From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Daniel v. Gat Airline Ground Support, Inc.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
Oct 25, 2023
Civil Action 2:23-cv-1160-BHH-TER (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2023)

Opinion

Civil Action 2:23-cv-1160-BHH-TER

10-25-2023

ALICIA DANIEL, Plaintiff, v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Charleston County, South Carolina. Defendant removed the case to this court. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for failure to accommodate, retaliation, and discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from severe, airborne food allergies to chocolate, shellfish, and nuts, which subjects her to anaphylactic shock if exposed. Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1-1). On March 30, 2021, Plaintiff interviewed for a position with Defendant as a Customer Service Agent to be conducted at the Charleston International Airport. Compl. ¶ 6. During the interview, one of Plaintiff's allergens, chocolate, was present on the table. Compl. ¶ 8. When Plaintiff noticed the chocolate, she notified the three interviewers of her allergy and step outside the room for a brief period to recover from the exposure. Compl. ¶ 9. Once she returned to the room, she further discussed her allergies with the interviewers and discussed the “emergency medical procedure” (the plan) she must follow after any exposure. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.

Immediately following the interview, Defendant offered Plaintiff the Customer Service Agent position at the Charleston International Airport. Compl. ¶ 12. On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff went to the Charleston Aviation Authority Police Annex Building to attend training for her position as a Customer Service Agent. Compl. ¶ 13. When she was introduced to Defendant's management team that was conducting the training, Plaintiff notified them of her allergies as well as the plan if exposed. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff requested an accommodation for her allergies and the plan, and also inquired about whether Defendant could ban Plaintiff's allergens from the break room so that she could safely eat during her lunch and other breaks. Compl. ¶ 16. The management team informed Plaintiff they would speak with Defendant's corporate office regarding an appropriate accommodation for Plaintiff's allergies. Compl. ¶ 17.

In case of an exposure, to help prevent severe reactions, Plaintiff generally would remove herself from the area in which the allergen was present and, if possible, go to an area with fresh air, utilize her prescribed rescue inhaler and/or bring Febreeze or Microban to sanitize any are exposed to her allergens so that she could occupy the area safely. Compl. ¶ 18. However, Plaintiff was not allowed to carry Febreeze or Microban with her while working at the Charleston International Airport because the location of her job required her to go through the airport's security checkpoints. Compl. ¶ 19.

Plaintiff returned for in-person training between May 3, 2021, and May 12, 2021. Compl. ¶ 20. Defendant had not established an area, as requested, separate from the training area for trainees to eat so trainees were eating in the training area, possibly exposing Plaintiff to her allergens. Compl. ¶ 22. Plaintiff asked about a safe area where she could eat and separate herself from others while they were eating, but the management team did not have such an area available. Compl. ¶ 2425. As a result, Plaintiff would remove herself from the training area while others were eating and ate her lunch in her car. Compl. ¶ 23. During training, one of Defendant's employees brought and opened a Kit-Kat bar outside of the lunch break hours. Compl. ¶ 26. Plaintiff informed the employee, in the presence of other employees, of her allergies and them removed herself from the training room. Compl. ¶ 27. The following day, another employee brought food that contained Plaintiff's allergens into the training room outside of the lunch break hours. Compl. ¶ 28. Again, Plaintiff informed the employee of her allergies and removed herself from the training room. Compl. ¶ 29. On another day, the same employee again brought a Kit-Kat bar to the training room. Compl. ¶ 30. Before the employee opened the Kit-Kat bar, Plaintiff informed a member of the management team, Meisa Jackson, of the other employees knowingly exposing her to her allergens, who told Plaintiff she would inform the General Manager of the issue. Compl. ¶ 31, 33.

That day, May 6, 2021, the General Manager and the Human Resources Director discussed the process of requesting ADA accommodations with the Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 34. Plaintiff was instructed to take leave with pay for that day and to not return until she provided the required ADA accommodations paperwork to Defendant and the paperwork had been reviewed. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was not granted leave with pay for May 7, or May 10-11. Compl. ¶ 36.

The next day, May 7, 2021, Plaintiff met with her doctor who completed the required ADA accommodations paperwork and forwarded the paperwork to Defendant as requested. Compl. ¶ 37. Her doctor suggested accommodations to include modification or adjustment of the work environment, modified work schedules, implementing policy restricting certain food from the workplace, posting signs in the workplace that certain foods are prohibited; modifying workplace policies to allow people to eat in certain secluded areas, allowing flexible scheduling so Plaintiff is not around multiple and/or offending co-workers, allowing Plaintiff to keep medication and access to emergency care close by, and permission to keep Plaintiff's cell phone on her for emergency contact. Compl. ¶ 56. On May 10, 2021, Defendant's Human Resources Director called Plaintiff to discuss the paperwork. Compl. ¶ 38. Plaintiff provided updated and signed paperwork the same day so that she could return to work on her next scheduled training day, May 12, 2021. Compl. ¶ 39.

Plaintiff returned to work on May 12, 2021. Compl. ¶ 41. On May 13, 2021, Jackson opened packaged food which contained Plaintiff's allergen while Jackson was in close proximity to Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 42. Plaintiff informed Jackson that the food contained one of Plaintiff's allergens and that she needed to move away from Jackson, and both Jackson and Plaintiff moved away from each other. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44. Later that day, a notice of Plaintiff's allergens was posted in the training room and stated that employees were not permitted to eat the listed foods in the break room. Compl. ¶ 45. As a result of the notice, an employee was verbally antagonistic towards Plaintiff and several employees complained to the General Manager about the prohibition, who told them that they could eat said foods in his office. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47.

Plaintiff did not attend work due to illness on May 14, 2021, and she provided the General Manager with a doctor's note. Compl. ¶ 48. On May 15, 2021, Plaintiff was informed by the Human Resources Director via email that Defendant would be “unable to reasonably accommodate [Plaintiff] in [her] current job or any other jobs at the airport due to the nature and location of [their] work.” Compl. ¶ 49. The email further stated “ we would not be able to let you continue your employment with us as a CSA due to the potential exposure to airborne food allergens.” Compl. ¶ 51. Plaintiff's employment was terminated. Compl. ¶ 50.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for dismissal of this action because it argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that she was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA who could perform the essential functions of her position with or without accommodation. The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . .the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,... and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). This “includes .not making reasonable accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To fall within the ADA's protected class, a plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015). The ADA defines “disability” as: “(1) ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities' (the ‘actual-disability' prong); (2) ‘a record of such impairment' (the ‘record-of' prong); or (3) ‘being regarded as having such an impairment' (the ‘regarded-as' prong).” Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). A “qualified individual” includes: “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a)(8).

An ADA plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating that [s]he is a ‘qualified individual.'” Jessup v. Barnes Grp., Inc., 23 F.4th 360, 365 (4th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA “must provide some allegation or allegations specifically indicating that the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.” Blackburn v. Trustees of Guilford Tech. Cmty. Coll., 733 F.Supp.2d 659, 664 (M.D. N.C. 2010); see also Lisotto v. New Prime, Inc., No. CA 3:13-2407-MGL-PJG, 2014 WL 4264838, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2014) (“[T]o set forth an ADA claim, [a plaintiff] must allege facts showing that he was a qualified individual under the ADA.”).

Plaintiff alleges that she “was qualified for the position for which she held with Defendant and capable of performing her duties; essential or otherwise” and “was qualified for the employment she held with Defendant prior to Defendant's termination.” Compl. ¶¶ 55, 72. Defendant argues that she does not include any factual allegations regarding what the duties of her position were and, although she alleges a list of potential accommodations, she does not include any factual allegations as to how the proposed accommodations would allow her to perform those duties. See Blackburn, 733 F.Supp.2d at 664 (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint where it “fail[ed] to contain any facts demonstrating that [the plaintiff] could perform the essential functions of her job.”). Plaintiff argues that the duties of a customer service agent are self-explanatory and that the court should be able to infer that she could perform the essential duties of her position from the allegations that Plaintiff informed Defendant of her allergens during her interview and, with this knowledge, Defendant offered her the position of Customer Service Agent. This inference is reasonable given the closeness in time between her hire and her termination, and, thus, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to allege that she is a qualified individual with a disability. Therefore, dismissal is not appropriate at this stage of the litigation.

Defendant also argues that, even if Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state she is a qualified individual with a disability, she still fails to allege a failure to accommodate claim. To establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must show that 1) she has a disability within the meaning of the statute; 2) Defendant had notice of such disability; 3) with reasonable accommodation Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of her position; and 4) Defendant refused to make such accommodations. Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001). For essentially the same reasons discussed above, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege a failure to accommodate claim because she does not include factual allegations in the complaint regarding what the essential functions of her position were or what accommodations would be reasonable to allow her to perform those functions. For the same reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to allege a claim for failure to accommodate.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) be denied.

The parties are directed to the important information on the following page.


Summaries of

Daniel v. Gat Airline Ground Support, Inc.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
Oct 25, 2023
Civil Action 2:23-cv-1160-BHH-TER (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2023)
Case details for

Daniel v. Gat Airline Ground Support, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:ALICIA DANIEL, Plaintiff, v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC, Defendant.

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

Date published: Oct 25, 2023

Citations

Civil Action 2:23-cv-1160-BHH-TER (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2023)