Opinion
2012-06-27
Kurt DANYSH, Petitioner v. John E. WETZEL, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Respondent.
Kurt Danysh, pro se. Travis S. Anderson, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for respondent.
Kurt Danysh, pro se. Travis S. Anderson, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for respondent.
BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge, and COVEY, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge COVEY.
Kurt Danysh (Danysh), an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Frackville (SCI–Frackville), initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint in Mandamus on December 6, 2011. On January 5, 2012, Danysh filed an Application for Special Relief seeking peremptory judgment. As a result of this Court's January 17, 2012 Order, this matter is being treated as a Petition for Review addressed to this Court's original jurisdiction. John E. Wetzel, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (Secretary), filed Preliminary Objections to the Petition for Review. The Secretary's Preliminary Objections to Danysh's Petition for Review and Danysh's Application for Special Relief are currently before this Court.
This Court, in ruling on preliminary objections, has consistently held that we must accept as true all well pleaded material allegations in the petition for review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. This court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Our standard of review is now whether the law under consideration is clear and free from doubt.
Buoncuore v. Pa. Game Comm'n, 830 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).
On October 9, 1997, Danysh pled guilty to the third-degree murder of his father. He was subsequently sentenced to 22 1/2 to 60 years in prison, and ordered to pay court costs and fines. On July 9, 2002, Danysh was advised that the Department of Corrections (DOC) was going to start deducting 20% of all money placed in his inmate account to pay costs and fines, pursuant to Section 9728 of the Sentencing Code, commonly known as Act 84. In response, Danysh filed a motion in the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) to stop the deductions. The trial court issued an order upholding the deductions. Danysh appealed to the Superior Court.
.42 Pa.C.S. § 9728.
The Superior Court ruled that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and vacated the trial court's order. The DOC subsequently ceased all deductions from Danysh's inmate account. On May 21, 2007, Danysh initiated a voluntary payment plan to satisfy his debts to Susquehanna County (County). On July 27, 2011, the DOC advised Danysh that it would once again begin deducting 20% of all money posted to his inmate account to satisfy his debts owed to the County. Danysh exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a DOC grievance, and then filed the instant Complaint in Mandamus.
See Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 (Pa.Super.2003). The case was subsequently transferred to this Court, wherein, it was held that personal gifts were appropriately subject to deductions as a legitimate consequence of conviction. Danysh v. Dep't of Corr., 845 A.2d 260 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), aff'd,584 Pa. 122, 881 A.2d 1263 (2005). This Court sustained Respondents' Preliminary Objections and dismissed Danysh's Petition for Review. Id.
Under the voluntary payment plan, Danysh paid two dollars a month to satisfy his sentencing order.
This Court has held:
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and used to compel performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. Mandamus may only be granted where the moving party establishes a clear legal right, the defendant's corresponding duty and the lack of any other appropriate and adequate remedy. A peremptory judgment in a mandamus action may be entered only where no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the case is free and clear from doubt. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DeGeorge v. Young, 892 A.2d 48, 51–52 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Secretary argues that Danysh is not entitled to a peremptory judgment because he cannot establish a clear right to relief. The Secretary contends that DOC has the authority to collect costs and fees under Act 84 where there is a court order, and Danysh's Petition for Review should be dismissed. We agree.
Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, specifically states:
.42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5).
The county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or the [DOC] shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation. Any amount deducted shall be transmitted by the [DOC] or the county correctional facility to the probation department of the county or other agent designated by the county commissionersof the county with the approval of the president judge of the county in which the offender was convicted. The [DOC] shall develop guidelines relating to its responsibilities under this paragraph.
Further, Section 1101 of the Crime Victims Act, commonly known as Act 85, specifically states:
Act of November 24, 1998, P.L. 882, as amended,18 P.S. § 11.1101.
A person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is convicted of a crime shall, in addition to costs imposed under 42 Pa.C.S. § 3571(c) (relating to Commonwealth portion of fines, etc.), pay costs of at least $60 and may be sentenced to pay additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum monetary penalty for the offense committed.
18 P.S. § 11.1101(a)(1). “No court order shall be necessary in order for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section....” 18 P.S. § 11.1101(e). Danysh does not dispute that he was ordered at sentencing to pay court costs and fines. Moreover, the original Act 84 order was upheld by this Court in Danysh v. Department of Corrections, 845 A.2d 260 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), aff'd,584 Pa. 122, 881 A.2d 1263 (2005). The only difference between the instant case and the prior case is that Danysh entered into a voluntary payment plan before the second Act 84 order was issued.
Danysh argues that the voluntary payment plan prevents the Secretary from ordering an Act 84 deduction; thus, he is entitled to have the deductions stopped. Specifically, he argues that the purpose of Act 84 is for the DOC to force defendants who are not paying their costs to fulfill their obligations. Hence, because he has been making payments, the Secretary cannot order an Act 84 deduction on his account. However, Danysh cannot establish a clear legal right to have the deductions stopped, the Secretary's corresponding duty to stop making the deductions, or the lack of any other appropriate and adequate remedy. The plain language of Act 84 states that “[t]he county correctional facility ... or the [DOC] shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5) (emphasis added). Act 84 does not set out an exception for inmates who voluntarily make payments. To prohibit the DOC from making deductions pursuant to Act 84 because an inmate makes voluntary payments would allow an inmate to dictate the amount of the deductions; thereby, usurping the county correctional facility and the DOC's undisputed statutory authority. Such a result is contrary to the statute's clear words.
For all of the above reasons, the Secretary's Preliminary Objections to Danysh's Petition for Review are sustained. Danysh's Petition for Review is, therefore, dismissed.
Because we have sustained the Secretary's Preliminary Objections, there is no need to address Danysh's Application for Special Relief.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2012, the Preliminary Objections filed by John E. Wetzel, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, are sustained. The Petition for Review is dismissed. The Application for Special Relief filed by Kurt Danysh is dismissed as moot.