Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J06-01968
Swager, J.
On June 23, 2008, the Contra Costa County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered an order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for T.H. (born May 2003). Damian H. (Father) challenges that order, objecting to the adequacy of the reunification services and visitation offered or provided by the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau). As discussed below, we find no merit in his claims and deny his petition on the merits.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(1)(A), bars review on appeal if the aggrieved party has not made a timely writ challenge to an order setting a hearing for selection and implementation of a permanent plan. The statute also encourages the appellate court to determine all such writ petitions on their merits, as we do here. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(B).)
Background
The Bureau initiated these proceedings in November 2006. The underlying facts and the proceedings leading up to the dispositional order are summarized in our prior opinion that affirmed the dispositional order as to Teresa M. (Mother) whose appeal challenged the validity of rulings denying her visitation and reunification services. That order, entered August 20, 2007, directed that Father receive reunification services and adopted the Bureau’s proposed case plan for him. The plan essentially called for Father to engage in individual counseling and to continue participating, both individually and jointly with T.H., in attachment therapy he had already begun. The order further provided for visitation consisting of at least two 1-hour visits per month, to be supervised if the Bureau deemed it appropriate, and frequent telephone contact.
(In re T.H.; Contra Costa County, Children & Family Services Bureau v. Teresa M. (Aug. 27, 2008, A119557) [nonpub. opn.].)
The juvenile court conducted a status review hearing on December 13, 2007, which was, essentially, the 12-month permanency hearing. On that date the court continued T.H. in long-term foster care and terminated Father’s reunification services. (See § 366.21, subd. (g)(3).) The court continued Father’s visitation at a minimum of two 1-hour visits per month, to be supervised at the Bureau’s discretion.
The hearing on December 13, 2007, occurred almost 12 months from the date T.H. entered foster care, that is, the date falling 60 days after the Bureau initially removed T.H. from the physical custody of Mother, the custodial parent. (See §§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21 subd. (f).)
On May 8, 2008, Father filed a modification petition pursuant to section 388, requesting that T.H. be placed in his care, or “[a]t the very least” that the court order the implementation of “a transitional period . . . with the ultimate goal of return.” After hearing testimony on the issue, the juvenile court denied Father’s petition on June 5.
On June 23, 2008, the juvenile court conducted the 18-month status review hearing. (See § 366.22.) At the conclusion of this hearing the court continued the minor’s out-of-home placement, reduced Father’s visitation to a minimum of one supervised visit per month, and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26. This petition followed. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).)
Discussion
A. Timeliness of the Notice of Intent
The Bureau urges dismissal of the petition because Father filed the prerequisite notice of intent one day late.
Both parents were present at the hearing on June 23, 2008, and the juvenile court gave both the oral advisement required by rule 5.600(b)—including the seven-day deadline for filing a notice of intent. (See rules 5.600(c), 8.450(e)(4)(A).) The following day, however, the clerk of the court mailed both parties a written notice of the hearing. This notice gave the parties the 12-day deadline for filing a notice of intent, which applies only to parties who were not present at the hearing setting a section 366.26 hearing. (Rules 5.600(b), 8.450(e)(4)(B).) Given the potential for confusion engendered by these conflicting advisements, we deem it appropriate under the circumstances to decide Father’s petition on the merits. (See rule 8.450(b), (d).)
We granted the Bureau’s request for an extension of time to file opposition briefing, counsel for T.H. has raised no objection to the timeliness of Father’s notice of intent, and we have not stayed the section 366.26 hearing pending our decision.
B. Reunification Services
Father argues he was denied adequate reunification services. Noting that it was not his conduct that led to the minor’s detention, but Mother’s, he insists there was no evidence that he himself was “unable to provide care for [T.H.] if he received the appropriate services.” He claims appropriate services in his case would have been “a specialized parenting class and a referral for understanding [] childhood trauma.” He suggests the Bureau not only failed to offer such services, but instead required that he engage in services—for sex offenses and domestic violence—that were inappropriate and unnecessary.
Initially we observe that our review in this writ proceeding is properly limited to the order of June 23, 2008, which set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26. (See § 366.26, subd. (l); rule 8.450(b).) Father cannot effectively challenge earlier rulings of the juvenile court included in appealable and now final orders. (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811 (Steve J.).) Such orders include, in this case, the dispositional order of August 20, 2007, and the status review order of December 13, 2007. (See Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 259.) It was the dispositional order of August 2007 that adopted Father’s case plan, and it was the order of December 2007 that terminated Father’s services and found that the Bureau had, up to that point, offered or provided Father with reasonable services. If Father had objections to the appropriateness of his case plan or the adequacy of his reunification services, his remedy was to take a timely appeal from those orders, and this he failed to do.
The order of June 5, 2008, denying Father’s section 388 petition after an evidentiary hearing, was also an appealable order now final. (See In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 702–703.)
In any event, we see no merit in Father’s objections. Reunification services are deemed reasonable when the evidence shows: the case plan identified the problems leading to the loss of custody (or, in this case, the plan identified the problems precluding placement with a noncustodial parent); the social services agency offered services designed to remedy those problems; and, the agency maintained reasonable contact with the parent and made reasonable efforts to assist that parent in areas in which compliance proved difficult. (See In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) When the juvenile court has found that the agency offered or provided reasonable reunification services, we review the record for substantial evidence supporting that finding. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) At the conclusion of the 12-month permanency hearing, the juvenile court has the discretion to terminate a parent’s reunification services even though it does not set a hearing under section 366.26 at that time. (See In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 561–562, 564–566.)
Here the record shows that this proceeding was, in fact, precipitated by Mother’s conduct. By the time of its inception in November 2006, however, Father had been a noncustodial parent for some time and his contact with T.H. had been limited to visitation regulated by the Contra Costa County family law court. Moreover, the Bureau’s petition alleged jurisdictional facts against Father in addition to those involving Mother’s conduct. There is no indication that the Bureau improperly pursued or persisted with these allegations, which concerned sexual molestation and domestic violence. The Bureau withdrew its requirement of domestic violence services when its own assessment concluded such services were unnecessary. Similarly, it withdrew its recommendation calling for Father to engage in sex offender treatment as soon as the juvenile court dismissed the allegation of sexual molestation.
About one month after the juvenile court issued its jurisdictional order in June 2007, the Bureau completed its dispositional report. At that time the Bureau identified a new concern expressed by Father’s attachment therapist. That is, Father appeared to “lack basic insight” into child development and age-appropriate expectations. More critically, Father appeared “unable” to understand, despite “repeated discussions,” that T.H. had suffered severe trauma during her formative years and that as a result she needed special long-term care. The Bureau had already referred Father to individual therapy and attachment therapy. These services, in which the court ordered Father to participate when it adopted the Bureau’s case plan, were designed to assist him in gaining insight into childhood trauma and to provide him with specialized parenting training. They were, in effect, the very services that Father now claims the Bureau failed to provide.
In its report prepared for the status review hearing in December 2007, the Bureau stated Father had consistently insisted he did not need the required individual therapy and had, after the dispositional hearing, refused this service. Father had additionally refused to participate in a psychological evaluation, which the Bureau had recommended to gain insight into Father’s difficulties and tailor its services accordingly. While Father had consistently participated in the attachment therapy, the therapist providing that treatment reported that, after more than 30 sessions, Father had made only “minimal” progress in his parenting abilities and his understanding of the minor’s special needs. For these reasons the Bureau concluded that further services were unlikely to result in reunification and recommended their termination.
In light of the foregoing principles and evidence, we conclude the Bureau proposed, and the juvenile court adopted, a case plan that was reasonably and appropriately designed to provide services that would enable Father to reunify with T.H. We conclude further that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Bureau offered or provided Father with reasonable services up to the time of the status review hearing in December 2007. We conclude finally that the court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father’s services at the 12-month permanency hearing due to his minimal progress.
C. Visitation
Father urges that the Bureau improperly limited his visitation to supervised visits and therapeutic visitation, whereas it should have facilitated visitation “at least two to three times a week for a number of hours . . . in a natural setting.” Father suggests the Bureau improperly limited visitation on the basis of its allegation, ultimately dismissed, that he had sexually molested T.H.’s half-sibling.
Again, the juvenile court’s dispositional order of August 2007 and its status review order of December 2007, in which the court made its crucial rulings regarding Father’s visitation, were appealable orders that are now final. Challenges to rulings made in those orders are hence beyond the scope of our present review. (See Steve J., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.)
Moreover, Father’s objections again lack merit. Visitation orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756–757 (Jennifer G.).) Here the record indicates the Bureau arranged for Father to have weekly one- or two-hour supervised visits from the inception of the case in November 2006 until May 2007. In its dispositional report completed in July 2007 the Bureau noted it had changed this arrangement to weekly visitation in the setting of attachment therapy, but had done so only because T.H. had begun to exhibit behaviors indicating that she was having “significant difficulty . . . before, during and after [the] visits.” In its subsequent status review report, completed in early December 2007, the Bureau acknowledged that Father had requested more, unsupervised visitation, and also that T.H., with one exception, no longer exhibited regressive behaviors before, during, or after her visits with Father. It reported, however, that Father had responded to defiant behavior by T.H. with punitive discipline, and that he had continued to do so despite redirection from the therapist. Given such persistent inability to understand T.H.’s trauma and special needs, and Father’s refusal to undergo a psychological evaluation in order to help the Bureau better assist him with his difficulty, the Bureau was unable to recommend a change in visitation.
In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude the juvenile court acted well within its discretion to the extent it limited Father’s visitation in its dispositional order of August 2007 and continued that limited visitation in its status review order of December 2007.
We turn finally to the juvenile court’s most recent visitation ruling, included in the order of June 23, 2008, that is presently subject to our review. As noted above, that ruling reduced Father’s visitation to one supervised visit per month. Our review of the ruling is, again, to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. (Jennifer G., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756–757.)
In its report prepared for the 18-month status review hearing, the Bureau stated that Father continued to show minimal progress despite some 12 months of “intensive therapeutic visits.” Because he still “maintained his own agenda” concerning visitation and “resisted integration of any material that would promote an increased level of understanding towards [T.H.’s] needs,” the Bureau recommended that any continued visitation be limited to one supervised visit per month.
In making its ruling, the juvenile court essentially adopted the Bureau’s recommendation. In light of the foregoing evidence of Father’s continued failure to gain any positive benefit from the therapeutic visits, we cannot say it abused its discretion in doing so.
Disposition
The request for stay is denied and the petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) The decision is final in this court immediately. (Rule 8.264(b)(3).)
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.