Damiani v. Lobasco

13 Citing cases

  1. Scalfaro v. Rudloff

    934 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    We begin with the principles that control in this area. Under Pennsylvania law, the power of revocation is a power that the settlor of the trust reserves. In re Trust ofKaufmann, 460 Pa. 24, 331 A.2d 209, 211 (1975); Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (1951). A settlor may revoke a trust, if and to the extent that power has been reserved in the trust instrument.

  2. Brenneman v. Bennett

    420 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    We note parenthetically that several jurisdictions have found that where the settlor does reserve the power to sell or otherwise dispose of the trust res and retain the proceeds he has effectively retained the power of revocation. United Building Loan Association v. Garrett, supra; Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158 S.W. 624 (1913); Trenton Banking Co. v. Howard, 187 A. 569 (Ct. of Chancery N.J. 1936); Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d 268 (1951). See also A. Scott, Trusts § 330.1 (3d ed. 1967); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 1000 (2d ed. 1965).

  3. F.E. McGillick Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    30 T.C. 1130 (U.S.T.C. 1958)

    There are conflicting provisions in the deed of trust. The entire instrument must be considered and effect given to all of its reconcilable parts in order to carry out the intent of the settlor as expressed in the language which he used: Wolters Estate, 359 Pa. 520, 525; Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 6, 7. The entire estate embraced by the deed of trust of January 6, 1937, is committed irrevocably by the settlor to the charitable uses therein provided, subject only to the payment of expenses, charges, legacies and annuities which he has directed.

  4. F. E. McGillick Co. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue

    30 T.C. 1130 (U.S.T.C. 1958)

    There are conflicting provisions in the deed of trust. The entire instrument must be considered and effect given to all of its reconcilable parts in order to carry out the intent of the settlor as expressed in the language which he used: Wolters Estate, 359 Pa. 520, 525; Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 6, 7. The entire estate embraced by the deed of trust of January 6, 1937, is committed irrevocably by the settlor to the charitable uses therein provided, subject only to the payment of expenses, charges, legacies and annuities which he has directed.

  5. Biggins v. Shore

    565 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1989)   Cited 8 times
    Stating that death or incapacity of either party terminates an offer

    The rule with respect to insurance companies for a long time has been likewise opposite to that of the Second Restatement of Contracts.Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d 268 (1951); Thompson v. Fitzgerald, 344 Pa. 90, 22 A.2d 658 (1941); Second Restatement of Trusts, §§ 330-331. Comment c. to § 311 of the Restatement of Contracts Second reads as follows:

  6. Trust Agreement of Kaufmann

    331 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1975)   Cited 8 times
    In Kaufmann, the supreme court held that where a trust agreement provided that amendments by the settlor were effective only if delivered to the trustees, any amendment could not be effective unless actually delivered to the trustees, regardless of the intent of the settlor when he executed the trust amendment.

    Pennsylvania and general trust law clearly provide that a revocable or amendable trust can only be revoked or amended in accordance with the terms of the trust. Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d 268 (1951); Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946); Reese's Estate, 317 Pa. 473, 177 A. 792 (1935); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331(1), comment d (1959). See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330(1) comment j (1959).

  7. Potteiger v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.

    227 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1967)   Cited 11 times
    In Potteiger v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Company, 424 Pa. 418, 424, 227 A.2d 864, 869 (1967), we recently reiterated the definition of "principal defendant" set forth in Bird v. Sleppy, 265 Pa. 295, 108 A. 618 (1919), as "one who has an interest in the controversy presented by the bill, and whose presence is requisite to the complete or partial adjudication of the controversy."

    Recently, in La Rocca Trust, 411 Pa. 633, 636, 192 A.2d 409 (1963), we said: "As a general rule, the jurisdiction of litigation involving the reformation of written instruments is in the court of common pleas sitting in equity." For over a century, common pleas courts in this Commonwealth have exercised equitable jurisdiction to reform or set aside inter vivos trust instruments: Browne, for use, v. Weir, 5 S. R. 400 (1819); Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa. 269 (1874); Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528, (1884); Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380 (1933); Irish v. Irish, 361 Pa. 410, 65 A.2d 345 (1949); Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d 268 (1951); Schellentrager v. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952). Until the passage of the Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1384, § 1, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2253 (a) (now repealed), amending the Orphans' Court Act of 1917 (Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 363, § 9 (n)), the jurisdiction over trusts inter vivos in the common pleas courts was exclusive and such trusts were beyond the jurisdiction of the orphans' courts.

  8. Curry Appeal

    134 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1957)   Cited 9 times

    This holding of Frederick's Appeal has been consistently distinguished by this Court and we have expressly limited that case to its particular facts. Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 5-6, 79 A.2d 268 (1951); Rynd v. Baker, 193 Pa. 486, 492-93, 44 A. 551 (1899); Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531, 537-38, 40 A. 1096 (1898). There is no vitality remaining in this doctrine of Frederick's Appeal and its following; these cases do not declare the law in Pennsylvania.

  9. Forrish v. Kennedy

    105 A.2d 67 (Pa. 1954)   Cited 22 times

    ance with the defendants' own standards, the plaintiff was a duly certified member in good standing of that organization and, as such, one of the intended beneficiaries of the trust. If the appellants can now assert some omnipotent power to strip him of his benefits after he has complied with each and every condition, then the purposes of the trust can be readily frustrated at the whim or caprice of the trustees. That the settlors of the trust never intended to confer such powers is patent and a court of equity can always intervene to control such an unreasonable exercise of discretion: In Brown's Appeal, 345 Pa. 373, 379, 29 A.2d 52, we said that "While a court cannot control the discretion conferred upon a trustee it may compel him to exercise it in good faith and within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, and it may also interpose where he fails to use his judgment at all because of a mistaken view, either of fact or law, as to the extent of his powers or duties: . . .". See also Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 7, 79 A.2d 268. The decree is affirmed at the cost of appellants.

  10. In re Fellman

    604 A.2d 263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    In Pennsylvania, it is well settled that a settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust in accordance with the terms of the trust. In re Insurance Trust Agreement of Kaufmann, 460 Pa. 24, 28, 331 A.2d 209, 211 (1975); Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 6, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (1951). A settlor has the power to revoke a trust if and to the extent he has reserved such power by the terms of the trust.