Opinion
2014-07582
03-25-2015
Anthony Michael Francis D'ANGELO, et al., appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent, et al., defendants.
Weiss & Weiss, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Alan R. Levy of counsel), for appellants. Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Mitchell L. Kaufman of counsel), for respondent.
Weiss & Weiss, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Alan R. Levy of counsel), for appellants.
Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Mitchell L. Kaufman of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of an insurance contract, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), entered June 6, 2014, which granted the motion of the defendant Allstate Insurance Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiffs correctly contend that while parties are free to agree to shorten a statute of limitations, the new time period must be reasonable. However, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, a one-year time limitation provision for commencing an action under a policy of insurance, such as the subject provision, is valid and enforceable (see Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 966, 967–968, 525 N.Y.S.2d 793, 520 N.E.2d 512 ; Blitman Constr. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 66 N.Y.2d 820, 822, 498 N.Y.S.2d 349, 489 N.E.2d 236 ; Brown v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 210 A.D.2d 279, 279, 620 N.Y.S.2d 399 ; cf. Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.3d 511, 982 N.Y.S.2d 826, 5 N.E.3d 989 ). Accordingly, the subject provision, which required that an action be commenced within one year after the date of the loss, was not unreasonable.
The plaintiffs' contention that the subject provision is ambiguous is without merit. This Court has held on many occasions that the phrase “date of loss” refers “to the date of the catastrophe insured against” (Roberts v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 253 A.D.2d 807, 807, 677 N.Y.S.2d 621, citing Costello v. Allstate Ins. Co., 230 A.D.2d 763, 646 N.Y.S.2d 695 ; see Vaccaro v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 A.D.3d 839, 840, 983 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Shah v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 A.D.2d 815, 816, 757 N.Y.S.2d 870 ; cf. McGowan v. Great N. Ins. Co., 105 A.D.3d 714, 715, 962 N.Y.S.2d 638 ).
Here, Allstate made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting the subject provision, and by establishing that the plaintiffs commenced this action after the expiration of that period (see Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.2d at 967–968, 525 N.Y.S.2d 793, 520 N.E.2d 512 ; Vaccaro v. New York
Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 A.D.3d at 840, 983 N.Y.S.2d 436 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it (see e.g. Blitman Constr. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 66 N.Y.2d at 822, 498 N.Y.S.2d 349, 489 N.E.2d 236 ; Vaccaro v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 A.D.3d at 840, 983 N.Y.S.2d 436 ).