Opinion
No. 05-04-00626-CV
Opinion Filed May 12, 2005.
On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-1285.
Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ralph S. Daniels appeals the trial court's rulings sustaining the special appearance of attorney Gerry A. Blodgett and Blodgett Blodgett, P.C., and denying his motion to disqualify counsel. The facts of this case are well known to the parties, and we do not recite them in detail. Because all issues are well settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court's order.
In 1981 or 1982, appellant hired Blodgett to represent him in intellectual property matters. Blodgett is a resident of Massachusetts, an attorney licensed to practice in Massachusetts, and president of the law firm Blodgett Blodgett, P.C., a professional corporation organized and existing under Massachusetts law. At the time the attorney-client relationship was formed, appellant also resided in Massachusetts but moved to Texas in the 1990s.
According to appellant's petition, appellees performed "extensive work" for one of his company's, Agrotech, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Sherman, Texas. Appellant alleged that appellees are claiming $1 million in fees. Appellant sued appellees seeking a declaration that he was not obligated to pay the attorney's fees, or that any fee claim was barred by the statute of limitations, or the fee claims are the obligation of Agrotech, Inc., or that the fees were forfeited as a result of appellees' breach of fiduciary duty.
Appellees filed a special appearance asserting they did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support jurisdiction and assumption of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Appellees asserted that they (1) are not residents of Texas, (2) are not required to maintain a registered agent for service of process in Texas, (3) do not engage in business in Texas and have not done so in the past, (4) do not maintain a place of business in Texas and have no employees, servants, or agents within the State, and (5) have no continuous or systematic contacts within Texas. Finally, they asserted that appellant's lawsuit did not arise from or relate to any activity in Texas.
In an affidavit attached to the motion, Blodgett stated that he obtained several patents for appellant, and these patent rights were subsequently transferred to RDR Trust, whose sole trustee is an Illinois resident. RDR Trust licensed the patent rights to Agrotech, Inc. Blodgett said he mailed invoices for legal services to RDR Trust and Agrotech, Inc. to appellant's Texas address at appellant's instructions. Blodgett also asserted he did not perform any of the legal work in Texas or for a Texas domiciliary. Further, Blodgett swore neither he nor Blodgett Blodgett, P.C. had any clients in Texas or performed any legal work in Texas, or had any other business or personal contacts in the State. Blodgett stated he had been to Texas only once in his life, in 1978, in connection with a job interview.
At the special appearance hearing, Daniels testified that he had been in Texas ten years and had had extensive contacts with Blodgett, which he described as hundreds of telephone calls, visits to Blodgett's office in Massachusetts, conferences with board members, and a board meeting in Philadelphia that Blodgett attended. Although appellant testified that Blodgett provided legal services to two Texas corporations and a trust created in Texas, he also acknowledged that any work was performed at Blodgett's office in Massachusetts and none of the work was performed in Texas. Appellant also testified that he had paid Blodgett "somewhere close to $700,000" for work performed since appellant had been in Texas and said Blodgett claimed he was owed another million dollars.
After considering the evidence, the trial court granted the special appearance. As part of its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that appellees did not purposefully perform any act or consummate any transaction in Texas; appellant's cause of action did not arise from any act performed or transaction consummated in Texas by appellees; appellees had no systematic or continuing contacts with Texas; there was not sufficient contacts between appellant and appellees to confer jurisdiction; and the assumption of jurisdiction by the court would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In his first four issues, appellant challenges the trial court's ruling to sustain the special appearance. In his first issue, he asserts there were sufficient minimum contacts to assert jurisdiction over appellees, arguing appellees' contacts with him in Texas were "far-reaching, extensive, pervasive, and continuous over a period of almost ten years." In issues two, three, and four, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings that appellees (1) have performed no legal work in Texas or for the benefit of a Texas domiciliary, (2) have no clients in Texas and perform no legal work in Texas, and (3) have no business or personal contacts in Texas.
We begin by addressing his complaints regarding the trial court's fact findings. Initially, we note that the parties agree that none of the work was performed in Texas. Evidence on the other issues, however, was conflicting. Blodgett's affidavit testimony supports the findings, and appellant presented conflicting evidence. Even if we assumed appellant is correct and the evidence does not support the findings, we would nevertheless conclude appellant has not shown on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the special appearance.
The standard of review in special appearance cases and the law regarding in personam jurisdiction are well established. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793-96 (Tex. 2002); Myers v. Emery, 697 S.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ). In particular, we note that the due process clause of the United States Constitution permits a state to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if (1) the defendant has some minimum, purposeful contacts with the State and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 326 (Tex. 1998).
Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that appellees had insufficient minimum contacts for which to hale them into a Texas court under either general or specific jurisdiction. The record shows that appellant, while a resident of Massachusetts, hired appellees to represent him in legal matters involving intellectual property rights. This attorney-client relationship continued after appellant moved to Texas. By his own testimony, appellant's list of contacts with appellees has been by telephone or appellant's own trips to Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Blodgett has not been to Texas other than a brief visit more than twenty-five years ago. There was no evidence that appellees purposefully directed any act or consummated any transaction in Texas. Moreover, any of the contacts appellees had with this State are not of the quality or quantity such that jurisdiction can be imposed. See Myers, 697 S.W.2d at 31-32 (holding contacts minimal and fortuitous in case where Texas resident sued Oklahoma lawyer, who represented him at trial in Oklahoma, to prevent lawyer from collecting fees from him).
Further, even if appellees had purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state, the exercise of jurisdiction must still be fair and reasonable. See Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. 1991). The trial court, after considering the relevant factors, concluded that the assumption of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although it is appellant's burden to show reversible error, he has not even attempted to brief whether this required element was met. Because appellant has not challenged one of the bases for upholding the trial court's ruling, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in granting the special appearance. We resolve issues one through four against appellant. Further, our disposition of these issues makes it unnecessary to address appellant's fifth issue complaining about the denial of the motion to disqualify counsel.
We affirm the trial court's order.