Daniel v. Ga. Power Co.

18 Citing cases

  1. Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Famble

    170 Ga. App. 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 43 times
    In Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509, 527 (317 S.E.2d 853) (1984), we compared this test with the one adopted by our Supreme Court regarding artificial conditions highly dangerous to trespassing children.

    " Succinctly stated, according to counsel's contention, liability is dependent on whether an alleged tortfeasor had any duty which might arise from "`control of the property, whether or not he has title thereto and whether or not he has a superior right to possession of property which is in the possession or control of another.'" Scheer v. Cliatt, 133 Ga. App. 702 (2a), 704 ( 212 S.E.2d 29). Accord Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 597 (2) ( 247 S.E.2d 139). General Facts

  2. Khamis Enterprises v. Boone

    480 S.E.2d 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    Arriving at this intention requires consideration of the whole deed, the contract, the subject-matter, the object, the purpose, the nature of restrictions or limitations, the attendant facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of making the deed, and the consideration involved. Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 599 (4) ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978). The 1988 easement deed at issue here provides, "[s]aid perpetual easement is for the purpose of erecting, repairing, maintaining, improving and changing not more than one outdoor advertising structure(s) on the above described premises together with free right of ingress and egress. . . ."

  3. Amear v. Hall

    164 Ga. App. 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 45 times
    In Amear, plaintiff was an employee of a contractor hired to do carpentry work and fiberglass installation for the defendant.

    "`There is no liability from ownership alone . . . It must appear that the injury resulted from a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the injured party.'" Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 600 ( 247 S.E.2d 139). Liability, if any, of the owner "is dependent on whether [the owner] had any duty which might arise from `"control of the property [or] . . . title thereto . . . [or had] a superior right to possession of property which is in the possession or control of another.

  4. Biggers on Behalf of Key v. Southern Ry.

    820 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1993)   Cited 11 times
    Refusing to consider hearsay statements by a declarant under Rule 804(b) where at summary judgment no evidence had been produced as to declarant's unavailability

    Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that the Gwinnett County tax records do not support an inference that the roadway is taxed as a private driveway. Duluth cites Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978) (owner of land who expressly or impliedly induces others to come upon his premises is liable in damages for injuries occasioned by his failure to exercise ordinary care) and Richards v. Mayor City Council of Americus, 158 Ga. App. 693, 282 S.E.2d 122 (1981) (municipalities primarily are responsible for the safe condition of the municipal street system) supporting its concession. Plaintiff asserts that the "Record of Ownership" cards on file for the two individuals do not show the road appraised as an improvement on the west side of the tracks.

  5. Lipham v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.

    263 Ga. 865 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. did not apply to limit the liability of a store owner for the negligent act of its employee, who had unintentionally knocked plaintiff to the ground

    See, e.g., Swanson v. Smith, 199 Ga. App. 471 ( 405 S.E.2d 301) (1991). Further, this duty pertains to the condition of the premises and is imposed because the landowner has control over the property and is thus able to act in order to protect others from conditions on the property which might cause harm. Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978); Scheer v. Cliatt, 133 Ga. App. 702, 704 ( 212 S.E.2d 29) (1975). This case, however, does not concern a condition of the premises over which Rich's could have exercised some degree of control or of which Rich's could have warned; instead, the claims pertain to an act of active negligence on the part of a Rich's employee.

  6. Anderson v. David

    367 Ga. App. 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    In fact, the Easement Agreement explicitly states that the Andersons retain the property in the easement areas: they are responsible "to pay ad valorem taxes on the Grantor Property, including, but not limited to, those taxes applicable to the Easement Areas." Compare Daniel v. Ga. Power Co. , 146 Ga. App. 596, 599-600 (4), 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978) (deed conveyed fee simple title rather than an easement). The Davids and the trial court attempt to support their interpretation of the term "exclusive easement" — to mean used and possessed by the Davids to the exclusion of all others, including the Andersons — by citing dicta in numerous nonexclusive easement decisions that reads: "unless the easement is exclusive, the grantor may construct buildings or other improvements on the land which do not ‘substantially interfere’ with the enjoyment of an easement previously granted." Upson v. Stafford , 205 Ga. App. 615, 616, 422 S.E.2d 882 (1992) ; accord Davista Holdings , 321 Ga. App. at 135, n. 3, 741 S.E.2d 266 ; Stricklett , 252 Ga. App. at 433 (1), 555 S.E.2d 800.

  7. City of Buford v. Gwinnett Cty

    262 Ga. App. 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 5 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 599(4) ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978). The only evidence in the record regarding the intent of the parties in making the deed is the deed itself, in which the grantor conveys to Georgia Power "the said tract or parcel of land, with all and singular the rights, members and appurtenances thereof, to the same being, belonging, or in anywise appertaining, to the only proper use, benefit and behoof of the said Grantee forever in FEE SIMPLE."

  8. Gammage v. Graham

    221 Ga. App. 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    Neither did Gammage own, have access to, or control over, conditions in the prison, such that he could have taken any remedial or preventative measures to protect Graham. See generally Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 600 (5) ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978). Generally, issues of negligence and proximate cause are matters for the jury.

  9. Johnson v. Richardson

    414 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    "`There is no liability from ownership alone, (cits.), or from joint ownership, (cit.), or from cotenancy, (cit.). It must appear that the injury resulted from a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the injured party.' [Cit.]" Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 600 (5) ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978). In the instant case, there was no breach of the duty to keep the premises safe for invitees because there is no assertion of the existence of any defects or conditions which were in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, and the like, such that they would not be known to appellant and would not be observed by him in the exercise of ordinary care.

  10. Green v. Moreland

    407 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    4. The trial court held that the county had no liability in its capacity as the owner or occupier of land because the evidence of record showed that possession and control of the work site had been relinquished to FCCI at the time of the incident. See Black v. City of Cordele, 163 Ga. App. 322, 326 ( 293 S.E.2d 557) (1982) (factually distinguishing Daniel v. Ga. Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596 ( 247 S.E.2d 139) (1978); Amear v. Hall, 164 Ga. App. 163, 166-167 (2) ( 296 S.E.2d 611) (1982). A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court's holding in this regard is correct.