{¶4} Petitioner does not establish that a specific statutory ground for termination was satisfied in this case. See In re Adoption Petition of Darla D., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 14-15, 382 P.3d 1000 (noting that strict statutory compliance under the Adoption Act is required). Although Petitioner notes that Darla D. addressed the right to counsel, and Respondent waived this right in the present case, the strict compliance standard for either statutory process for terminating parental rights must be followed. [MIO 5] State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams.

Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016- NMCA-093, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 1000 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"The standard of proof for termination of parental rights is clear and convincing evidence." Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶ 36, 382 P.3d 1000. Notwithstanding this demanding standard of proof, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the district court as to any factual matter.

Actions to terminate parental rights "must be conducted with scrupulous fairness" to comply with due process requirements. Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 1000 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, "[e]ven where specific findings adopted by the trial court are shown to be erroneous, if they are unnecessary to support the judgment of the court and other valid material findings uphold the trial court's decision, the trial court's decision will not be overturned." Normand v. Ray, 1990-NMSC-006, ¶ 35, 109 N.M. 403, 785 P.2d 743; see Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 66-67, 382 P.3d 1000 (acknowledging that even where some evidence is excluded, termination of parental rights may be appropriate if the remaining evidence supports termination). As we explain below, setting aside the specific hair follicle test results Mother claims were erroneously admitted, substantial evidence supports the district court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to Children.

See State of N.M. ex rel Children, Youth & Families v. Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 9-10, 141 N.M. 535, 157 P.3d 714 (indicating that Section 39-1-1 motions are viable means of preserving issues in TPR cases). Nevertheless, to the extent that Mother and her attorney may have been unaware of the subsequent development, [MIO 11-12] and in light of the fundamental interests at stake, see In re Adoption Petition of Darla D., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 1000, we will consider Mother's arguments under the auspices of the doctrine of fundamental error. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Paul P., Jr., 1999-NMCA-077, ¶ 14, 127 N.M. 492, 983 P.2d 1011