Summary
granting motion for reconsideration where “[t]he actual language of [an] Agreement” that was “provided to this Court as part of defendants' motion ... raise[d] new facts that were obviously overlooked by this Court”
Summary of this case from In re Optimal U.S. Litig.Opinion
99 Civ. 1695 (SAS).
July 16, 2007
For Plaintiffs: Jennifer R. Cowan, Esq., Vanessa De Simone, Esq., Debevoise Plimpton, New York, New York.
Andrea Costello, Esq., Kamau K. Franklin, Esq., Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, New York.
Jonathan C. Moore, Esq., Beldock Levine Hoffman LLP, New York, New York.
William H. Goodman, Esq., Goodman Hurwitz, P.C., Detroit, Michigan.
For Defendants: Heidi Grossman, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the City of New York New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
At a conference held on April 16, 2007, I granted plaintiffs' request or an extension of the Stipulation of Settlement, ordered by this Court on January 9, 2004. Although defendants' counsel apprised the Court of certain terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, I did not review the actual Stipulation at that time. Since then, defendants have moved to vacate the Order under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted and the order issued on April 16, 2007 is hereby vacated.
See Transcript of April 16, 2007 Conference ("Tr.") at 9 ("I'm hereby extending the Court supervision for another year. I have to do that. You are two years late on producing the data. It is a very benign thing to do. And you may move to terminate it earlier.").
I. BACKGROUND
1. Defendants' Obligations
A. The Stipulation of Settlement
The parties settled this class action in September 2003, after vigorously negotiating the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement over several months. This Court approved the settlement after a fairness hearing and dismissed the action with prejudice in January 2004, retaining jurisdiction "for the purposes of enforcing compliance with the terms and provisions of the Class Stipulation." The parties agreed that the Agreement would terminate on December 31, 2007 and that upon termination "the Court shall retain no further jurisdiction over this action." The parties further agreed that the Agreement "can be modified only on the written consent of all parties."
See Stipulation of Settlement ("Stipulation" or "Agreement"), Ex. A to the 4/30/07 Declaration of Heidi Grossman, Assistant Corporation Counsel ("Grossman Decl.").
1/9/04 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Ex. A to the 5/22/07 Declaration of Vanessa De Simone in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Order Extending the Term of the Stipulation of Settlement.
See Stipulation ¶ O(2).
Id. ¶ K(5).
Id. ¶ O(1).
The Agreement obligates defendants to take certain actions, including providing Class Counsel with quarterly data from the New York Police Department ("NYPD") UF-250 Database. Pursuant to the Agreement, defendants must provide the UF-250 data within six months after the end of each quarter. Defendants have other obligations under the Agreement. For example, defendants are required "to have a written policy regarding racial or ethnic/national origin profiling that complies with the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution (the `Racial Profiling Policy')." Defendants are further required to supervise, monitor and train officers with regard to the Racial Profiling Policy.
See id. ¶ F. The UF-250 Report is the form used by NYPD officers to record stop and frisk activity. The Stipulation requires the NYPD to continue to compile a database consisting of all of the UF-250 Reports completed by NYPD officers. See id. ¶ F(5) ("A CD Rom of the UF-250 Database shall be provided to Class Counsel on a quarterly basis and shall be redacted as to information identifying civilians and NYPD officers.").
See id. ("A copy of the CD Rom of each quarterly UF-250 Database shall be provided to Class Counsel within six months of the end of the quarter to which the reports correspond.").
Id. ¶ C(1).
See id. ¶ C(5).
The Agreement, however, does not include any provisions regarding plaintiffs' use or analysis of the UF-250 data. Nor does the Agreement contain any remedies or obligations regarding any trends or patterns reflected in the UF-250 database. Moreover, the Agreement does not require any specific outcomes and makes no specific assurances with respect to the supervision, monitoring and training of NYPD officers with regard to the Racial Profiling Policy.
2. Agreed Upon Dispute Resolution Procedure
The Agreement includes detailed dispute resolution procedures in the event that defendants are not complying with any of the Agreement's terms. The Agreement requires plaintiffs to fulfill certain conditions before seeking court intervention. Moreover, the Agreement limits the type of relief that can be awarded by a court to specific performance of the term in issue. Under the Agreement, defendants can be held in contempt only if they fail to comply with a court order directing such specific performance.
See generally id. ¶ L.
The dispute resolution procedures found in the Agreement contain several steps that must be followed in the event of noncompliance. First, plaintiffs must notify defendants, in writing, that they have failed to comply with the Agreement. If, after receiving written notification of noncompliance, defendants agree that they have not complied with a specific term of the Agreement, defendants shall specifically perform that term within a reasonable time period mutually agreed upon by the parties. If defendants dispute their noncompliance, plaintiffs may seek a court order directing specific performance if: (1) the parties cannot agree on a reasonable time period for defendants to perform; or (2) defendants fail to specifically perform the term within the agreed upon time frame. Upon the happening of any of the these events, plaintiffs:
See id. ¶ L(1).
See id. ¶ L(2)(a).
See id. ¶ L(2)(b).
may apply to the Court for an order directing specific performance of that term or terms. Such application may not be made fewer than thirty days after the initial notification of non-compliance to the NYPD and Office of the Corporation Counsel.
Id.
Defendants can be held in contempt for noncompliance only if they fail to comply with a court order directing specific performance.
In no event shall any of the Municipal Defendants be held in contempt for proven non-compliance with any of the terms or provisions of this Stipulation unless and until the Municipal Defendants fail to comply with an order from the Court directing specific performance of such terms or provisions, obtained by the Class Representatives and/or class members in compliance with the provisions of this paragraph.
See id. ¶ L(2)(c).
Id.
B. Defendants' Failure to Comply Timely
In a letter dated January 18, 2007, plaintiffs notified defendants that they had not produced the UF-250 database for quarters dating back from 2003. Defendants responded to plaintiffs' January 18th letter in writing, noting that they had not heard from plaintiffs since October 18, 2005. Defendants provided the following explanation for the delay in production of the UF-250 database:
See 1/18/07 Letter from Marc J. Krupanski to Heidi Grossman, Ex. B to the Grossman Decl.
See 2/1/07 Letter from Grossman to Krupanski, Ex. C to the Grossman Decl.
Originally, the data on the UF-250 forms had been input manually at a centralized location. This procedure proved inadequate and inefficient especially since the number of UF-250 forms increased significantly over time. To improve efficiency of the system, the NYPD created an improved decentralized system, which eliminated the need for manual entry and facilitated timely production of UF-250 data.
See id. Defendants produced all of the 2006 data on March 19, 2007. See 3/19/07 Letter from Grossman to William Goodman, Ex. E to the Grossman Decl. ("March 19th Letter") ("While the Agreement obligates us to produce UF250 data for the first half of 2006, we are providing data for the second half of 2006, as well."). Under the Agreement, the last quarter of 2006 would have been due by June 2007.
Defendants further explained that producing the remaining data for the last quarter of 2003, and all of 2004 through 2005, would require more time because it entailed manual compilation.
See id.
By letter dated February 16, 2007, plaintiffs sent "official notice of non-compliance with the Stipulation" with regard to the production of the UF-250 database. In that letter, plaintiffs expressed their concern that without a date certain for production, the delay, which they described as "unacceptable," "could extend beyond the term of the Stipulation and thereby effectively subvert it." By letter dated March 19, 2007, defendants advised plaintiffs that the NYPD was working with an outside vendor to input the data for the outstanding quarters which was expected to be produced "well in advance of the end of the year."
See 2/16/07 Letter from Goodman to Grossman and S. Andrew Schaffer, Deputy Commissioner of Legal Affairs for the NYPD, Ex. D to the Grossman Decl.
Id.
March 19th Letter at 1.
Plaintiffs wrote this Court on April 2, 2007, requesting a conference to address the production date for the UF-250 database. Plaintiffs complained that the missing data would not be produced "until some unspecified future date." Plaintiffs requested a conference to secure a date certain for the production of the UF-250 data and "ensure that Defendants comply with their obligations under the Stipulation." Notably, this was the first time plaintiffs ever sought judicial intervention with regard to any term of the Agreement. In a letter dated April 12, 2007, defendants advised this Court and plaintiffs of the following targeted production dates: 4th Quarter 2003 by June 1, 2007; Full Year 2004 by August 1, 2007; and Full Year 2005 by October 1, 2007.
4/2/07 Letter from Goodman to this Court, Ex. F to the Grossman Decl.
Id. ("Defendants' vague assurances are not only insufficient, they also highlight a flagrant continuing violation of the Stipulation.").
Id.
See 4/12/07 Letter from Grossman to this Court, Ex. I to the Grossman Decl.
On April 16, 2007, I held a conference to address plaintiffs' concerns. Although the issue of defendants' noncompliance was certainly on the agenda, neither party provided this Court with a copy of the Agreement. At the conference, plaintiffs did not request an order from this Court directing specific performance. At this Court's invitation, however, plaintiffs did seek to extend the term of the Agreement. Citing defendants' two-year delay in producing the UF-250 database, I extended the term of the Agreement one year but allowed defendants to move for early termination once the data was produced. One reason for the one-year extension was to avoid prejudice to the plaintiffs, who needed time to review the data provided to them before the Stipulation expired.
See Tr. at 5-6.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 6 ("The whole point is when you get the data, you may need to do something about [what] you learned. And there is no time left.").
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3 and are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Reconsideration may also be granted "to correct a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice." However, reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources."
See Pattterson v. United States, No. 04 Civ. 3170, 2006 WL 2067036, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006) ("The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court." (citing McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) ("To be entitled to reargument, a party must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Local Civil Rule 6.3 is narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to avoid repetitive arguments already considered by the Court. A motion for reconsideration is not a substitute for appeal. Nor is it "a `second bite at the apple' for a party dissatisfied with a court's ruling." Accordingly, the moving party may not "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court."
See Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 2000).
See RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841, 2004 WL 1794504, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2004).
Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 948 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
At the April 16th conference, defendants' counsel attempted to explain certain relevant portions of the Agreement. For example, she advised the Court that the Agreement contained a. dispute resolution procedure. Counsel further explained that the Agreement "specifically says no contempt shall be sought until certain procedures are followed" but she did not elaborate on those procedures. Finally, counsel noted that the Agreement did not contain any provision for extending the Agreement past December 31, 2007.
See Tr. at 8 ("The terms of the agreement set out the dispute resolution [mechanism] and [the] remedies available to plaintiff[s] if we don't comply with timely production. . . .").
Id. at 10.
See id. at 11.
A copy of the Agreement has subsequently been provided to this Court as part of defendants' motion. The actual language of the Agreement raises new facts that were obviously overlooked by this Court at the conference. After reading the entire Agreement, I hereby vacate the April 16th Order and order defendants to specifically perform by producing the UF-250 database in accordance with the scheduled proposed in the March 19th Letter, namely: Full Year 2004 by August 1, 2007; and Full Year 2005 by October 1, 2007. If defendants fail to specifically perform on these dates, plaintiffs may then move for contempt. If, and when, plaintiffs so move, this Court will consider extending the term of the Agreement, among other sanctions.
Presumably, the last quarter of 2003 has already been provided given that its targeted production date was June 1, 2007.
Defendants should be forewarned that if they fail to produce the UF-250 database by the dates ordered, the Court will consider all appropriate sanctions given the two-year delay already suffered by plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the April 16th Order is hereby vacated. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close defendants' motion to vacate [Document # 173]. Plaintiffs are directed to notify this Court of any noncompliance on defendants' part as soon as reasonably practicable.
SO ORDERED: