Opinion
NO. 1D20-1253
02-22-2021
Steven Francis D'AMICO, Appellant, v. Robert CONNOR, Warden, Appellee.
Steven Francis D'Amico, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Burke, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Steven Francis D'Amico, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Burke, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Long, J.
The trial court dismissed D'Amico's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition challenged the legality of his conviction. He is incarcerated in Liberty County. He petitioned in Liberty County rather than in Broward County where he was adjudicated and sentenced. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus should normally be filed in the county of the petitioner's detention. Coakley v. State , 43 So. 3d 790, 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). But if the petition attacks the validity of a judgment or sentence, the court that entered the judgment and imposed the sentence has jurisdiction. Torres v. State , 208 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Dismissal, rather than transfer, of petitions is proper if they seek:
the kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first motion was filed.
Baker v. State , 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004). Though his petition is meritless, D'Amico's claim sought the type of relief available through a postconviction motion in the sentencing court. Transfer to the sentencing court was not appropriate because, if considered as a motion for postconviction relief, the petition would be untimely, successive, and raise claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal—any one of which would be sufficient for dismissal. It was, therefore, properly dismissed by the trial court.
AFFIRMED .
Rowe and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.