Davis's 1991 first offender probation had not been revoked prior to his 1997 convictions, and therefore had not become convictions. Compare Daniels v. State, 271 Ga. 167 ( 517 S.E.2d 66) (1999). Thus, in 1997, he had not previously been convicted of a violent crime and could not be sentenced as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2).
Sentencing is the critical moment for determining whether a defendant is a convicted felon for purposes of recidivist treatment. See Daniels v. State, 271 Ga. 167, 168-169 ( 517 S.E.2d 66) (1999). By the time he was sentenced in this case, Sutton had been adjudicated guilty of the prior charges.
This made Morris a convicted felon. See, e.g., Roland v. Meadows , 273 Ga. 857, 858 (1), 548 S.E.2d 289 (2001) ("When a first offender probationer violates the terms of his probation and the trial court enters an adjudication of guilt, the court may impose any sentence permitted by law for the offense the probationer has been found guilty of committing."); Daniels v. State , 271 Ga. 167, 517 S.E.2d 66 (1999) (defendant was a "convicted felon" after trial court revoked defendant's first offender status and adjudicated him guilty of felony armed robbery based on defendant's violation of terms of his first offender probation). Morris's argument to the contrary is without merit.