Opinion
No. CV 01 0451523 S
December 3, 2008
ISSUE
Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel barrs the plaintiff's state law tort claims, which are premised on his alleged wrongful arrest by the defendants, when a federal judge has found that there was probable cause for his arrest. The court concludes that the federal judge's finding of probable cause collaterally estops the plaintiff from litigating his claims.
FACTS
This motion arises from a murder investigation conducted more than 16 years ago. The undisputed portions of the evidence submitted by the parties' reveals the following. On May 21, 1992, Jose Melendez was shot and killed in New Haven. One of the defendants, Detective James Ponteau, was assigned to lead the murder investigation. On July 9, 1992, Ponteau, relying on witness statements and identifications, signed an affidavit in support of an application for an arrest warrant for the plaintiff, Thomas Daniels. On July 15, 1992, the state's attorney reviewed the warrant affidavit and determined there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The following day, a Superior Court judge reviewed the application, determined there was probable cause, and issued the arrest warrant. On September 3, 1992, another Superior Court judge determined there was probable cause to proceed with prosecution of the plaintiff. In July 1994, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to manslaughter under the Alford doctrine. He served approximately nineteen months in prison. He was released in 1995 after authorities obtained information that the murder had been perpetrated by someone else and that one of the identifying witnesses had been involved in the crime.
A detailed account of the investigation of the murder of Jose Melendez can be found in the federal ruling dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims. See Daniels v. New Haven, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:97 CV 594 (RNC) (D.Conn. April 22, 2001).
The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court against Ponteau and the city of New Haven (the city) under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff also alleged pendent state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim on the ground that Ponteau had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The federal district court found that Ponteau had probable cause to arrest Daniels and, in the alternative, that he was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Therefore, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claims with prejudice and his pendent state law claims without prejudice. See Daniels v. New Haven, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:97 CV 594 (RNC) (D.Conn. April 22, 2001).
Detective Hilden Wright was also named as a defendant in the federal action. The plaintiff's allegations against him were dismissed because of his minor role in the investigation. Wright was initially a named defendant in the present case as well. The plaintiff did not, however, include any claims against Wright in the revised complaint. Therefore, "the defendants" will hereafter only refer to Ponteau and the city.
Section 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
The plaintiff then commenced the present action against Ponteau and the city, which is also premised on the defendants' conduct toward the plaintiff in regard to the Melendez murder investigation. On April 26, 2007, the plaintiff filed a second revised four-count complaint alleging, in counts one through three, claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment against Ponteau, and alleging, in count four, a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the city. On June 29, 2007, the defendants filed an answer and special defenses in which they assert as special defense that Ponteau is entitled to qualified immunity and both defendants are entitled to common law statutory immunity.
On July 31, 2008, Ponteau filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims against him. On August 8, 2008, the city filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims against it. On October 1, 2008, the plaintiff filed his opposition brief. On October 8 and 9, 2008, respectively, Ponteau and the city filed reply briefs.
Because this matter was scheduled for trial as of July 9, 2008, both defendants requested permission to file their motions pursuant to Practice Book § 17-44. The plaintiff filed an objection to the city's request, which was sustained by the court, Silbert, J., on September 8, 2008. Subsequently, the city filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court, Silbert, J., granted on September 22, 2008, noting "Defendant City of New Haven may join in and adopt defendant Ponteau's motion as its own."
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfleld, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007).
The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on three grounds: (1) there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the Melendez murder, (2) even if there was not probable cause, Ponteau is entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) collateral estoppel barrs the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff counters that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was probable cause to arrest him. He further argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar this action because the state law claims he alleges here differ from those determined by the federal court.
"Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R R Pool Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 466, 778 A.2d 61 (2001). "To establish whether collateral estoppel applies, the court must determine what facts were necessarily determined in the first trial, and must then assess whether the [party] is attempting to relitigate those facts in the second proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golino v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 260076 (April 21, 1994, Fracasse, J.) (9 C.S.C.R. 553).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the interests protected in a § 1983 action are similar to those protected in common law tort actions." Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 502, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988). In that case, the court explained that "[a]lthough the current state court action involves claims in negligence and assault and battery, while the federal court action ultimately involved only a claim for violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under § 1983, both causes of action arose out of the same alleged wrongs, allegedly committed by the same defendants, and involved the same injuries." Id. Therefore, collateral estoppel barred plaintiff's state law tort claims. Id. In addition, a Connecticut trial court dismissed a plaintiff's state law tort claims, including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, under the doctrine of the collateral estoppel after a federal jury determined, in dismissing his § 1983 claims, there was probable cause to arrest him. Golino v. New Haven, supra, 9 C.S.C.R. 553. The court determined that, in finding there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, the federal jury "necessarily determined that the defendants did not have actual knowledge of the plaintiff's innocence," and because "[t]he factual allegations underlying the [state] claims are the same factual allegations presented to the federal jury and were litigated and determined in the federal action," the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Id., 554.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also barrs the plaintiff's state law tort claims in the present case. In the federal decision, Judge Chatigny found that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the murder of Jose Melendez. Judge Chatigny alternatively found that even if Ponteau did not have probable cause, he was entitled to qualified immunity because the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant was not "so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Daniels v. New Haven, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:97 CV 594 (RNC) (D.Conn. April 22, 2001), quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). The issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff was fully and fairly litigated, decided; and imperative to the federal court's dismissal of the plaintiff's constitutional claims. Therefore, collateral estoppel barrs the plaintiff from re-litigating the issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest him.
The federal court's finding of probable cause negates the essential elements of the plaintiff's state law tort claims. "In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [the intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). Given that Ponteau had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, or that probable cause was not so lacking as to make Ponteau's belief in its existence unreasonable, the plaintiff cannot show Ponteau intentionally caused him emotional distress or that Ponteau's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Furthermore, "false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another." Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, 140 Conn. 496, 499, 101 A.2d 500 (1953). Because Ponteau had probable cause to arrest, or a reasonable belief in its existence, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Ponteau unlawfully restrained him.
"Liability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim; Outrageous!" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey v. Yale University, 268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004). Reasonable minds could not differ over whether a police officer's arrest of a murder suspect upon probable cause, or a reasonable belief in the existence thereof, meets this standard.
Finally, the plaintiff's allegation of negligent infliction of emotional distress against both Ponteau and the city must also fail. A plaintiff claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress must show, "(1) the defendants conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress." Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). The existence of probable cause, or a reasonable belief in the existence thereof, negates an essential element of the plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, that the defendants act unreasonably.
In conclusion, the doctrine of collateral estoppel barrs the plaintiff from re-litigating the issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest him. Given that a federal judge found that there was probable cause, or at the very least, a reasonable belief in the existence thereof, the plaintiff's state law tort claims must fail. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The motion for summary judgment is granted.