Summary
holding pro se plaintiff-arrestee's arrest was lawful based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the false arrest claims against the officers would be dismissed on a Rule 12(b) motion
Summary of this case from Wymer v. Baxter ex rel. Orlando Police Dep'tOpinion
03 Civ. 0809 (GEL)
November 3, 2003
Leah A. Bynon, (Michael A. Cardozo of counsel), for defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bertram Daniels, proceeding pro se, sues the City of New York, Police Officer John O'Gorman, and as yet unidentified New York police and corrections officers for civil rights violations under federal and state law in connection with his February 17, 2002, arrest and subsequent detention in Bellevue Hospital Prison Ward. Daniels argues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him because the arrest was based on the false complaint of a citizen who had accused him of assaulting her. Defendants move to dismiss the false arrest claim for failure to allege a cause of action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the claims alleging false arrest as to the February 17, 2002, incident will be dismissed. Since it is unclear whether Daniels intends to assert another claim relating either to his detention in Bellevue or to some other arrest, he is granted leave to amend his complaint to set forth any such claims he intends to make. If no such amended complaint is filed by November 21, 2003, the case will be closed.
Defendant O'Gorman also raises the defense of qualified immunity; in light of the disposition, it is unnecessary to address that defense. In the Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss filed on August 5, 2003, O'Gorman also moved to dismiss the claims against him on the ground that he had not been properly served. However, service was subsequently made on O'Gorman, and an affidavit of service was filed on September 4, 2003, in accordance with this Court's order dated August 12, 2003. The claim of inadequate service has not been renewed.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the Second Amended Complaint filed on July 14, 2003, and must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. The Court will also consider the documents submitted along with the original Complaint. filed on February 4, 2003.See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) "In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a district court must limit itself to the facts stated in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.")
The Second Amended Complaint appears to be identical to the Amended Complaint, filed on June 11, 2003, except that the word "Second" is added to the caption of the pleading.
In the late afternoon of Sunday, February 17, 2003, Daniels was in a McDonald's Restaurant on 51st Street and Broadway in Manhattan. He claims that an acquaintance named Loretta Pagalisi (a non-party to this action) assaulted him and caused him to injure his hand. Unknown persons called the police as well as an ambulance. The police arrived as paramedics were treating Daniels's hand injury. Defendant O'Gorman and another police officer told Daniels that he was under arrest for assaulting Pagalisi. Daniels told the officers that Pagalisi was lying, that in fact Pagalisi had assaulted him, and that he had not touched her. Nevertheless, the officers did not interview any of the restaurant patrons who were potential witnesses to the incident, and proceeded to arrest Daniels. Daniels was taken to Bellevue Hospital Prison Ward in an ambulance. On February 18, 2002, Pagalisi signed an Accusatory Statement alleging that Daniels had assaulted her at the 51st Street location on the preceding day. (See Compl. Ex. A.)
Daniels was arraigned before the Criminal Court on February 22, 2002. He was subsequently released on bail. Daniels alleges that he spent from seven to eleven days in Bellevue (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 18). The criminal case was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal on September 5, 2002, and the criminal charges against Daniels were ultimately dismissed on March 4, 2003. Daniels commenced this action on February 4, 2003.
The original Complaint alleged that plaintiff was also detained for six days in the Tombs (Compl. ¶ 2), but this allegation is omitted from the Second Amended Complaint.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept "as true the facts alleged in the Complaint," Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch Co., 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1994), and may grant the motion only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see alsoBernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996) (when adjudicating motion to dismiss under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the "issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference. Brass v. American Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993). Where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must liberally construe the complaint. See, e.g., Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). This duty is particularly strong when a pro se plaintiff alleges violation of his civil rights. Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001).
II. False Arrest Claims Against Individual Officers
Daniels brings claims for false arrest under state and federal law. Under New York law, "a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975). The federal claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983, resting on plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures, is substantially similar to the state law claim.Id. An arrest is justified, and a claim for false arrest must be dismissed, if the facts asserted by plaintiff demonstrate that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed a crime. Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994). Probable cause exists when the arresting officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989).
The gravamen of Daniels's claim is that the police lacked probable cause to believe he had committed a crime at the time of the arrest, because Pagalisi's statement to the police that plaintiff had assaulted her was false, and Daniels so advised the police at the time. Daniels admits that Pagalisi told the officers that he had attacked her in the restaurant, and argues that the officers' failure to investigate the truth of that statement before arresting him and transporting him to Bellevue rendered the arrest an arbitrary act in violation of his civil rights. Therefore, the question before the Court is whether, based on the facts asserted in the complaint and supporting documents, Daniels would be able to prove a set of facts that would establish that the officers lacked probable cause. See Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a motion to dismiss a claim for false arrest should be denied if there are any plausible interpretations of the facts alleged which would not establish probable cause).
In evaluating whether there was probable cause to make the arrest, the court must "consider the facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest." Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997), citing Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996). On this motion to dismiss, the Court may assume that the officers knew only what the complaint alleges they saw and heard. Here, Daniels alleges that the police responded to a call regarding a disturbance in the McDonald's. They arrived to find Daniels with a hand injury being treated by paramedics, and Pagalisi claiming to have been the victim of an assault by Daniels. Daniels protested his innocence, and told police that Pagalisi had actually assaulted him. Defendants may not contest these facts at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the Court may determine probable cause as a matter of law because, for purposes of this motion, "there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers." Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852.
The complaint alleges that plaintiffs "arrest and imprisonment;] were unlawful, since plaintiff had not committed any crimes or offenses." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 28). However, contrary to what Daniels appears to believe, the key issue for his civil rights claim is not whether Daniels actually did assault Pagalisi. Rather, the question is whether Pagaiisi's accusation provided the officers with probable cause to believe that Daniels had assaulted her. See, e.g., Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Probable cause does not depend on the witness turning out to have been right; it's what the police know, not whether they know the truth, that matters.") The complaint does not allege that Pagalisi was intoxicated or incoherent, or otherwise appeared to be an unreliable witness. It simply alleges that she was lying about the incident and that Daniels told the police so at the time.
Information furnished by a single complainant can establish probable cause when the information comes from a victim who provides specific details of a crime. See Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1994), citing Grimm v. Churchill 932 F.2d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that "When an officer has received information from some person — normally the putative victim or an eye witness — who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth, he has probable cause") (internal punctuation and citations omitted). The complaint does not allege that the officers had any reason, other than Daniels's contrary account, to disbelieve Pagalisi's story. To the extent that the officers encountered two people who each appeared credible and who each claimed to be the victim of assault by the other, the police had probable cause to arrest either plaintiff or Pagalisi or both. Even construing the allegations broadly, as befits analysis of a pro se complaint, it cannot be concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff because an apparently reliable complaining victim justifies a reasonable officer's belief that the complainant was assaulted by the person she claims assaulted her.
The fact that Pagalisi swore out a complaint against plaintiff on the following day is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis. It cannot support a finding of probable cause, because it occurred after the arrest. Nor does the delay in obtaining a sworn statement detract from a finding of probable cause, because it is reasonable for police acting in a spontaneous encounter to rely on the seemingly credible statements of a putative victim at the scene of an incident, even without a sworn statement.
Daniels argues that because the police failed to conduct inquiries and took Pagalisi's word over his, probable cause to arrest him was lacking. However, once Pagalisi complained to the police about an assault, the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and were not required to investigate further. "Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest." Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. The facts ofRicciuti are indistinguishable from the present case. Like Daniels, Ricciuti argued that his protestations of innocence should have led the police to "ma[k]e further inquiries and interview witnesses at the scene," and that their failure to do so defeated any claim of probable cause. Id. The Court of Appeals was "not persuaded," noting that although the arresting officer "would have been entitled to believe [the plaintiffs] version of events rather than [the putative victim's], he was not required to do so. Given [the victim's] version of events and his visible injuries a competent police officer could believe it was objectively reasonable to arrest plaintiff for the assault. The officer was not required to make a full investigation into the plaintiffs [claims] prior to taking action." Id.
Daniels proffers the statement of an alleged eyewitness who supports his version of the incident (Letter from Ramseywak Domai, dated June 19, 2002, attached as p. 11 to Compl.), but he does not allege that Domai provided such information to the police at the time. Daniels also proffers an affidavit of another eyewitness, Peter Vega, sworn to September 13, 2003. To the extent this affidavit, which was not part of the complaint, can be considered, the Court notes that Vega expressly states that he failed to come forward to the arresting officers with his information at the time of the arrest (Vega Aff. ¶ 3).
In sum, because Daniels affirmatively alleges that he was arrested en the complaint of a person who claimed to be the victim of assault, and does not allege any facts suggesting that the putative victim should have appeared unreliable to a reasonable police officer, the facts alleged in the complaint do not permit the conclusion that the officers lacked probable cause. Accordingly, Daniels's arrest was lawful and the false arrest claims against the officers must be dismissed.
III. False Arrest Claims Against the City of New York
The City of New York argues that Daniels's allegations fail to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The Court need not reach that issue. Since any municipal claim must be predicated on a false arrest, and the complaint does not state a claim for false arrest, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for constitutional violations against the City of New York, and that claim too must be dismissed.
IV. Other Potential Claims
Daniels's complaint invokes numerous constitutional provisions not directly relevant to a claim of false arrest. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 2, citing U.S. Const, amends. V, VI, VIE, DC.) Moreover, while the gist of his complaint appears to be a claim of false arrest, and the defendants interpret it as raising only such a claim, Daniels at times appears to complain, at least in passing, of the fact that he was detained at Bellevue rather than in a normal jail (2d Am, Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27), and mentions, without supporting facts, what appears to be different arrests (Compl. ¶ 2 and p. 9). The complaints now before the Court do not provide sufficient facts to clarify what if any claims Daniels might be making with respect to these issues. Accordingly, given the traditional solicitude for pro se litigants, the Court will permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to set forth any specific facts that might support other claims not addressed in this Opinion and Order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the federal and state claims for false arrest shall be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Because it is unclear whether the plaintiff intends to allege other claims based on his detention in Bellevue or on other arrests or detentions, he may amend his complaint to set forth the facts relevant to any such additional claims he wishes to make. If an amended complaint is not filed by November 21, 2003, the case will be closed.