We need not address this contention because Ledbetter's failure to object or avail himself of the opportunity to poll the jury waived the issue. Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 42 (2) (b) ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). 2.

Snell was charged with stabbing and attempting to strangle the victim and with taking from the victim $132 in cash and two small caliber pistols. Snell's appointed appellate counsel raises two challenges: The convictions should be reversed because Snell's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the state standard of Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638, 639 ( 203 S.E.2d 515) (1974), as applied in Hicks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 542 (1) ( 314 S.E.2d 113) (1984), and Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 43 (2) (c) ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983); the convictions should be reversed because the trial court charged the jury on flight and its corresponding inference of guilt. Subsequent to counsel's filings, Snell also filed a pro se brief containing allegations of error under the mistaken belief that he has a right to simultaneous representation by counsel and self-representation.

In doing so, we have no difficulty in finding that [appellant] had the benefit of a competent, well-prepared and aggressive advocate for his defense and that [his] claim to the contrary is wholly without merit." Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 43 (2) (c) ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). Judgment affirmed.

The effectiveness of counsel is not determined by looking at isolated trial errors, but rather by an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 43 ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). We have reviewed the entire record and transcript and find that trial counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance by cross-examining witnesses, making objections and presenting witnesses for the defense.

Frostgate Warehouses v. Cole, 244 Ga. 782, 783 ( 262 S.E.2d 98) (1979). See OCGA § 9-12-1 et seq.; Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 42, 43 ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). This enumeration is without merit.

Effectiveness of counsel is determined by looking at the totality of circumstances, not at isolated trial errors. Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 43 (2c) ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). There is a strong presumption that representation has been effective.

Viewed in such context, the jury's verdict in this case cannot reasonably be interpreted as anything other than a finding of guilt on both counts of the indictment. "Furthermore, any objection to the reformation of the verdict is waived if not contemporaneously raised," ( Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 42 ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983)); and no such objection was interposed in this case. 3. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a Brady motion requesting all potentially exculpatory materials in the possession of the state's attorney.

Affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach the verdict. OCGA § 17-9-41; Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277, 285 (7) ( 295 S.E.2d 518) (1982); Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41, 42 (2 (a)) ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983). Hence, this enumeration of error is without merit.

In determining the effectiveness of counsel, this court looks to the totality of the representation provided by counsel. Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41 ( 299 S.E.2d 579) (1983); Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 ( 203 S.E.2d 515) (1974). A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee errorless counsel or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, "`but counsel . . . likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.' [Cits.

The Pitts v. Glass standard . . . requires us to look at the totality of the representation provided by counsel." Dansby v. State, 165 Ga. App. 41 (2c) ( 299 S.E.2d 579). Having done so, we find that counsel rendered effective assistance. 3. Apparently exasperated with repetitious questions and answers, the trial court said: "Didn't you understand her [the witness], sir [defense counsel]? He was on Sunday and Monday.