Opinion
No. 06-17-00197-CR
05-22-2018
DEIONTRAY DEWAYNE DARDEN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 45,313-B Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Deiontray Dewayne Darden was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. Darden admits that the trial court properly admonished him in accordance with the requirements of Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure prior to accepting his plea of guilt. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2017). Yet, in his sole point of error on appeal, Darden questions whether his plea was knowingly entered "in spite of the trial court's failure to fully explain to the defendant that his liability for murder was based on 'law of the parties.'"
"The two basic kinds of plea-bargaining in the United States are charge-bargaining and sentence-bargaining." Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). "Sentence-bargaining may be for binding or non-binding recommendations to the court on sentences, including a recommended 'cap' on sentencing." Id. Because the appellate record in this case demonstrates that the parties agreed to a punishment cap of forty years' imprisonment, this case involved a plea bargain.
The Texas Legislature has granted a very limited right of appeal in plea-bargain cases. In a plea-bargain case, a defendant may only appeal those matters (1) that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or (2) after obtaining the trial court's permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Here, Darden has obtained the trial court's permission to appeal.
After the trial court (1) accepted Darden's plea of guilty and (2) found him guilty of murder, the trial court heard the State's argument regarding sentencing. Based on the State's argument, the trial court found, during sentencing, that Darden was guilty under the law of the parties. Darden's appellate argument is based on this comment made by the trial court during sentencing.
We overrule Darden's point of error as meritless. The appellate record reveals that Darden pled guilty to "intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of an individual, namely F. Jones, by shooting F. Jones with a firearm." The State's indictment made no mention that Darden was being charged under the law of the parties. Accordingly, Darden judicially confessed to the offense as the primary actor and informed the trial court in open court that he was guilty of the offense as the primary actor. Accordingly, the issue of whether Darden was required to be warned about the law of the parties is immaterial to this case.
Having overruled Darden's sole point of error as meritless, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: May 21, 2018
Date Decided: May 22, 2018 Do Not Publish