Opinion
No. 05-08-00960-CR
Opinion issued February 6, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-69162-NYT.
Before Justices BRIDGES, RICHTER, and MAZZANT. Opinion By Justice MAZZANT.
OPINION
A jury convicted Jeffery Deon Darensburgh of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. In three points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision and by not specifying which allegation it found proven by the State, and assessing a prison term that violates the objectives of the penal code. We modify and affirm the trial court's judgment. In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision. Appellant asserts that because the trial court did not state it found he violated each of the conditions as stated in the amended motion to revoke, the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant's community supervision. Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). In its amended motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant violated several terms of his community supervision, including failing to report, failing to inform of his residence, failing to pay fees, and failing to participate in the electronic monitoring program as directed. In a hearing, appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the amended motion to revoke. Appellant admitted he did not pay all of his fees, did not participate in the electronic monitoring program, and did not report because he went to Louisiana without permission and lived with his mother. A plea of true, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant's signed plea of true and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. We overrule appellant's first point of error. In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by not specifying which set of allegations it found he violated. Appellant asserts the judgment failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process because it provides conflicting indications regarding whether the trial court revoked community supervision upon the State's original motion to revoke or amended motion to revoke. The State responds appellant did not request that specific findings be included in the judgment, and the trial court is not required to make specific findings. The State also asks this Court to modify the written judgment to show the trial court found the allegations in the amended motion to revoke true. Texas courts require a defendant to make a request for specific findings. See King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). In the absence of such a request, the trial court's failure to make specific findings in the order revoking community supervision is not reversible error. Id. Here, appellant did not request specific findings. Moreover, the amended motion to revoke is included in the record, and the judgment recites the trial court found the allegations had been proven. We overrule appellant's second point of error. Having overruled appellant's second point of error, we agree with the State that the trial court's written judgment is erroneous and should be modified. The record shows the State filed an original motion to revoke alleging appellant failed to report, inform of his residence, and pay fees. Additionally, the original motion alleged appellant violated a condition to have no contact with A.N. The motion alleged appellant's probation officer had received a report that appellant assaulted A.N. and stole her money. The State later filed an amended motion to revoke that alleged the first three violations and an allegation of failure to participate in the electronic monitoring program, but omitted the allegation of prohibited contact with A.N. During the revocation hearing, all of the parties proceeded on the State's amended motion to revoke. Appellant testified about all of the allegations contained in the amended motion to revoke. The trial court found appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision as outlined in the amended motion to revoke. However, the trial court's written judgment incorrectly recites appellant violated the conditions of community supervision "as set out in the State's original motion to revoke." We modify the trial court's judgment to show appellant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision "as set out in the State's amended motion to revoke community supervision." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). In his third point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to a prison term rather than continuing his community supervision. Appellant asserts the evidence shows he only left Texas because he was facing difficulties in his home life and felt he needed to go to Louisiana. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in assessing appellant's sentence. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Moreover, the trial court sentenced appellant as an habitual offender, and it imposed a punishment within the statutory range for the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not err in assessing the life sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). We overrule appellant's third point of error. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.