Opinion
CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-166-TLS
11-03-2017
WILLIAM DANIELS and JUDY DANIELS, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF FORT WAYNE PLAN COMMISSION, whose MEMBERS are CONNIE HAAS ZUBER, DON SCHMIDT, TOM FREISTROFFER, PAUL SAUERTEIG, JUSTIN SHURLEY, MIKE BYNUM, SHAN GUNAWARDENA, BILLY DAVENPORT, and JUDI WIRE, and LST, LLC, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 18] filed by Defendant City of Fort Wayne Plan Commission ("FWPC") and a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [ECF No. 21] filed by Defendant LST, L.L.C. ("LST"). Plaintiffs William and Judy Daniels responded to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and moved to stay the proceedings [ECF No. 23] on June 5, 2017. The Plaintiffs also filed their Response to LST's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27] on June 12, 2017. FWPC filed its Reply in support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 24], and LST filed its Response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay [ECF No. 26] on June 12, 2017. This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is provided through the pleadings, motions, and attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs own a residential property within a subdivision known as Broadmoor Addition located at 1735 Broadmoor Avenue in Fort Wayne, Indiana. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) There are approximately seventy-nine lots in Broadmoor Addition, and all are subject to certain restrictive covenants. (Id.) The Plaintiffs own lot number 58. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Defendant FWPC is an advisory plan commission under the Indiana Advisory Planning Law. (Answer ¶ 3, ECF No. 14.) Defendant LST owns lots 3, 4, and 5 in Broadmoor Addition, and petitioned the FWPC to vacate the restrictive covenants contained on the three lots in February 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.) The Plaintiffs allege that LST also requested that the FWPC approve a development plan for a shopping center on lots 3, 4, and 5 within Broadmoor Addition, which FWPC denies. (Compl. ¶ 13; Answer ¶ 13.) FWPC scheduled a public hearing on LST's requests for March 13, 2017. (Answer ¶ 14.)
According to the Plaintiffs, numerous residents of Broadmoor Addition objected to these requests at the March 13, 2017, public hearing. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Counsel for the Plaintiffs warned the FWPC that vacating the restrictive covenants on lots 3, 4, and 5 (1) would constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property for a private use, and (2) was also a taking without just compensation. (Id.) On March 20, 2017, the FWPC made a final zoning decision and entered findings of fact approving a vacation of the platted lots and of the covenants on the lots. (Answer ¶ 16.)
On April 18, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against LST and FWPC in this Court [ECF No. 1]. The Plaintiffs also filed a parallel action that same day in the Allen Circuit Court ("State Court Action"). (Def. City of Fort Wayne Plan Commission's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings Ex. A, ECF No. 18-1.) In the State Court Action, the Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the zoning decision made by the FWPC and, in the alternative, sought compensation through the Indiana eminent domain statute. (Id.) The State Court Action remains pending. (Pl's Mot. to Stay and Resp. to Def. City of Fort Wayne Plan Commission's Mot. J. on the Pleadings at 1-2, ECF No. 23.) In this federal action, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the FWPC's decision to vacate the restrictive covenants on lots 3, 4, and 5 in Broadmoor Addition. (Compl. at 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and this jurisdiction only extends to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Johnson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 783 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2015). One justiciability doctrine which further limits the federal courts is ripeness, which is based on both prudential and Article III limitations. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).
When the Court considers a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences from these allegations in the plaintiff's favor. The Court may look beyond the pleadings and view whatever evidence has been submitted to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists if a defendant challenges jurisdiction as a factual matter. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). The plaintiff must demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lee v. City of Chi., 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
In their respective motions both Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. More specifically, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe per Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Williamson County, the Supreme Court placed two requirements on plaintiffs pursuing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 takings claim. First, the plaintiff must show that she has received a final decision from the relevant government entity. 473 U.S. at 186-87. Second, the plaintiff must have sought "compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." Id. at 194.
The Defendants insist that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the instant case because the Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted available state procedures as required by Williamson County. The Court agrees that the instant case is non-justiciable, but not due to Article III limitations. As the Seventh Circuit recently declared, "Williamson County has nothing to do with subject-matter jurisdiction." Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013) ("A 'Case' or 'Controversy' exists once the government has taken private property without paying for it. Accordingly, whether an alternative remedy exists does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court.") Therefore, the Court is not without jurisdiction simply because a plaintiff may bring a claim against an allegedly unconstitutional taking through alternative state remedies and procedures. This makes sense because a plaintiff can challenge the adequacies of these alternative remedies or procedures in federal court before exhausting the same inadequate remedies or procedures. See Kolton, 869 F.3d at 534.
This case, though, is different. Here, the Plaintiffs are not challenging the adequacies of the available state procedures and remedies. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has determined that Indiana provides adequate remedies for takings claims through its Code. Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the Plaintiffs filed two parallel actions in state and federal court, and are seeking monetary damages in the State Court Action. This is precisely the type of action that Williamson County precludes. Thus, while the consideration is not strictly based on Article III limitations, the Court finds that dismissal is warranted because the case is not justiciable under the "prudential ripeness" test announced in Williamson County.
Because the case is being dismissed because it is currently not justiciable, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay is moot, as is Defendant FWPC's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant LST's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction [ECF No. 21] and DISMISSES this case without prejudice. The Court DENIES AS MOOT the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay [ECF No. 23] and Defendant Fort Wayne Plan Commission's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 18].
SO ORDERED on November 3, 2017.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT