Opinion
No. 10 5033426 S
October 22, 2010
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Ursula D'Angelo, filed the present action against the defendants, the State of Connecticut (referred to as "Complainer Doe" by the plaintiff), the Connecticut Superior Court, (referred to as John Doe #6 by the plaintiff), Inspector Appuzo (referred to as John Doe #5 by the plaintiff) and Inspector Tyson (referred to as John Doe #5 by the plaintiff) of the department of motor vehicles and Officers Capozzo, Thorpe and Hannon of the North Haven police department on August 3, 2010. The complaint sets forth four counts. Count one seeks recovery for trespass. Count two seeks recovery for "trespass on the case." Count three seeks recovery for "trespass on the case" under a theory of vicarious liability. Count four seeks recovery for "trover." The plaintiff seeks both monetary and equitable relief.
The complaint alleges the following relevant facts. On or about July 22, 2010, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in North Haven when she was pulled over by Apuzzo. After protracted discussions between the plaintiff and the various defendants, it was determined that the plaintiff's vehicle was unregistered. The vehicle was towed despite the plaintiff's vigorous objection.
The State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Superior Court, Appuzo and Tyson filed a motion to dismiss on September 1, 2010. The motion was accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a document which might, although improperly styled as a court order, be construed as an objection to this motion on September 10, 2010.
DISCUSSION
The defendants, the State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Superior Court, Appuzo and Tyson, in their official capacities only, move to dismiss the present action on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff does not respond to this argument directly.
The complaint seeks recovery against Appuzo and Tyson in their official capacities only. "Our Supreme Court has set forth criteria to determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in an individual capacity." Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 621, 787 A.2d 666 (2002). The four criteria are as follows: "(1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). All of these criteria have been met in the present case.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law . . . Not only have [courts] recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [courts] have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 258, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007).
"A plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." (Internal citation omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim for monetary relief. The plaintiff does not argue the existence of a waiver or an exception to immunity; she argues only that she, not the state, is the true sovereign. Although the plaintiff might have obtained a waiver through the claims commissioner; General Statutes §§ 4-141, 4-142; Hirschfeld v. Commission on Claims, 172 Conn. 603, 604-05, 376 A.2d 71 (1977); she has failed to do so. Consequently, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim for monetary relief against the state and its officers.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues: "Who is the sovereign? . . . [I]n this case it is Ursula Ilse d'Angelo . . . [T]he State of Connecticut, and the United States of America have no general sovereignty."
Likewise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. Although, as a general rule, "actions that seek injunctive or declaratory relief against a state officer acting in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute do not conflict with the policies underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity"; Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, CT Page 20416 828 A.2d 549 (2003); when "it is evident that the factual basis for [a constitutional] claim simply [does] not exist . . . the doctrine of sovereign immunity operates as a bar to subject matter jurisdiction." Barde v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Colleges, 207 Conn. 59, 66, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's declaratory judgment action under the doctrine of sovereign immunity where facts supporting claims of due process and equal protection violations were lacking). None of the facts set forth in the complaint indicate that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. Consequently, the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state and its officers are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Superior Court, Inspector Apuzzo and Inspector Tyson's motion to dismiss is granted.