The vehicle for obtaining a name change is set forth in Civil Rights Law article 6, which limits jurisdiction, insofar as here pertinent, to the County Court or Supreme Court in the county where the person seeking the name change resides (Civil Rights Law § 60). Although the Civil Rights Law does not diminish an individual's common-law right to select an appropriate name, it does define the exclusive mechanism for a court-ordered change (see, Matter of Maria E. v Anthony E., 125 Misc.2d 933; Dana A. v Harry M.N., 113 Misc.2d 635; but see, Matter of Brooks v Willie, 117 Misc.2d 640). We hold that the power to direct a name change is outside Family Court's jurisdiction.
Michael B. v. Sendi Diann W. (1983), 121 Misc.2d 475, 467 N YS.2d 1009. Accord, Dana A. v. Harry M.N. (1982), 113 Misc.2d 635, 449 N.Y.S.2d 851. The application of the doctrine of res judicata in the parent-child context was examined in Privity, Preclusion and the Parent-Child Relationship, 1977 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 612. The article begins in general terms saying:
This statute does not grant the Family Court authority to entertain an application for a name change. ( Dana A. v Harry M.N., 113 Misc.2d 635.) In fact, the apparent purpose of section 543 is to effectuate the issuance of a new birth certificate reflecting the name of the father when an order of filiation is made pursuant to section 4138 (subd 1, par [b]) of the Public Health Law.
The issues to be resolved are twofold: (1) does the Family Court have the power in an article 5 filiation proceeding (Family Ct Act, art 5) to determine the surname of the child, and assuming it does, (2) will the child's interests be best served by his bearing the surname of the adjudicated father? Notwithstanding the willingness of both sides to have this court determine the boy's name, the mother now asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to determine surname "status" in a paternity proceeding, relying upon a recent New York County Family Court decision, Dana A. v Harry M.N. ( 113 Misc.2d 635). The father, however, maintains that a proper construction of section 543 Fam. Ct. Act of the Family Court Act together with the emerging judicial trend towards establishment of equal rights for putative fathers, provides a sound rationale for a grant of power to this court to determine the matter raised.
The respondent, by his attorney, has filed a written objection to the report of the hearing examiner, which recommends that petitioner have judgment for arrears in the amount of $1,200 (Family Ct Act, § 460). Respondent objects on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that an application for a judgment pursuant to section 460 cannot be referred to the hearing examiner since section 460 is not "one of the proceedings specifically enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 439" ( Lamagro v Murray, 107 Misc.2d 579). Although this court and other Family Courts of the State refer such applications (see Matter of Huttenlocker v Damstetter, 111 Misc.2d 484), as well as other supplementary proceedings (cf. Dana A. v Harry M.N., 113 Misc.2d 635) to the hearing examiner, we have been unable to locate a case in which this jurisdictional objection has been raised. We find it unpersuasive, and confirm the report.