According to the Court: The Court of Appeals' decision in Daniel v. Hardin Cnty. Gen'l Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), and the General Assembly's legislative response to that decision, is instructive in the present case. In Daniel, we addressed “whether the twelve month limitation for bringing suit against a governmental entity pursuant to [the GTLA] can be extended by T.C.A. § 20–1–119,” the comparativefault statute.

According to the Court:The Court of Appeals' decision in Daniel v. Hardin Cnty. Gen'l Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), and the General Assembly's legislative response to that decision, is instructive in the present case. In Daniel, we addressed “whether the twelve month limitation for bringing suit against a governmental entity pursuant to [the GTLA] can be extended by T.C.A. § 20–1–119,” the comparative

Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tenn.2013).The Court of Appeals' decision in Daniel v. Hardin Cnty. Gen'l Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997), and the General Assembly's legislative response to that decision, is instructive in the present case. In Daniel, we addressed “whether the twelve month limitation for bringing suit against a governmental entity pursuant to [the GTLA] can be extended by T.C.A. § 20–1–119,” the comparative fault statute.

Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tenn.2013). The Court of Appeals' decision in Daniel v. Hardin Cnty. Gen'l Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997), and the General Assembly's legislative response to that decision, is instructive in the present case. In Daniel, we addressed “whether the twelve month limitation for bringing suit against a governmental entity pursuant to [the GTLA] can be extended by T.C.A. § 20–1–119,” the comparative fault statute.

SeeNance, 883 S.W.2d at 631. In Daniel v. Hardin County General Hospital, 971 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997), this Court addressed the applicability of the comparative fault joinder statute, which provides that in a comparative fault case, where, after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the defendant alleges that a nonparty contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff may within 90 days of the defendant's answer alleging such person's fault, either: "(1) Amend the complaint . . . pursuant to Rule 15 . . .; or (2) Institute a separate action against that person. . . ." T.C.A. § 20-1-119(a) (Supp. 2001).

Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997); Daniel v. Hardin County Gen. Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). In such cases, we must "construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and take the allegations of the complaint as true."

This Court emphasized that this provision means that bringing an action within the twelve months of the date the cause of action accrued is a "condition precedent to the bringing of a claim under the TGTLA." Id. at *4 (citing Lockaby v. City of Knoxville, No. 03A01-9609-CV-00297, 1997 WL 129115, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. March 21, 1997); Nance v. City of Knoxville, 883 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994); Williams v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 773 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988); Daniel v. Hardin County Gen. Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997)). The Doyle Court also noted Daniel v. Hardin County General Hospital, 971 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997)), and Goodman v. Suh, No. 03A01-9501-CV-00005, 1995 WL 507778 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 29, 1995), which held that the twelve month statute of limitations of the TGTLA cannot be extended by use of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-1-119, which provides for the relation back of claims asserted by a plaintiff against a new defendant, identified in the original defendant's answer to the complaint as a party responsible for some or all of the plaintiff's injuries.

1997); Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tenn. 1996); Daniel v. Hardin Co. Gen.Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tenn.App. 1997). We must examine the complaint alone, "construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and take the allegations of the complaint as true."

This argument has been made in other Tennessee cases involving broadly–worded statutes that were deemed inconsistent with the GTLA statute of limitations, and has found no purchase. See, e.g.,Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d at 336–37 (broadly–worded general savings statutes permitting action dismissed in federal court to be refiled in state court within one year of dismissal did not apply to extend GTLA statute of limitations because they did not "expressly" state applicability to suits against governmental entities) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ("The period of limitations for any claim asserted ... and for any claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed ... shall be tolled ....") (emphasis added) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 28–1–115 ("Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitations to the contrary, ...") (emphasis added)); Daniel v. Hardin Co. General Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (declined to apply 90–day window in 1993 version of Section 20–1–119, extending expired statute of limitations to add "a person not a party to the suit," to statute of limitations in GTLA claims because Section 20–1–119 did not reference GTLA or governmental entities). See alsoCunningham, 405 S.W.3d at 45–46 (holding that 2009 amendment to Section 29–26–121(c) providing 120–day extension upon filing of pre–suit notice, applicable "to all medical malpractice actions," did not "evince an express legislative intent to extend the statute of limitations in GTLA cases," even though, at the time, a "medical malpractice action" was statutorily defined as "any civil action ... alleging that a health care provider or providers have caused an injury related to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services to a person, regardless of the theory of liability on which the action is based."); Wade v. Jackson–Madison County General Hosp. Dist., No. W2014–01103–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 340265

This argument has been made in other Tennessee cases involving broadly–worded statutes that were deemed inconsistent with the GTLA statute of limitations, and has found no purchase. See, e.g.,Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d at 336–37 (broadly–worded general savings statutes permitting action dismissed in federal court to be refiled in state court within one year of dismissal did not apply to extend GTLA statute of limitations because they did not “expressly” state applicability to suits against governmental entities) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted ... and for any claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed ... shall be tolled ....”) (emphasis added) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 28–1–115 (“Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitations to the contrary, ...”) (emphasis added)); Daniel v. Hardin Co. General Hosp., 971 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (declined to apply 90–day window in 1993 version of Section 20–1–119, extending expired statute of limitations to add “a person not a party to the suit,” to statute of limitations in GTLA claims because Section 20–1–119 did not reference GTLA or governmental entities). See alsoCunningham, 405 S.W.3d at 45–46 (holding that 2009 amendment to Section 29–26–121(c) providing 120–day extension upon filing of pre–suit notice, applicable “to all medical malpractice actions,” did not “evince an express legislative intent to extend the statute of limitations in GTLA cases,” even though, at the time, a “medical malpractice action” was statutorily defined as “any civil action ... alleging that a health care provider or providers have caused an injury related to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services to a person, regardless of the theory of liability on which the action is based.”); Wade v. Jackson–Madison County General Hosp. Dist., No. W2014–01103–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 340265