Opinion
NO. CY-03-3O99-EFS
September 5, 2003
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
A hearing was held in the above-captioned matter on September 3, 2003. Plaintiff Darigold, Inc. ("Darigold") was represented by Henry Farber, and David Ballew appeared on behalf of Defendant Teamsters, Local 524 ("the Union"), Darigold seeks a declaration that the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties did not terminate on July 31, 2003, that it continues in full force and effect for one year, and that the CBA prevents a strike by the Union. The Union presents the following arguments in response: (1) that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under either the Declaratory Judgment Act or the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), (2) in the event the Court finds subject matter jurisdiction, the Union has the right to strike during reopening since it did not clearly and unmistakably waive this right in the CBA, and (3) if the Court finds the CBA ambiguous, the matter must be submitted to arbitration. After listening to oral argument and reading the submitted material and applicable statutory and case law, the Court is fully informed and enters the following declaration: the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the CBA did not terminate, and the Union did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to strike during a reopening.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Union is correct that the Declaratory Judgment Act itself does not provide subject matter jurisdiction. Textron Lycoming v. United Autos. Workers, 523 U.S. 653, 660-61 (1998); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1986). The Declaratory Judgment Act serves only to enlarge the range of available remedies and does not extend the jurisdiction of federal courts. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction must exist under the LMRA; the Court finds that it does.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides:
[i]n a case of actual controversy, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
The Labor Management Relations Act provides that,
[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This statute specifically provides subject matter jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts." Id. Accordingly, the question is whether a "violation of contract" has occurred. The Union has not yet struck, but has notified Darigold that it does intend to strike.
The Supreme Court in Textron Lycoming v. United Automobiles Workers, 523 U.S. 653, 657-58 (1998), held that the district court did not have jurisdiction under LMRA § 301 because the dispute was over the validity of the CBA itself, i.e. whether the CBA was fraudulently entered into due to alleged misrepresentations, and not whether the agreement itself was violated. "`Suits for violation of contracts" under § 301(a) are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated." Id. at 658.
This case is distinguishable from Textron Lycoming because Darigold and the Union do not dispute the validity of the CBA, but rather dispute whether it is still in effect and whether the Union can engage in a strike. In fact, the dispute at hand, is similar to what the Supreme Court referred to in Texton Lycoming when it noted "[t]his was not (as one might have expected in a declaratory-judgment suit of this sort) a situation in which the Union had threatened to strike over the contracting-out, and Textron had asserted that a strike would violate the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 661. Based on this comment, the Court infers that in situations where a threat to strike has been made, jurisdiction exists under § 301.
The Union has threatened to strike, the parties dispute whether the Union can lawfully strike. A dispute over the application or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement falls within the purview of § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Irwin v. Carpenters Health Welfare Trust Fund for Cal., 745 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1984); Carpenters Health Welfare Trust Fund v. Tri Capital Corp., 25 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 1994). Due to the Union's threat of an imminent strike, the Court finds that jurisdiction exists under § 301.
Furthermore, the Court finds that an actual controversy regarding the parties' rights under the CBA exists. "A plaintiff will have raised a cause of action for a declaratory judgment if `the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.'" Post Tribune Publ'g, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 767 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). An actual controversy is a "dispute, touching as it does the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests and permitting a definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties." Temp-Resisto Corp. v. Glatt, 18 F.R.D. 148 (D.N.J. 1955). Darigold's and the Union's dispute regards the legal rights of the parties. Accordingly, the Court finds that a actual controversy exists, and thus a Declaratory Judgment is appropriate.
B. Collective Bargaining Agreement
The parties do not dispute that the Union did not provide a notice of termination, but rather provided a notice of modification. The Union's argument is that the CBA, and public policy, allows the Union to strike since the Union did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to engage in a reopening strike. Accordingly, the dispute in this matter concerns the interplay between Article 24, the "Termination" provisions, and Article 15, the "No Strike/No Lockout" provisions.
Under Article 15, the Union agrees:
. . . that during the term of this Agreement, neither the Local Union, its officers nor any of the members covered by this Agreement will collectively, concertedly or individually engage in or participate directly or indirectly, in any slowdown, stoppage, or other willful interference or production of work during the life of this Agreement. Nor will they strike in sympathy with other individuals regardless of their location or particular business during the life of this Agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.
(CBA ¶ 15.1.) Pursuant to this section, the Union clearly waives its right to engage in sympathy strikes. However, the provision does not specifically mention strikes during reopening.
In NLRB v. Lion Oil Company, 352 U.S. 282 (1954), the United States Supreme Court determined that the union could strike after the sixty-day notice period had elapsed, but prior to the termination of the agreement. The Court reasoned that "Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining. It would be anomalous for Congress to recognize such a duty and at the same time deprive the union of the strike threat which, together with `the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settlements.'" Id. at 290-91. However, the Lion Oil CBA did not include a no-strike provision, and thus, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to discuss waiver of the right to strike in such a context.
Since Lion Oil, the NLRB has had an opportunity to analyze whether a no-strike provision impacts a party's ability to strike following the sixty-day notice period. In Hydrologics, Inc., 293 NLRB 1060 (1989), the NLRB found that the union's strike was protected, even though the CBA contained a no-strike clause, since the union had given sufficient sixty-day warning. The NLRB reasoned that workers should be able to utilize economic weapons after reaching an impasse during a reopening. In a related opinion, the NLRB stated in Speedrack, Inc., 293 NLRB 1054 (1989), "the same statutory policies that privilege an employer's unilateral action after impasse on a reopened subject also privilege the collective-bargaining representative's resort to an economic strike over the dispute on that subject, notwithstanding the existence of a no-strike clause." Id. at 1055.
The Court recognizes that the NLRB decisions are not controlling in the context of a Declaratory Judgment action, however, the Court finds their analysis helpful.
Due to the public policy recognizing the importance of providing an ability to strike, any waiver of a right to strike must be "clear and unmistakable," Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). "A general no-strike clause that does not specify whether sympathy 3trikes are included or excluded does not, simply by virtue of its incorporation in a collective bargaining agreement, constitute such a clear and unmistakable waiver." Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. of N. Cal. v. Cal. Nurses Assoc., 283 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).
It is sound labor policy to enforce a clear and unmistakable waiver of economic sanctions contained in a CBA during the time it is in effect as the result of bargaining. Here, each party had a right to terminate the CBA in the manner specified in it and thereby regain the right to employ economic sanctions. Neither did; as provided therein, the CBA was automatically continued for one year; the union then gave notice of intent to modify. After sixty days passed, the parties were unable to reach an agreement.
As discussed above, the strike provisions in the CBA in this case do not specifically address reopening strikes. This Court concludes that the policy recognized by the Supreme Court in Lion Oil Company is applicable when a non-specific no-strike provision is included — "[i]f Congress contemplated a duty to bargain during reopener periods, then it must have intended to allow unions to retain `the strike threat which, together with `the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settlements.'" NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 291 (1954). After scrutinizing the CBA wording and the public policy in support of providing a union an avenue to exercise bargaining, the Court finds that the Union did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to strike during reopening.
Further, the Court finds that the Termination provisions do not create an ambiguity. Both Paragraphs 24.1 and 24.3 specify that the contract is "in full force and effect." The consequence of these provisions is to allow the remaining provisions of the CBA to continue during a reopening strike. For the above-explained reasons, IT IS HEREBY DECLARED:
1. The CBA did not terminate on July 31, 2003.
2. The Union did not clearly and unmistakably waive their right to strike during reopening.
3. This decision will be stayed until noon, Friday, September 12th in order to give the parties an opportunity to file an appeal with the 9th Circuit and seek a stay pending an expedited appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to:
(1) Enter this Order, and
(2) Provide copies to counsel.