there must be a "‘clear-cut former adjudication" on the merits.’" (quoting Badra, 765 So. 2d at 254)).
[7] In the instant case, Former Husband has not met his burden of showing that the denial of Former Wife’s first motion to enforce was a "clear cut" adjudication on the merits. The trial court’s order did not explain why it denied the motion, and both parties have admitted that they do not know why the trial court denied the motion.
Former Husband argued that Former Wife’s initial motion to enforce was premature because (1) Former Wife’s lump sum payments were required to be reduced by half of whatever Former Husband spent on arbitration and Former Wife’s attorney’s fees, and (2) the final dissolution judgment was not yet a "final judgment of dissolution of marriage" under the Agreement, as issues remained set for arbitration. Nothing in the record shows the trial court denied Former Wife’s motion to enforce on the merits. Instead, the trial court clearly relied on Former Husband’s argument that arbitration should be concluded before determining "who owes what." Therefore, the trial court erred in applying res judicata to Former Wife’s renewed motion to enforce. See also Tampa Pipeline Tramp. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 614 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that where a trial court’s order granting motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings did not specify the grounds upon which it relied, it was "unclear whether the trial court intended the final judgment to be an adjudication on the merits ... or whether the court found that the action was merely premature"; and, where "the dispute resolution mechanism of the contract is clear and unambiguous and was not complied with by [appellant], [the appellate court] must conclude that the [trial] court only determined that the action was premature.").
We reject without discussion Former Husband’s unclean hands argument. We do note, however, that Former Husband’s unclean hands argument is premised on the fact that Former Wife’s motion to enforce was premature.
Conclusion
Res judicata requires a "clear-cut" adjudication on the merits and it is evident from the record that Former Wife did not receive one. The unclear nature of the trial court’s order in combination with Former Husband’s prematurity argument, lead us to conclude that the trial court must have denied Former Wife’s motion because it was filed prior to arbitration. Now that arbitration is finished, Former Wife is entitled to her day in court. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to adjudicate the merits of Former Wife’s motion to enforce the Agreement and spe- cifically, her entitlement to the lump sum payments under the Agreement.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Ciklin and Conner, JJ., concur.