Opinion
Civ. File No. 03-3488 (PAM/JSM)
November 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For the following reasons, the Motion is denied
BACKGROUND
This case involves patents for a shopping cart retrieval vehicle of the kind used by Target, Cub, and similar stores to pick up shopping carts in their parking lots. Plaintiff Dane Industries, Inc. ("Dane") is the owner of two patents on the cart retrieval vehicles it manufactures: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,934,694 ("`694 patent") and 6,220,379 ("`379 patent"). Dane's vehicles are called QuicKarts, and are manufactured in several series, as in QuicKart 2000, QuicKart 4000, and so on.
In September 2001, Dane's Vice President of Research and Development, Defendant Gary Hoonsbeen, left Dane. He subsequently began working for Defendant Ameritek Industries, LLC ("Ameritek"). Ameritek manufactures a cart retrieval vehicle called the "Golden Retriever." Dane contends that the Golden Retriever infringes on Dane's patents.
Dane brought this lawsuit in June 2003 and sought a preliminary injunction against Ameritek's alleged infringement one month later. Dane sought a preliminary injunction at that time because Target had just announced that it would hold an "auction" between Dane and Ameritek for Target's business. Ameritek voluntarily withdrew from the auction, however, and stopped manufacturing cart retrieval vehicles. The parties were unable to resolve their differences, and Dane reinstated its Motion in late September or early October. The matter is now fully briefed and ready for resolution.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A preliminary injunction may be granted only if the moving party can demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the balance of harms favors the movant; (3) that the public interest favors the movant; and (4) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm absent the restraining order. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Reebok Int'l Ltd, v. J. Baker. Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Injunctive relief is considered to be a "drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted." Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To prevail on its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Dane must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its patent infringement allegations. Thus, the Court must preliminarily construe the claims of the two patents at issue, and determine whether, in light of that construction, Dane has proved that Ameritek's cart retrieval vehicle infringes Dane's patents. The Court notes that its construction of the claims involved here is preliminary only, and that in future proceedings, the following claim constructions will not necessarily bind the parties. See, e.g., Jack Guttman. Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that district court may issue "tentative" claim construction when "faced with construing highly technical claim language on an expedited basis").
Although the patents at issue encompass numerous claim limitations, the parties disagree about the construction of only one claim limitation in each patent.
1. The `694 Patent
In relevant part, the `694 patent claims a `Vehicle for moving at least one wheeled cart, the vehicle comprising: . . . two jaws protruding from the front plate, wherein said jaws operate to engage corresponding vertical frame members of the at least one wheeled cart." (Robbennolt Aff. Ex. A at 8 (`694 Patent).) In simpler terms, this limitation claims a set of two jaw-like structures that emerge from the front of the retrieval vehicle to attach to the legs of a shopping cart and hold the cart in place.
Ameritek also contends that its vehicle does not infringe on a second claim in the `694 patent. The success of that contention, however, depends entirely on whether Ameritek infringes the claim discussed below.
In the embodiment of the `694 patent, this element is depicted as a single metal bar with J-shaped hooks on either end. (See Defs.' Opp'n Mem. at 4 (reproducing `694 patent figure 6).) The hooks face the same direction and, according to the illustration, the legs of the shopping cart fit into the hooks. The legs are secured in the hooks with a moveable pin that is situated across the open portion of one of the hooks. The wheels of the shopping cart rest on the ground.
In Ameritek's vehicle, the shopping cart is attached to the vehicle by the use of cups. (See id. at 11 (reproducing photographs of Ameritek's vehicle).) The rear wheels of the shopping cart rest in the cups, and the front wheels of the cart are on the ground. The cups are hinged, allowing the wheels to move in response to the terrain over which the cart is moving. A moveable pin holds the wheel in place. Bumpers above the cups on the front of the vehicle rest against the frame of the shopping cart, further holding the cart in place.
Dane argues that the cups on Ameritek's vehicle, together with the bumpers, constitute "jaws" that "engage" the shopping cart and therefore that Ameritek's vehicle infringes this limitation of Dane's `694 patent. Dane contends that the Court should give "jaw" its ordinary meaning, namely "something resembling the jaw of an animal for holding or engaging something else." (PL's Supp. Mem. at 13 (citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary).) The Court has no doubt that the word "jaw" in the claim limitation was intended to have its ordinary meaning. However, that ordinary meaning simply does not encompass the cups used by Ameritek. A cup is defined as "a small open container." Random House College Dictionary at 326 (rev. ed. 1982). A "small open container" does not "resembl[e] the jaw of an animal" and thus does not constitute a "jaw." Dane has failed to show that it is likely to succeed on its claim that Ameritek's Golden Retriever infringes Dane's `694 patent.
2. The `379 Patent
The limitation in dispute in the `379 patent is "a brake controller operative to drive the electric motor in an opposite direction in response to the stop signal." (Robbennolt Aff. Ex. B at 15 (`379 patent).) This limitation describes the operation of the motor and specifically how the motor brings the vehicle to a stop. Dane contends that the description encompasses a system of braking called "dynamic braking." (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 20.) According to Dane, the braking system in Ameritek's Golden Retriever uses a type of dynamic braking called regenerative braking, and thus infringes Dane's `379 patent.
Regenerative braking is a braking system in which, when the brakes receive the "stop" signal, the power to the battery is turned off. The machine continues to coast, however, which generates energy. This energy is pumped back into the battery to recharge the battery, and creates a drag on the motor which slows the vehicle to a stop. The motor does not, however, ever run "in an opposite direction."
Dane contends that the `379 patent does not require an engine to run in the opposite direction. Rather, Dane argues that, because Ameritek concedes that its engine turns positive torque into negative torque, the current driving the motor goes in the opposite direction, which infringes Dane's patent. (Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 9-10.) The plain language of the patent, however, encompasses only an engine in which the brake "drive[s] the electric motor in an opposite direction." (`379 patent at 15 (emphasis added).) Ameritek's regenerative braking system does not appear to be covered by the plain language of this claim limitation. Thus, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, Dane has failed to show that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its patent infringement claims. Failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits is fatal to Dane's request for a preliminary injunction. Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l. Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that preliminary injunction may not be granted unless movant establishes both likelihood of success on merits and irreparable harm). Therefore, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, and upon all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Clerk Doc. No. 19) is DENIED.